The downfall of a captured state

Moldova parliament (CC) www.flickr.com

More than four months have passed since power peacefully transitioned (in mid-June 2019) to the coalition, while the former ruling party – the Democratic Party under the oligarchic leadership of Vladimir Plahotniuc – went into opposition. Initially, the coalition claimed the country is “free” from oligarchic influence. However, there are voices from within the ACUM bloc and elsewhere that question the coalition’s ability to successfully accomplish its de-oligarchisation agenda.

Opposition instincts

The ruling coalition has begun what it calls the “cleansing” of state institutions and the public sector from malicious practices in an effort to dismantle the oligarchic pyramid of power. Different institutions have undergone an informal lustration process (e.g. anti-corruption, prosecution, etc.) that castigated former allies of Plahotniuc. The legislature lifted the immunity of five MPs that represent the core of the oligarchic regime – Shor Party and the former ruling Democratic Party. Three of them are investigated in the banking fraud case and the other two for deviations committed in the 2013 privatisation of the Chișinău International Airport. Consequently, this has led to an implosion of the former potent power vertical. Yet the governing coalition, still led by their oppositional instincts, often blames the presence of oligarchic interference when the reforms are delayed or fail.

The authorities readily confess their mistakes or constrains. This allows them to sow more realistic expectations with the public. Communication with domestic and international media is frequently used to promote the government’s agenda or to mitigate the errors. Engaging with audiences, via live sessions on social networks, is still the main mode of direct communication by Prime Minister Maia Sandu (via Facebook) and President Igor Dodon (primarily via Odnoklassniki).

Inside the reform agenda, the justice sector and the fight against corruption are combined as the top priority. In order to deliver any substantial policy outcomes, the government is going to need time, as well as political stability and mandate-longevity. Meanwhile, co-operation with external partners such as the EU, US and Russia has intensified. Through an active foreign policy, more financial support is being sought which could help offset the complicated production of “successful reforms” at home.

It is important to note that Moldova experienced political change through democratic means, even if it occurred amid a political and constitutional crisis provoked by an oligarchy-driven struggle for power. Taking a look at the wider region, this situation bears little resemblance to the well-engineered “new faces” paradigm which has brought Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his Servant of the People party to power after this year’s Ukrainian election. Nor are there any similarities with the 2018 Armenian Velvet Revolution that completely swept the old kleptocratic parties from the decision-making process. Within these comparisons, Moldova seems like a less spectacular case of political transformation in the Eastern Partnership region. However, what is common in all these cases is the struggle against the old systems: the corrupt oligarchic and kelptocratic ones.

The degree of political change in Moldova, nonetheless, is less dramatic in comparison. On the one hand, the society is strongly polarised and it injects geopolitical preferences in its voting decisions (e.g. pro-West vs. pro-Russia). This is a very difficult task for a national leader looking to unite the country. Recent polls suggest that popularity for the main political leaders – Dodon, Sandu and Andrei Năstase – is below 30 per cent. This means that Moldova lacks a figure like Zelenskyy or Nikol Pashinyan who have the ability to unite.

On the other hand, if there were to be early elections, none of the current governing parties would manage to obtain a parliamentary majority. The pro-Russian socialists or the pro-EU ACUM bloc would need a coalition partner to rule with certain stability. At the same time, a stable government depends on the personalities within the coalition. In Ukraine and Armenia, the new ruling classes have a complete majority in their legislature and total control over the executive. This means a surplus of decision-making power and a prosperous terrain to unconditionally conduct the most sensitive reforms. Such a political comfort does not exist in Moldova’s coalition-based government, and may in fact be good for the country’s democracy.

Old habits die hard

Even the most well-intentioned government would be unable to perform miracles in such a short period of time, especially when taking into account the several urgent issues left behind by their predecessor. Inflated public expenditure as a result of unfeasible populist projects overstretched the state budget. It did not help that EU aid was suspended in 2018 due to failed reforms (on money-laundering and anti-corruption) and democratic backsliding. The ineffectiveness of the banking fraud investigation (which saw the disappearance of one billion US dollars from Moldovan banks in 2014) led to no asset recovery and allowed the preliminary sentencing of businessman Ilan Șhor to avoid prison; in fact, he subsequently entered parliament, and even fled the country after the oligarchic regime fell. Many state institutions, under pressure, adopted controversial decisions and thus discredited themselves. Crushed by a complicated election system and other limitations, the democratic institutions suffered a major breakdown, thus undermining the fairness of the February 2019 election.

The first steps taken by the Socialist-ACUM coalition matched the demands expressed in the declaration titled “On Moldova as a captured state” adopted on June 8th 2019. This brought increased political pressure as the ruling coalition worked to remove the heads of key positions such as the intelligence service, central electoral committee, the prosecutor office and the anti-corruption centre. Several other institutions like the national bank, the audio-visual co-ordinating council, the energy regulatory agency, the prosecutor’s office, as well as the magistrate councils, have retained their leaderships which were appointed during the oligarchic regime and thus remain heavily mistrusted. The coalition perceives these institutions as Plahotniuc’s unconquered fortresses.

The goal is to depoliticise every corner of the state system. State secretaries (formerly deputy-minister positions) who expressed political loyalty towards Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party were sacked. Similar cleansing acts took place within the diplomatic representation abroad. Sandu demanded that ministers assess their staff and remove those who “do not act for the benefit of citizens” or commit acts of sabotage against the government.

Despite the harsh attitude against the former government’s control of state institutions, the coalition has yet been unable to restrain its own instincts of politicisation. Examples include the information and security service and the anti-corruption centre, which are now headed by people affiliated with the Socialist Party. A more dramatic situation unfolded around the appointment of the constitutional court’s six judges. Two candidates were appointed, but the legal procedures were neglected, while at least three of the six judges openly backed the ruling political force. Finally, the new head of the constitutional court – Vladimir Turcan – was, not so long ago, one of the leading voices of the socialists within parliament. These cases question the willingness, and the ability, of the Socialist-ACUM coalition to break old habits and to truly invest in independent institutions.

Challenges ahead

During the end of summer, the government and parliament showed some dedication to moving forward with the reform agenda. The concern about Plahotniuc’s potential to engineer sabotage, as well as the huge public demand for swift results, limited the government’s room for manoeuvre.

The coalition should weather the late-October local elections. The by-election for four liberated seats in the legislature will also take place under the mixed voting’s principle of single-member constituency. This came about as a result of the decision by Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase to hold onto their jobs as prime minister and minister of interior respectively, while the fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc gave up his parliament seat from abroad. The independent candidate Viorel Melnic renounced his seat as well. The elections will take place approximately five months since the coalition came to power. The results will assess the political mood of the county since democracy has resurfaced.

Nevertheless, the government needs a transfusion of stability which can be achieved if the new coalition agreement, sealed in the middle of September, will last long enough. Anydecisions the government makes needs to persuade rural voters, where democracy is often seen as an empty concept, especially if it does not come with higher social payments or other material benefits. Additionally, the political spectrum, thanks to the wind of democratisation, is showing signs of revitalisation on both the political left and right. On the right, the pro-unification with the Romanian political party – Save Bessarabia Union (USB) – is condemning the ACUM bloc for governing with the pro-Russian socialists. The pro-Romanian stance is voiced including from within the ACUM bloc by such MPs like Octavian Țîcu, who broke ACUM’s homogeneity when decided to run in the local elections in Chișinău against his colleague and minister of interior, Andrei Năstase. On the centre-left, the Moscow-linked former mayor of Bălți, Renato Usatîi, and his Our Party and the re-activated Communist Party will certainly challenge the Socialist Party in power.

In terms of reform, the coalition’s energy is channelled towards the justice system. It can produce a positive chain reaction in other policy areas, qualitatively transforming the public and private sectors and improving the public confidence in the state. The reform includes the following: 1) an evaluation mechanism to select judges; 2) the rationalisation of the fight against corruption; and, 3) a multi-layered filter to appoint the prosecutor general. Firstly, a mechanism to evaluate judges will target all three levels of the court system. A similar concept will be used to assess the prosecutors. According to the minister of justice Olesea Stamate, European experts who served as judges or prosecutors in the past should form one-third of the future 18-member evaluating committee. Secondly, the anti-corruption prosecutor’s office has to deal with the large corruption cases, with smaller corruption cases transferred to the anti-corruption centre. Previously, the prime minister suggested establishing a special office that would coordinate the justice and anti-corruption reforms. Thirdly, the next prosecutor general will go through more filters of selection, with a starting point at the ministry of justice, after the prosecutor law was amended. The superior prosecutor council will continue to participate in the selection, but only based on the final candidates filtered by the ministry. Attracting civil society and lawyer associations will infuse meritocracy, as well as the elimination of the criterion regarding the mandatory five years of prosecutor experience.

East-West balance

In relation to foreign affairs, the coalition has to survive the challenge of its geopolitical dichotomy. Restoring relations with major regional stakeholders is what matters the most. Yet the socialists, through the voice of President Dodon, popularise the idea that Moldova will not become a member of the EU any time soon. Although it sounds pragmatic, this is also discouraging the slightly revitalised pro-EU mood within society. At the same time, Dodon is a consecrated promoter of the “balanced external policy” which entails a strategic partnership with Russia. Sandu has openly admitted that the ACUM bloc is dealing with European integration while the socialists are good at exploring opportunities from Russia (e.g. gas prices, trade, migration issues). The distribution of responsibility represents a way out of a dangerously sensitive policy area. Even if the EU remains the top priority and the European budget assistance is restored, with the macro-financial assistance available soon, the socialists naturally lean towards the East. They like the idea of activating co-operation within the Commonwealth of Independent States and conducting an informal dialogue with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. In fact, too close a rapprochement between the socialists and the Kremlin entails medium and long-term risks, which could limit Dodon’s ability to exercise political control over the security sector including the ministry of defence, the intelligence services and the bureau co-ordinating the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.

The Socialist-ACUM coalition needs to implement the new engaging deal, without which the internal cohesion of the ACUM will inevitably strain. The latter already contains several rebellious voices that justifiably fear the indirect influence Moscow has through the political empowerment of the socialists. In this respect, such warnings require preventative action instead of rejection or trivialisation. In parallel, overcoming the oligarchic legacy should be further prioritised. The government also has to deal with the critical structural shortcomings that make the state vulnerable to vested interests.

In the end, genuine shock therapy may be needed to make the institutions function properly. The recently initiated justice reform could become the favourable solution, thus enabling that the necessary checks-and-balances are in place. However, without a stable, coherent and efficient government, real political will, incisive public scrutiny and active conditionality-based external assistance, any of the changes will be, at best, cosmetic.

Denis Cenusa is a PhD candidate and researcher at the Institute of Political Science at the Giessen University in Germany. He is an associate expert at the “Expert-Grup” think tank in Moldova and a contributor at IPN News Agency in Moldova since 2015.

Listen for more: Check out the Talk Eastern Europe podcast episode 19: Strange Bedfellows in Moldova.

ACUM, government, Moldova