The Tallinn question

Border between Estonia and Russia in Narva. Photo: Shutterstock

Conversations about European security usually start with an update on the latest Trump decision that might negatively influence NATO, the organization that for decades has been a failsafe against an increasingly belligerent Russia. The Alliance’s original political goal mentioned “keeping the Germans down, Russians out and the French in”. With many changes in the US, we might for the first time have to consider how to keep the Americans from casting doubts on NATO’s credibility. President Trump’s recent remarks questioning US intervention in case of an attack on one of the allies if they do not spend at least five per cent of GDP on defence widened the already substantial foreign policy gap between the EU and US. With recent remarks on the “ocean between us” guaranteeing American safety from the consequences of a Russian attack, sceptics are asking about the cohesion of the Alliance in such a situation. This is very disconcerting given the fact that the Russian appetite to test NATO’s resolve and reinvigorate the historical fantasy of reclaiming once occupied countries remains a constant “feature, not a bug”.

In 2016, NATO’s worst nightmare was not a hypothetical – it was a war game with a clock ticking down to defeat. Russian forces, simulated across multiple RAND Corporation scenarios, needed just 60 hours to reach the gates of Tallinn and Riga, effectively decapitating NATO’s Eastern Flank before breakfast on day three. Fast forward to 2025 and the script has changed – but has the ending? As new deployments, rearmament strategies, and shifting geopolitical tensions reshape the region, the question is not just whether NATO is ready to fight. Instead, it is whether NATO would be fighting in the first place. If anything, the prospect of withholding joint military action in 2025 might be more dangerous than the alarm bells of 2016.

The commander of the Estonian Defence Forces mentioned that without a defeat in Ukraine, Russia may attack one of the Baltic states in 2024-25. At the time of writing this forecast has, luckily, not been proven correct but it does raise concerns. Firstly, even if it is “stuck” in Ukraine, would Russia attempt something like that? Secondly, what would be the nature of such a move? Would it be a brief raid across territory within the scope of horizontal escalation or a major offensive with the aim of holding territory? These are essential questions not only for Baltic security but also for EU and NATO solidarity as well. Exploring the evidentiary basis for assessing a prospective Russian attack on the Baltics and making forecasts about Russian foreign policy is a topic in itself. However, the probability of such an attack cannot be disregarded. This is especially true if such scenarios have already been presented to the broader public and the build-up of Russian forces along the Finnish border is causing concerns amongst experts. While by 2027 Russia could mirror at least some of its 2022 land capacities, European states would need to invest close to one trillion US dollars within a period of give or take a decade in order to replace US assets within NATO if Washington decides to abandon the Alliance.

Yet, why is this conundrum called the “Tallinn question”? Ultimately, this outlying capital is the best litmus test to consider whether NATO and EU would honour their Alliance obligations to defend a member state in case of Russian aggression. Although Estonia hosts NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and has provided invaluable experience in countering digital hybrid threats, Tallinn, proverbially, may still be considered “a bridge too far” by major transatlantic stakeholders to actually fight for.

The “not my problem” problem

One of the strongest levers in the past was public pressure to react against aggression. But today? Would populations in Western Europe or the US support going to war over small countries they cannot find on a map? Leaders might hesitate if they fear political blowback at home. A Baltic war could be framed as “someone else’s problem”, especially if misinformation campaigns muddy the waters about who started it.

Growing public apathy is changing the societal view on potential military action: moving from the logic of collective security to the logic of member states minimizing individual risks. As a result, the “Tallinn question”, the issue of whether NATO would be willing and capable of defending its small and peripherally located ally, cannot be answered only through the deliberations of experts and policymakers. The decision of European NATO countries to send troops to the Alliance’s Eastern border (and potentially die) or express solidarity and proclaim “we are all Estonians” is not only up to politicians and experts. It is up to the general public as well, as in many EU member states this attitude is not necessarily clear. This translates into a very practical challenge. If Spain, for example, cares somewhat less for Ukraine than, say, Finland does, how could Madrid be convinced in this scenario? Moreover, who among the leaders at the EU level would talk about the need to defend the Baltics and explain it to the general public?

Without essentializing, one can say that “the West” has a low tolerance for military losses (own citizens’ deaths) and a high capacity for society’s collective action. At the same time, Russian society has a low capacity for collective action and very high loss tolerance. The general public within the EU has the right to ask questions, however unapologetic and awkward they may be, in order to uphold accountability and democratic principles. EU politicians (and by extension NATO politicians as well) owe them such an explanation, an explanation in which democracy and security are not juxtaposed but are indivisible elements. However cynical it may sound, the comparative value of citizens’ lives in the “West” as opposed to Russia is reflected even in a different approach to military operations. The survivability of infantry dismounts and military vehicles are not much of a priority in the Russian military approach.

One for all, all for one?

Officially, under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. But in practice, several political, military and psychological barriers could complicate or even delay NATO’s response to an attack on a Baltic state. NATO is a coalition of 31 countries, each with its own government, politics and strategic priorities. Unanimity is required to invoke Article 5. If a member – say, Hungary or Turkey – chooses to obstruct or delay consensus, NATO’s response could be fragmented or fatally slow. Some members may question whether the conflict is worth the risks, especially if they see it as a “local issue” or are economically dependent on Russia.

With rising geopolitical tensions, especially in Eastern Europe, concerns over the US commitment to NATO’s defence obligations have grown. This leads to two problems:

• Will the US activate Article 5 in case one of its NATO or EU allies is attacked?
• In light of the US decoupling from the EU, will Brussels jointly defend a member state that is being attacked, or uphold Article 5 even with no participation from the US?

A negative answer to any of these questions would not only signal an end of the transatlantic partnership but also place the EU cooperative security system under very substantial strain. Concerns about the consequences of US security guarantees to the Baltics are not new. The fear of US entrapment in a confrontation with Russia due to the reckless behaviour of one of the Baltic states has quite a long tradition. Yet, the Baltics’ approach to Russia was always cautious, apprehensive of security risks and coordinated with the US and/or EU allies. Moreover, the current situation is different: rather than allies forcing an agenda on a powerful patron, it is the patron that is doubting whether it would uphold its promises of security guarantees.

The European gambit

In 2014-15 the RAND Corporation’s analysis showed not only that the Baltics could very quickly fall to Russian occupation but also envisaged several practical solutions to preventing this scenario. Beefing up the NATO/EU military presence or the Baltic states’ own capacities is possible and less costly than the fallout from failing to defend an ally. Yet, even if the EU decides to defend the Baltics without US help, the obligation to defend its ally runs up against several challenges of feasibility. For example, even if the US “decouples” from the EU, it still wants it to buy increasing amounts of American military equipment, creating tensions with Brussels’s own (re)armament plans. For the EU, decoupling from US weapons imports will be difficult. After 2020, the US share in the EU’s armaments imports became even larger, amounting to over 60 per cent. A major factor to consider is the continued reliance of the EU on US platforms in long-range electronic warfare, MRLS, precision munition, and long-range target detection. The military logistics of EU forces also depend on US capabilities. All this makes it difficult – but not impossible – for the EU to defend the Baltics without US support.

Currently, Baltic countries have some of the highest defence spending rates among EU member states. This is calculated as percentage of GDP, with Estonia pledging to commit five per cent of its GDP spending to defence. The military capacity-building programmes that they have launched may have enhanced specific land capabilities but the Baltics still depend on EU allies for providing naval and air assets, intelligence, and logistical support that could sustain their efforts. An unnerving argument has been made that the “Baltics were spared not by deterrence but by Putin’s priorities”, with his focus remaining on Ukraine. What happens if these priorities shift? Moreover, since 2022 Estonia has been providing almost all of its military hardware to Ukraine, leaving its own stocks depleted and dependent on external support. Even if the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit has shifted the organization’s approach to the Baltics from a “forward presence” to “forward defense”, the countries of the region would still require NATO/EU assistance.

The question remains whether the scaling up of the NATO Battle Groups in the Baltic – a necessity in the face of the prospective Russian threat – can be done without the US. The stationing of the German 45th Panzer Brigade in Lithuania is, hence, a welcome change in the right direction. Yet, the presence of a British brigade in Estonia, for example, has not materialized so far, while other EU/NATO members are de facto cautious in positioning troops and material in the Baltics.

The nuclear offering

While in the short and mid-term perspective Russia has the resources to continue the war in Ukraine, its exact intent in the Baltics is more difficult to discern: will it be limited to hybrid war, operations “below the escalation threshold”, or an actual military operation? In any case, the Baltics are likely to be a flashpoint.

Moreover, Russia knows how to play nuclear poker. A full NATO response could mean engaging Russian forces directly, raising the spectre of an escalation to nuclear war. Moscow could exploit this fear by swiftly occupying territory and then threatening nuclear retaliation if NATO intervenes. Would the US really risk New York for Narva? Many in Moscow – and possibly in Washington – might quietly bet on “no”. Even the prospect of nuclear blackmail might be met by the offering of the Baltics. The British and/or French offer to extend nuclear coverage to of all Europe is a welcome gesture. However, the question remains whether the British and French nuclear assets can compensate for the “withdrawal” of the US nuclear capabilities.

Why bother about Tallinn?

The general public within EU member states may still not be impressed by these concerns and still ask why bother defending Tallinn? The visceral reason number one is the following: the rapid expansion of Russian GPS jamming activity in North-Eastern Europe and particularly the Baltic region. As of early 2025, over 50 per cent of the airspace above Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been the subject of persistent GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) interference, affecting both civilian and military platforms. Bad flyers on civilian flights now have one more reason to be concerned. For the military, the main concern is that such jamming operations – originating from Kaliningrad, Pskov and possibly naval assets in the Baltic Sea – degrade the effectiveness of precision-guided munitions, delay ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) operations, and threaten the integrity of NATO’s C4ISR networks. In a live conflict, such jamming could cripple NATO’s ability to coordinate air support, execute deep strikes, and even conduct basic manoeuvre operations across the theatre.

While Tallinn has long been viewed as a geopolitical flashpoint, it must now be recognized as a digitally degraded battlespace-in-waiting. Russia’s electronic warfare systems, particularly its Krasukha-4, R-330Zh, and Tobol EW suites, are designed to operate in this exact environment – where jamming is not just a prelude to kinetic action, but a core component of hybrid warfare doctrine. In a future conflict, whoever controls Tallinn will not just hold territory – they will control the signal. And right now, Russia’s already dialling in.

The visceral reason number two are the attacks on critical infrastructure in the Baltics, ranging from damage to underwater internet cables to the new practice of Russian military vessels escorting “shadow fleet” tankers transporting oil across the Baltic Sea. Attempts made by the Estonian authorities to seize some of these vessels led to a chain reaction of Russian SU35 fighter jets scaring off Estonian coast guards, only for them to be chased away by F-16s. Bluntly, if one wants to have a stable internet at home, it might well make sense to protect Tallinn. Finding an adequate response to such sabotage attempts is a difficult task and significantly depends on Russia’s willingness to enhance the military component in its trans-Baltic shipping.

Holding the line

NATO’s current force posture in the Baltics is often described as a “tripwire” – a small, multinational forward presence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania meant not to repel a Russian invasion, but to ensure that any attack would trigger a broader NATO response. The idea is simple: if you kill NATO troops, you activate Article 5. It is deterrence by commitment, not by capability. But here is the problem: a tripwire is only effective if it is connected to a bomb. The risk? The tripwire becomes not a deterrent, but a martyrdom trap – a token sacrifice that buys time for debate in Brussels while the Baltics fall. For deterrence to work, the tripwire must be backed by credible firepower, logistical readiness, and above all, political will. If Moscow believes that NATO will hesitate, stall or fracture in the face of a rapid strike, the tripwire becomes a bluff. And in deterrence, a bluff once called becomes an invitation.

The tripwire forces deployed by EU member states – namely Poland, Germany and France – in the Baltic region are central to NATO’s forward deterrence posture. However, a critical question remains: in the event of a crisis, will these European contingents be left to operate independently, or will they receive meaningful and timely support from the United States? The US has less than 2000 military personnel in the Baltics (around 600 in Estonia). Regardless of various possible scenarios of the US “decoupling” from the EU, reliance on immediate US support may become shortsighted and calls may grow for the development of new and better coordination regarding existing EU military capabilities. Regardless of whether one believes in the “Revolution in Military Affairs” or has a more cautious approach, the evolution in drone technology, amongst others, also implies that the idea behind tripwire force may be outdated. If territory is lost (and the Baltics are lost), reconquering that territory might be extremely costly, meaning that a lean tripwire force may not be enough to diminish the Russian challenge.

Conclusions

Ultimately, defending Tallinn is not only a question of transatlantic security but also of societal resilience. Whichever cooperation format the EU and NATO would choose and however difficult the scaling up of military capabilities, as well as coordination, may be, the question of the relevance of all these measures to the broader public remains crucial. GPS distortion and attacks on critical infrastructure are the clearest arguments for illustrating Tallinn’s importance to the broader public. Even if, hopefully, Russian actions remain “below the level” of military operations and limited, for the sake of a better term, to hybrid threats, the governments of EU member states still need to make their citizens aware of Tallinn’s value in maintaining European security.

Objectively, EU member states have different foci when it comes to their foreign policies. Hence, the broader message of supporting Tallinn has to be broadcasted at the EU level, regardless of whether it is done by a national politician (i.e. Emmanuel Macron), a representative of an EU institution (i.e. Kaja Kallas), or a body representing the collective will of EU member states (i.e. the European Council). Probably, representatives of Scandinavian countries (as opposed to the Baltics or Poland) may be perceived as more “objective” messengers of Tallinn’s value for collective European security.

Small states, Estonia being one of them, defend themselves through being part of alliances or fulfilling some crucial function within the international cooperation system. In abstract terms, currently, we find ourselves in a situation where there is no guarantee that an alliance would actually fulfil its obligation. The task at hand is to convince the rest of the Alliance to aid a small member state. NATO should realize that by negating its promise of help, it undermines the trust that the Alliance would come to help even if a more powerful member state is threatened.

Alexander Strelkov has obtained his PhD (2015) from the Maastricht University. Currently, he holds the position of Senior lecturer in politics at Erasmus University College and coordinates the “Politics and International Relations Major”. In his academic work, Alexander has addressed EU foreign policy, political dynamics in the post-Soviet space and the Balkans, democracy and rule of law promotion as well as qualitative methods in order to provide policy-relevant insight to address contemporary challenges. He is expanding his professional interests in the domain of international political economy, scenario-building and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).

Natalia Wojtowicz-Zwarts is the Research Leader in Wargaming at RAND Europe based in the Netherlands office. She has previously worked at the Hague University (Safety and Security Management, Information Security Management) as Lecturer and Researcher. Before that, she has led a Wargaming, Modelling and Simulation project at the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence. Her interests include new strategies for European defence, cybernostalgia and combat modelling. 

Chris McGivern retired from UK policing in 2024. He spent most of his career working within the UK’s national security community, including international postings to The Netherlands, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and latterly Ukraine. He has guest lectured at University of Leiden and aspires to commence a PhD in the near future.

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Baltic Sea, Baltics, Eastern flank, Estonia, NATO