The evolution of the Alliance

We forget that at the beginning of NATO, in 1949, Germany was not a member and joined the Alliance in 1952. Today, in the Russian narrative, the question is why did NATO continue to exist after 1989? In order to answer this question, which is in fact the same as why the newly reunified Germany remained a member of NATO, we need to remember the situation in 1989.

Back then, there was George HW. Bush in the United States, François Mitterrand in France and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. All of these leaders were from a generation which took part and remembered the Second World War. The first threat they saw when the reunification of Germany began to be evident was what will happen with Germany in the future. It was not about Russia. It was about Germany. And this concern about the return of German warmongering was also a very sensitive issue in Moscow. When in November 1989 Helmut Kohl proposed the reunification of Germany, he said that the country had to be in the Atlantic alliance to respond to the fears of allies.

Kohl said this to France, the UK, Russia and the US in order to persuade them that Germany would stay a pacifist state and not seek to be strong and aggressive. In fact, in 1989, the new architecture of Europe was not created to respond to a potentially aggressive Soviet Union but rather to assuage fears of the comeback of an aggressive Germany. By signing the Moscow Treaty in 1990, the Soviet Union was fully conscious of its acceptance that the new Germany would be in the Alliance. For allies, including Mikhail Gorbachev, it was a guarantee that Germany would not become again what it had been twice in the 20th century. Thus, the Atlantic alliance after 1989 was not an alliance against Russia or the Soviet Union. It was to quell fears about what could happen with a united Germany. Vladimir Putin, and those who today try to explain Russia’s current actions by presenting those years as an original anti-Russian sin, are simply not telling the truth.

The second thing to note relates to the history of France’s relationship with NATO. This is namely the fact that France began its nuclear programme in 1954. Why? In 1954, we were not in a situation where we could make a durable peace treaty in Indochina after our defeat in Dien Bien Phu, and we realized that we could not count on the help of our allies. Whatever we think of French policy at that time, when decolonization was the order of the day, this lack of solidarity changed our perspective. The conditions of our departure from Indochina were also linked to what led the US to engage in a long war in Vietnam.

France then felt that there were situations where we could not count on the solidarity of our allies. Thus, we decided in 1954 to build our own atomic programme in order to challenge this apparent threat and the European Defence Community, which would have made it impossible for a European country to have an independent nuclear weapons programme.

Given the impact on international security following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, a strong and operational Alliance is more essential today than ever. However, it has to be said that operations by NATO or its members in a number of crisis theatres since 1990 have not always had the desired consequences. The American operations in Iraq (often mistaken for NATO operations despite the veto of Germany and France) and Afghanistan ended in failure. The operation in Libya, in which France had a leading role, played a dramatic role in the development of insecurity and the proliferation of jihadism from West Africa to Sinai. These failures and mistakes were perfectly exploited by the Kremlin.

NATO’s 75th anniversary is also about the evolution of an alliance of countries that initially used to dominate the world economy, but whose predominance is largely waning with the growth of the BRICS and the political aspirations that this engenders.

Thus, in my view, NATO’s future depends on three factors: 1) The way in which the conflict in Ukraine will end. If Ukraine were to fail and be unable to choose its future and its alliances freely, this would result in a major loss of credibility for NATO and a direct threat to its members. 2) The ability of European NATO members not to have to rely on the United States for their defence, to take account of feedback from Ukraine and to ensure the effective implementation of Article 47 of the Treaty on European Union. 3) The willingness of its members to face up to new threats such as economic and political influence, disinformation and destabilization operations. Changes concerning a newer member, Hungary, are also important. Budapest is playing a two-sided game and is undermining good faith cooperation within the Alliance.

This commentary is the result of a special seminar held May 21st 2024, co-organized by New Eastern Europe, LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University, and the East European Council. Co-funding is provided by NATO Public Diplomacy.

Jean-Yves Leconte is a former member of the French Senate, representing the constituency of French citizens living abroad from 2011 to 2023.

Europe, France, Germany, NATO, Russia