Romania and Moldova: Europe’s “special relationship”
Romania’s Klaus Iohannis and Moldova’s Maia Sandu have built a strong friendship that is leading Europe’s response to a neo-imperialist Russia.
November 20, 2024 - Hugo Blewett-Mundy - Articles and Commentary
Eighty-five years ago, a global war began that would lead to the creation of the greatest alliance the world has ever seen.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin Roosevelt transformed their nations’ kinship into an arsenal of democracy that overcame what many believed to be the insurmountable threat of fascism.
Today, a similar geopolitical dynamic is unfolding. Only this time, it is to be found on the south-eastern fringes of Europe instead of Downing Street or the White House. Moldova and Romania – two countries with common linguistic and historical roots – are leading the fight against Russian neo-imperialism thanks to the personal diplomatic initiative of their respective heads of state.
Relations between Romania and Moldova have not been straightforward since the fall of communism. The profound ideological and ethnic divisions that exist within Moldova make its societal and democratic cohesion particularly vulnerable to Moscow’s influence. Russian political proxies are adept at exploiting these fault lines to undermine Moldova’s national interests vis-à-vis its relationship with Romania.
But despite the challenges, Moldova’s President Maia Sandu and her Romanian counterpart Klaus Iohannis have struck up a close friendship that serves to advance European integration under Russia’s shadow. Iohannis chose to visit Moldova only days after Sandu’s inauguration in 2020 in a clear signal of support for her administration’s reform efforts.
Since then, Romania has used its status as an EU member to push forward Sandu’s pro-western agenda in Brussels. Bucharest was particularly instrumental in securing approval from the European Commission to start Moldova’s EU accession talks this summer. At a summit in Chisinău marking the Day of the Romanian Language, the Moldovan president described Iohannis as “a reliable partner”.
In the post-2022 global security environment, the rest of Europe should not overlook the bond between Romania and Moldova that Iohannis and Sandu have successfully revived. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the most significant threat to Europe in eight decades. But while the EU has achieved unprecedented levels of unity since February 2022, the bloc has found it difficult to act as one in response to Russia’s unprovoked assault.
France and Germany – the traditional motors behind the European project – struggle to see eye-to-eye when it comes to Russia. Emmanuel Macron has reversed his accommodating stance and stated that Russia cannot win in Ukraine. But Olaf Scholz continues to conduct economic diplomacy with Xi Jinping despite China’s role as an “decisive enabler” of Russia’s invasion. The vacuum of leadership that these diverging positions create limits the EU’s strategic capacity.
In contrast, Romania and Moldova have managed to align their approaches towards Russia by recognizing each other’s strategic importance. Sandu has repeatedly insisted that EU membership is Moldova’s only chance of survival as an independent state free from Russia’s orbit. For Iohannis, the successful European integration of Moldova is critical to preventing Russia’s neo-imperialist threat from spreading across the Black Sea region and beyond.
This meeting of minds in Bucharest and Chisinău bolsters the Moldovan government’s capabilities to withstand Russian attempts to destabilize its European trajectory. One of the key sources of hybrid aggression that Russia mobilizes to maintain influence in Moldova is corruption within its judiciary and public administration. Romanian Justice Minister Alina-Stefania Gorghiu has helped Chisinău counter this phenomenon by providing technical assistance with judicial reforms.
Reform of Moldova’s banking sector is another key area where Romania has provided Sandu’s government with support. In July, the Romanian Commodities Exchange decided to extend its operations into the EU candidate country in an effort to boost its economic competitiveness. Moldova’s Minister of Economic Development and Digitalization Dumitru Alaiba described this move as a “crucial step to strengthen transparency and efficiency in commercial transactions.”
Other EU leaders have started to follow Sandu and Iohannis’s joint efforts to consolidate Moldova’s place within Europe. A flurry of bilateral agreements have been reached between Moldova and individual EU member states on security and economic cooperation. The EU itself has struck a landmark defence pact with Chisinău that involves intelligence sharing, military exercises, and Moldova’s inclusion in the EU’s joint weapons procurement programme.
But more could be done at a wider EU level. The new Commission is set to take office in the autumn when the Parliament gathers for a plenary vote on the composition of the EU executive. This presents an opportunity for the bloc to reiterate that Russia’s threat is not limited to the Ukrainian battlefield and requires formalized political cooperation among like-minded EU partners, such as Moldova.
In parallel with making stronger commitments to Ukraine’s defence, the EU should update its Black Sea Synergy policy to identify the strategic importance of the Romanian-Moldovan relationship. While small in physical size, Moldova is a potential springboard for Russian neo-imperial ambitions as it is located deep in the Black Sea basin. Romania’s first-hand understanding of Moldova and its security concerns will be useful for the EU as it navigates an assertive Russia.
For now, Romania and Moldova are becoming the primary actors who are taking the initiative to build security and democratic resilience in Europe’s Eastern Neighbourhood. This would likely not have been possible without the personal diplomatic efforts of the Romanian and Moldovan leaders.
Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow at the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague. He specialises in Russia, Eastern Europe, and foreign policy. Hugo also writes regularly about Eastern European affairs and his articles have appeared in EUobserver, The Hill, Emerging Europe, and the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
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