Ukraine and Moldova trapped by the Hungarian veto

EU Days in the Republic of Moldova. Photo: Courtesy of EU NEIGHBOURS EAST. Flickr.com

Instead of deciding in Brussels on the opening of the first clusters in the negotiations, European ministers could only note that discussions for both countries remain paralysed due to Hungary’s obstacle to Ukraine’s accession. However, the member states resisted the temptation to separate the processes and start negotiations with Moldova alone, despite signals to that effect during the summer.

Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidate status almost simultaneously in 2022, a few months after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Yet, unlike Moldova, Ukraine has faced obstacles imposed by Budapest from the outset. The most recent is the veto on the opening of the first cluster of negotiations, justified by Hungary on the grounds of alleged discrimination against the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, but also on other grounds related to agriculture, the ongoing war and other issues. A non-binding public consultation was even organised, with 95 per cent of Hungarian participants declaring themselves in favour of the blockade.

According to Brussels, however, both Moldova and Ukraine meet the technical criteria for the opening of cluster one, known as “the fundamentals”, which covers key areas such as the rule of law, the functioning of democracy, human rights, the judicial system and the fight against corruption.

The opening of this cluster would be the first major step in the accession negotiations, but it requires unanimity. While the Hungarian authorities say they are not opposed to opening the cluster for Moldova, there are no signs that their position on Ukraine will change.

Some believe that it would be unfair for Moldova to become a “collateral victim” of the Hungarian veto and that it deserves additional support as a result of the crucial parliamentary elections held on September 28th. This is especially true given the country continues to face hybrid propaganda attacks from Moscow aimed at weakening pro-European forces and President Maia Sandu.

Earlier this year, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos said she did not rule out separating the accession processes of Ukraine and Moldova, stressing that these were individual processes based on merit. The idea of separation was also fuelled by Brussels’ dissatisfaction with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s actions regarding the independence of anti-corruption bodies.

“No member state is opposed to opening negotiation clusters with Moldova. I hope that we will find a solution not only for the first cluster, but for all negotiation clusters by the end of the year,” Kos said before the summer. However, this solution has not yet been found, and calls for separation have fallen silent.

A significant number of member states believe that separating Moldova and Ukraine would send a very bad signal to Kyiv, at a time when uncertain discussions are taking place on security guarantees in the event of peace. EU membership appears to be the only potentially viable option for Kyiv at a time when NATO’s doors remain closed and future US support remains highly uncertain.

Another key reason is that a separation would be seen as a political gift to Budapest. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán would see it as another victory, reinforcing his belief that he can influence relations between the EU and Ukraine. These two reasons explain why many member states – from the Baltic states to France and Germany – do not support a separate process for Ukraine and Moldova.

Finally, Moldova itself does not currently support the separation of the processes. Several European officials, including Moldovan ones, point out that it is precisely Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression that has put EU enlargement back at the top of the European agenda.

Pressure on Budapest

Cristina Gerasimova, Moldova’s deputy prime minister for European integration, called for a common approach in early September: “We hope for a joint solution for Moldova and Ukraine. It is important for our security and our path to accession that our region is stable and secure, and for that we need a stable and secure Ukraine,” she said at an informal meeting of European ministers.

In practice, this means a deadlock for both countries. In this context, Denmark, which holds the EU presidency, is advocating a two-pronged approach: increasing pressure on Hungary to lift its veto and, at the same time, preparing negotiations so that they can begin quickly as soon as the clusters are opened.

“We are continuing to put pressure on Hungary. At the same time, we are examining all the operational and technical measures that we can apply right now, without formally opening the clusters. That way, when they are opened, we will be able to close them quickly and bring Ukraine and Moldova closer to the EU,” said Marie Bjerre, the Danish minister for European affairs.

In recent practice, there are examples of separating processes for candidate countries that were initially treated as a bloc. Exactly one year ago, the EU decided to separate the accession process for Albania and North Macedonia, which had been facing a Bulgarian veto on the launch of negotiations for years. Following this separation, North Macedonia remains blocked, while Albania has opened five of the six negotiation clusters in 11 months, or 28 of the 33 chapters in total, constituting the fastest accession process ever recorded in the Western Balkans.

It is still unclear if and when Ukraine and Moldova will be separated, but one thing is clear: enlargement only happens when internal reforms align with geopolitical and strategic imperatives.

This text was first published in French on portal Le Courrier des Balkans and is republished here as part of a content exchange promoted by MOST – Media Organisations for Stronger Transnational Journalism, a project co-funded by the European Commission, which supports independent media specialising in international coverage. 

Dušan Gajić is a correspondent based in Brussels. He is also the founder of SEETV – South East Europe TV Exchanges and a documentary author and producer.

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EU enlargement, EU-Moldovan relations, EU-Ukrainian relations, Hungary, Moldova, Russia's war in Ukraine