To understand Russian nationalism

The imperial idea

Serhii Plokhy takes on this challenge in his new book Lost Kingdom. A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin. The acclaimed author – recognised because of his previous works such as The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union (2015) and Yalta. The Price of Peace (2011) – this time is returning to his earlier project which started with The Origins of the Slavic Nations (2006). Motivated by the current debate about Russian history and identity, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, Plokhy tackles the difficult question of Russian national identity. 

Plokhy guides us through the complicated history of the Russian nation and Russian ideology. He provides us with the indispensable knowledge of Russian rulers’ ideas across the centuries. This is a marvellous journey which starts with the beginning of Russian statehood. Highlighting the most important moments of Russian history, Plokhy divides his monograph into six parts. The first part is dedicated to the creation of the Russian imperial nationhood based on medieval concepts of the dynasty and religion. In the second and third parts, Plokhy concentrates on the question of Polish modern nationalism as well as Ukrainian and Belarusian concepts of the nation.

He underlines the role of language and the idea of a tripartite Russian nation, which is far from monolithic and includes three tribes: the Great Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the White Russians (Belarusians). In part four and five readers can follow the developments which contributed to the destruction of the imperial model of the tripartite nation. The conflict of interests dividing Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians in the last century is essential for understanding modern relations in the region. In the last part of the book Plokhy describes the most recent events, concentrating on political decisions taken in Moscow.

The 19th century resurrected

Plokhy focuses mainly on the complicated relation between Russians and Ukrainians, which is crucial to understand the continuous divisions between the two nations. While his research into nationalism and identities in Eastern Europe is a detailed monograph, the fundamental question about the future of Russian nationalism remains open.

The author aptly points out the most important moments in the creation of Russian nationality.  He writes: “[Sergey] Uvarov formulated the main principles of Russian political ideology and of the country’s new imperial identity” and “he had found them in the Orthodox faith, political autocracy and nationality”. Uvarov’s “nationality” was understood “as native tradition rooted in Russia’s historical development, linking the throne and the church in order to ensure their stability”.

Today, we are facing the revival of the 19th century tradition of alliance between the Russian rulers and the Russian Orthodox Church. The term “Russian world” (or Russkiy Mir), so actively used throughout the war in Ukraine, also has 19th century roots. Plokhy underlines the significance of Nikolai Nadezhdin’s view that the Russian nation consisted of three groups and his belief in both “diversity and the unity of Russian nation”. It was not far from the idea of the “tripartite division of what was then considered a single Russian world where the first shocks of a linguistic earthquake that would eventually change the political map of Eastern Europe”.

The role of the language was crucial for the creation of the national agenda not only for Russians but also for Ukrainians and Belarusians. In the difficult debate involving the language, an influential journalist Mikhail Katkov was “the first public intellectual to establish a close bond between language, ethnicity, national unity, and the strategic interests of Russian state”. Now, the concept of the “Russian world” plays a specific role in the Kremlin’s policy in the “near abroad”, with the latter term being another key concept, this time having post-Soviet roots. But the idea to allocate resources abroad to support the Russian community has a long tradition that started with the Slavic movement. 

Russian national confusion

The events of the 20th century – the February and October revolutions and the collapse of imperial Russia, the creation of the Soviet Union and the Second World War – all played a significant role in shaping Russian nationalism, although their legacy remains unclear. The communist regime had no cohesive vision or definition of nationalism. The idea of the nation evolved according to the changing political needs. In the 1930s a new course entitled “History of the USSR” was introduced in schools. Plokhy stresses that at this moment “prerevolutionary Russian history was back in favour, as was the concept of the motherland, which was crucial to the formation of Russian nationalism”.

It is difficult to understand Russia. After the successful 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi no one thought that a few days later the world would face one of the biggest crises since the end of the Cold War. In the name of protecting Russians, Moscow decided to attack a neighbouring state. It was the second time in only several years when politicians in the Kremlin took the concept of protecting Russian citizens in the “near abroad” region as casus belli. Like in the 19th century, the consequences of Russian confrontational policy are unpredictable. Even if president Putin now enjoys a high level of support for boosting national pride and imperial resentment, the Russian national idea is still best described by Tyutchev’s words that “In Russia, one can only believe”.                  

Jan Brodowski holds a PhD in political science from the Jagiellonian University. He graduated in Russian studies (MA) and in history (MA). His research focuses mainly on geopolitics, modern diplomacy and democratisation in the post-Soviet countries.