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Is the Georgian Dream committed to democracy and European integration?

Georgia is currently undergoing a political crisis which has led to an unprecedented amount of European Union involvement in resolving it. The mediation of the crisis, led by the president of the European Council, has demonstrated how important Georgia had become for the EU. Yet, the government’s decision to completely annul the deal has sent signals that it may be deviating from its pro-EU path.

After coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream party officially set out to uphold democratic values and support Georgia’s European integration. However, after the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union and obtaining visa-free travel for Georgian citizens to Schengen Area states, the Georgian Dream party soon started to display authoritarian tendencies as it harassed independent media and politicised the judiciary system in order to weaken the opposition. The party was utilised as a tool by its tycoon founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, for adapting legislation to fit his personal business interests.

September 12, 2021 - Ioseb Dzamukashvili Sekhniashvili - Hot TopicsIssue 5 2021Magazine

Photo: Tai Dundua / Shutterstock

As a result, Georgia gradually became a “captured state” with declining media pluralism and freedom of speech, a politicised judiciary system and elections with irregularities. Thus, the increasing democratic standards started to stumble several years after the 2012 change in power. Protests demanding electoral and judiciary reforms started in the summer of 2019 and turned into a never-ending cycle of political turmoil. Despite these negative shifts, the party’s rhetoric has always highlighted the necessity for the democratic development of Georgia and its future European integration. Nevertheless, ambitious statements of the Georgian Dream government were not backed by substantial commitments – since 2019 almost none of the party’s promises on democratic reforms have been implemented.

European integration without reforms

In January, the Georgian government revealed its willingness to submit an EU membership application by 2024 to fulfil its aspiration stated in the country’s 2018 constitution. The announcement was made amid a political crisis in the aftermath of the 2020 parliamentary elections, which the majority of opposition parties claimed was rigged. The OSCE electoral observation mission concluded that the vote was “competitive and, overall, fundamental freedoms were respected”, however it had serious irregularities, such as “pervasive allegations of pressure on voters and a blurring of the line between the ruling party and the state”. As a result, most opposition MPs refused to take up their mandates and demanded new elections.

The post-election crisis was further exacerbated by the court’s ruling to arrest a leader of the United National Movement opposition party, Nika Melia, for allegedly provoking protesters to seize parliament building in the summer protests of 2019. The decision of the ruling party both domestically and internationally was deemed to be politicised as it revealed grave issues in the Georgian judiciary system. Despite a boycott from the majority of opposition parties, the Georgian Dream repeatedly stated that the elections were generally “competitive” and there were no political prisoners in Georgia. Yet, representatives from the EU and United States expressed serious concerns about the situation, referring to it as a “dangerous trajectory” for the country. The EU released a special statement saying that Melia’s sentence damaged Georgia’s democracy and underlined that “an inclusive parliamentary process” was paramount for the country’s future relationship with the EU. 

The way out of Georgia’s prolonged political turmoil was mediated by the EU. In March, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, visited Georgia and immediately prioritised the resolution of the political crisis. Michel initiated several stages of inter-party negotiations and urged the government to follow democratic frameworks, reform the country “more ambitiously” and compromise with the opposition. He prepared a working agenda encompassing a number of key issues, such as electoral and judiciary reforms and the release of political prisoners. Michel made two trips to Tbilisi to personally mediate between politicians and in an unprecedented move; the EU even paid the bail, about 11,700 US dollars, for Melia to facilitate constructive dialogue.

The EU five-point agreement document, known as the Michel Document, was approved on April 19th, after which the opposition parties took up their seats in the parliament. Opposition alliance members led by Melia’s United National Movement, which did not sign the document, also accepted their mandates in parliament on June 8th, following a seven-month boycott. One group of MPs even named itself the “Group for Charles Michel’s Reforms” faction in honour of the negotiator. The EU-mediated agreement seemed to have successfully paved the way for further democratisation of Georgia as the ruling party compromised to pause all judiciary appointments, pursue electoral and judicial reforms. The ruling party also agreed to hold a snap parliamentary election in case it failed to garner at least 43 per cent of votes in local elections, slated for October this year.

Leaving EU Orbit?

July marked a turning point for the government’s commitment to democratic reforms as the ruling party started to undermine the progress achieved in previous months. The government’s credibility was put to the test as the Georgian Dream party demonstrated its unwillingness to deliver promises. Electoral changes were modest and did not receive the endorsement of the opposition; and even though two political prisoners had been released, the ruling party endorsed six supreme court judges on July 12th without considering the implementation of judiciary reforms and revising the appointment process. The European Commission stated that the appointments contradicted key provisions of the April Agreement as the selection process of judges had not been revised in compliance with the recommendations drawn by the Venice Commission and might have negatively affected the disbursement of the second tranche of EU macro-financial assistance to Georgia, as a mutually agreed condition.

The European Commission declared that the Georgian authorities missed an opportunity “to prove their commitment to a genuine and comprehensive reform of the judiciary”. The US also expressed concern about the appointments and according to the statements of the US Department of State and US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, the supreme court judges should have been selected only after the transparent and inclusive judiciary reforms. The statement highlighted that this step undermined Georgia’s democratic development and the resilience of its political institutions.

Despite domestic and foreign criticism and discussions on possible sanctions led by the government’s reluctance to implement reforms, the Georgian government went even further announcing its decision to completely back out of the agreement mediated by the EU. Georgian Dream Chairman Irakli Kobakhidze announced that the agreement “had already served its mission and exhausted itself”. The opposition accused the ruling party of reneging on the deal after which three opposition members immediately boycotted parliament. Eighteen local civil society organisations made a joint statement highlighting that the ruling party’s actions constituted “a straightforward rejection of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic course and the peaceful development of the country through democratic reforms”. The party’s decision was criticised by EU and US representatives. Western partners started to raise questions about the government’s commitment to achieving democratic goals, which the ruling party itself set out to achieve. Viola von Cramon-Taubadel, a lead member of the European Parliament’s democracy support and election coordination group for Georgia, said the decision was a “damaging step for Georgia’s interests” that “benefited the Kremlin” and that the EU would “reconsider its relations with the Georgian government”.

Even though Georgia underwent a political crisis, the EU’s active involvement in resolving its issues has been unprecedented. The mediation of the crisis, led by the president of the European Council, has demonstrated how important Georgia has become for the EU. Yet the government’s decision to annul the deal, on which EU representatives worked for months, sends the wrong signals to the country’s largest partner. Thus, the government’s decision might lead to severe consequences regarding the country’s European future, which it has strived for more than a decade.

Desire to stay in power

Opposition parties insist the government abandoned the agreement due to fears they would not be able to clear the threshold of 43 per cent of votes in the local elections necessary for the government to circumvent a new parliamentary election, as per the April Agreement. Similar criticism has been voiced by a coalition of civil society organisations which agree that the ruling party wanted to strengthen its position by rejecting “Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic course” and sacrificing the country’s prosperity, foreign policy orientation and relations with strategic partners. However, Georgian Dream party representatives blame the United National Movement opposition party for their decision. Even though the United National Movement entered the legislature in June, the party had not been part of the April Agreement due to a disagreement on the clauses on political prisoners and amnesty. The government representatives stated that the holding of elections according to the April Agreement “would damage state interests” as the major opposition party would try to “sabotage” election results should the government receive more than 43 per cent of votes.

Georgian Dream party representatives vigorously claim the party will be able to obtain more than half of the votes in the upcoming elections. Nonetheless, recent polls have demonstrated that support for the incumbent party barely reaches 40 per cent. According to Edison Research, around 39 per cent of the public support Georgian Dream, whereas an IPSOS poll shows only 32 per cent support for the ruling party. Hence, rejecting democratic reforms and undermining the Michel Document could be in the interest of the incumbent party as it could release them from the obligation of holding early elections and to remain in power until at least 2024.

The lack of commitment to democratic values and European integration, for the sake of staying in power, was also manifested when the government failed to provide adequate civil protection during a homophobic protest against Tbilisi Pride, led by radical groups and the church. Their goal to thwart an LGBT+ parade succeeded as the event did not take place that day. Yet the protest pushed further, including the burning of an EU flag and turning it into a pogrom against journalists and activists. Far-right groups attacked 54 journalists, including Lekso Lashkarava, a 36-year-old cameraman, who died the following day.

The government failed to mobilise the police to secure the safety of citizens, which, according to representatives of the opposition, was a deliberate move. Instead, the government provoked radical groups and accused opponents of conspiring with LGBT+ activists; they declared the opposition to be “anti-state” and “anti-Christian”. Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili stated that the government obeyed the decision of the majority of the nation who are “against holding the propagandistic parade” and declared that the only parade that would be held in Georgia would be “that of the Georgian army”.

By linking opponents to marginalised groups and fuelling hatred, the government tried to undermine the opposition. Many believe that the violence against the media was condoned by the ruling party to create an atmosphere of fear in the run-up to the local elections in October. Despite that, several days later, at the Batumi International Conference, Gharibashvili reiterated that the implementation of the Association Agreement remained “at the top of the Georgian Government’s agenda”. He declared that the government continued “reforms aimed at stronger democratic institutions”, which is very far from reality, considering the previous developments.

Sitting in two chairs

The ruling party cannot change its official rhetoric on European integration since the majority of Georgians have actively supported EU membership in the EU. Paradoxically, due to these factors, even the most conservative voters support Georgia’s pro-European policy. The question is how the Georgian Dream party can continue sitting in two chairs – making promises of a democratic future and European integration and simultaneously undermining the democratisation processes.

Western partners have already raised serious concerns about the government’s commitment to democratic values and have even considered the possibility of sanctions. While Georgian Dream’s pro-European aspirations are revealing to be only a façade in order to legitimise its power, the only winner in the game is Moscow. The Kremlin’s media applauded the burning of the EU flag in Georgia, while Aleksandr Dugin, a key ideologist, declared that the country had “at last embarked on the right path”. Russia has long been directing its aggression towards Georgia, while the West has become the only hope to its path to democratic and sustainable development.

Ioseb Dzamukashvili Sekhniashvili is a policy analyst focusing on political developments in Central and Eastern Europe. He is a junior researcher at Emerging Europe and a contributing writer for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. He holds an MA degree from the University of Glasgow.

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