In the Balkans, multiculturalism has come to represent a defining feature and a cause of conflict simultaneously. The region, shaped by centuries of migrations, conquests, political upheavals and civil wars, with its complex mix of cultural diversity and political instability, serves as a global example of the failure of multicultural policies. Consequently, “Balkanism” and “Balkanization” have emerged as technical terms denoting conflict driven by identity-based fragmentation.

Multiculturalism refers to 1) the coexistence of diverse cultural, ethnic and religious communities within a society, and 2) the social and political theory that promotes cultural diversity. It uses legal and administrative logic that seeks to regulate the coexistence of different cultures within a polity, as well as social theory that addresses the plurality of perspectives on society, the state, science, education and culture itself. It is most commonly understood in two primary ways: descriptively, as a characterization of cultural diversity, and normatively, as a theory asserting that culture plays a significant role in politics and as a practice of granting culturally distinct groups (for instance, minorities) certain special rights. Ideally, it seeks to enable their full equality. In this sense, multiculturalism has captivated generations of academic authors, journalists, politicians, NGO workers and human rights advocates. 

The European Union’s relations with Albania are often viewed as overwhelmingly positive. This is especially true when compared to the bloc’s rather troubled links with other states in the Western Balkans. Despite this, overlooking the autocratic practices present in Tirana could cause problems in the future.

North Macedonia’s path to the EU has now been stalled by a dispute with Bulgaria related to language and identity. Such issues have now become embedded in the integration process. The bloc must do everything it can to make sure that this problem does not hold up other discussions related to Skopje’s accession.

Serbia has become well known for its geopolitical position between East and West. Despite this, sharp divides also exist at every level of the country’s society. While Belgrade has eagerly embraced a neoliberal model, it still promotes its role as a defender of traditional values. The effects of such contradictions can be seen throughout Serbia.

Serbia is a country of contradictions. It is very close to the European Union, in fact almost in the centre of Europe, but at the same time it is very far from it. Serbian labour migrants have always chosen Western Europe as a destination for emigration, but the heart of the nation beats in the East, with a cultural and sentimental link to Russia. In Serbia, joining the EU is more a matter of national and social prestige – joining a club of rich and well-ordered countries – than a necessity. To the contrary, many of the rules laid down by the EU are seen as an obstacle and a hindrance to EU candidates.

The Serbian-Russian friendship is a politically constructed myth that emerged during the Milošević era but gained prominence after changes in Russia and the strengthening of Putin's position. Serbia, with its anti-NATO and anti-western sentiments that were caused mainly by the 1999 bombings and the activities of the Hague Tribunal, became a useful partner for Russia, opening a window for renewed influence in the region.

After reading a series on Serbian history of the 19th and early 20th centuries by Slobodan Jovanović, a highly esteemed Serbian historian, lawyer, philosopher, literary critic, diplomat and politician from the early 20th century, one might wonder why the myth of Serbian-Russian friendship appears so enduring in contemporary Serbian policy, culture and society. Indeed, Russia's historical presence was less significant than that of other European powers. The answer lies in the political construction of this historical friendship over recent decades. This myth serves both nations. For Russia, it helps maintain influence in the Balkans and counter EU presence, while for Serbia it supports its position in the ongoing Kosovo issue and reinforces illiberal policies.

The small Balkan state of Montenegro has been an official European Union candidate for many years. In spite of widespread support for integration, the political situation in the country has made accession an increasingly unlikely prospect. This challenge is compounded by growing influence of Serbia’s autocratic regime, which poses an immediate threat to Montenegro’s EU aspirations.

In a recent article, the New York Times suggested that Russia poses the primary external threat to Montenegro’s aspirations to join the European Union. This narrative, while appealing to many western officials and pundits, is misleading. Russia certainly plays a disruptive role in Montenegro and the broader Balkans, but it is Serbia, under the increasingly autocratic regime of Aleksandar Vučić, which presents a far more immediate and significant challenge.

A military intervention by Serbia into Kosovo would be the biggest upset to the political order in the Balkans since the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, with consequences that few have considered. Not only would such action do damage within Serbia, but neighbouring states and other powers could see similar repercussions as well. Even though such a scenario is not a certainty, these consequences must be considered.

The year 2008 is one that is singed into the mind of Serbs, both in Serbia and abroad. In February of that year, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. To the outrage of Serbs across the world, a part of the country regarded as integral to the Serbian identity itself left with minimal resistance and effort being made by the Serbian government. Since then, the question of Kosovo remains one of the most important political issues both within Serbia and major nations involved in the political order of the Balkans.

An interview with Jacob Mikanowski, author of Goodbye Eastern Europe. An intimate history of a divided land. Interviewers: Adam Reichardt and Nina Pániková