Orbán’s Russia-friendly course over the last year strained relations with EU institutions and put the country at odds with fellow EU member states. With no imminent end to Russia’s war in Ukraine in sight, the continuation of this opportunism may cost him dearly, as Hungary could lose its last ally in the EU, Poland, for good.

Budapest’s readiness to block military and financial aid to Kyiv, delay EU sanctions against Russia and its outspoken criticism thereof are creating serious repercussions for the EU’s image as a foreign policy actor vis-á-vis Russia. These issues further indicate deep divisions among member states and call into question European unity. They also reveal one of the EU’s most discussed weaknesses, namely, its inability to speak with one voice in foreign policy.

To the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, any measure is welcome to achieve his personal and inner circle’s objectives. While being a member of western institutions, such as the European Union and NATO, Orbán consistently seeks contact with autocrats from the East, particularly Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. This double-faced foreign policy benefits the Hungarian government in two ways: first, it helps to uphold its image as a credible actor on the world stage back home; and second, it ensures that Hungary continues receiving financial support and legitimation for its illiberal model of governance from outside of the EU.

Viktor Orbán’s thoughts about the Hungarian people almost always appear in his speeches. If you search for the term "Hungarian people" on Orbán’s personal site, a peculiar universe unfolds in front of your eyes. Certainly, his target is not the liberal Budapest intelligentsia, but rather ordinary Hungarians, a group that Orbán knows best – and grants him victory.

Whatever the expression means, Hungary has degraded into a “partly-free” democracy in recent years according to Freedom House. We are now both geographically and politically halfway between Germany and Belarus. Our democratic institutions still stand but they are like houses whose only renovation has been the façade – they look nice from the street but if one enters, destruction is obvious. This is because the caretaker was not appointed as the result of the residents’ trust but that of the local real estate tycoon. According to the 2022 World Press Freedom Index, Hungary’s media ranks 85th, behind Guinea and ahead of Israel. It was 23rd in 2010. No other country has slid down about five places on an annual basis.

Fidesz wins a fourth term in office in Hungary following an election campaign marred by disinformation. The united opposition’s aspirations of ousting Viktor Orbán from power turned out to be nothing but false hope.

Eager to attract investment from Russia and China and prove his independence, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has pursued a foreign policy independent from Brussels. Unwilling to give up EU membership or his opposition to EU principles, he has aspired to reframe the idea of Europe into one of sovereign Christian nations. The war in Ukraine, however, may be about to put an end to his strategy.

The Hungarian parliamentary elections are in just a few days, and political polarisation amongst the two competing camps is at an all time high. Disinformation offensives – well known before the campaign as well – are intensifying across the country.

A conversation with Ferenc Laczó, assistant professor of history at Maastricht University. Interviewer: Claus Leggewie.

In light of growing uncertainties over Ukraine, many Central and Eastern European states are now asking for further military and political support from their western allies. Despite this, Viktor Orbán recently visited Moscow to express his “respect” for Vladimir Putin and discuss cooperation in the energy and health care sectors.

As China explores new strategic opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán seeks his own advantages from the partnership. Despite the many limitations and lack of public support for closer Sino-Hungarian ties, threatening Brussels with the Chinese dragon yields some results.

When the first three cases of COVID-19 were registered in Hungary in March 2020, the government instituted a state of emergency and imposed restrictions that could still be in place this summer. At that time the Hungarian authorities almost immediately followed other countries in their fight against the virus; first by purchasing, independent of the EU, personal protection gear and later, non-EU approved vaccines.

Hungary has used the pandemic to convince the European Union and its own citizens that in difficult situations there is no point counting on EU institutions. Only partners from the East (mainly China and Russia) are reliable. These are real friends indeed. The sequence of priority (China being first) is not accidental either. It was from China that Hungary received an almost uninterrupted supply of personal protective gear. Deliveries, which arrived on board WizzAir planes (Hungary’s low-cost airline), were welcomed by senior officials at Budapest’s airport, including the minister of foreign affairs, Péter Szijjártó.

The history of the politics of scripts in modern central Europe is characterised by the gradual limitation of their number. The re-emerging Rovás and Glagolitic scriptures could be used to foster regional revisionism and tension.

The Hungarian story of how the social role of public intellectuals was undermined may help us make sense of what is happening elsewhere today. Hungary’s case highlights that the real danger to critical commentary and its functions in society arises not out of new media platforms, but out of the demise of the democratic multitude.

“In the 1970s and 80s, I met a fair number of western writers, most of them through György Konrád. In our conversations, the mystery that intrigued them the most was this one: how can opposition writers in Central Europe command such respect, play such an exceptional role in politics and in society – a role that they [the western authors] cannot dream about anymore.” Hungary’s prominent public intellectual Sándor Csoóri made this observation in 2006. At that time Csoóri, a one-time luminary of the Hungarian Narodnik tradition and of the post-1989 political universe as a whole, had been a bitter man for a decade and a half. He had been in the fulcrum of a controversy surrounding remarks he made concerning Jewish-Hungarian relations and the cleavage inscribed into them by the Holocaust.