On September 19th and 20th 2023, Azerbaijan took the Nagorno-Karabakh region by military means and forced the local authorities to dissolve their institutions. As a result, nearly the entire population of local Armenians fled their homes to Armenia. It is still difficult to try to make sense of how this unfolded so swiftly.

After many years of negotiations under the co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group, in September 2020, Azerbaijan decided to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh (in this article many of the interlocutors refer to the region as “Artsakh”, which is its name in the Armenian context – editor’s note) conflict via military means and attacked the region. As a guarantor of the security of the Armenians living there, Armenia supported the local population.

In September 2023 Azerbaijan regained control of Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting more than 100,000 Armenians who had been living in the territory to flee to Armenia. This development marks a significant change for the South Caucasus, and while it adds to existing tensions, it may also result in the long-term in a more stable region that is less dependent on Russia.

The South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia rarely make the headlines in western news sources. However, that changed in autumn 2023. On September 19th, Azerbaijan launched an unexpected 24-hour military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh that resulted in the region’s de facto government surrendering to Azerbaijan. Those who have followed the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh for decades know that the outcome of September’s military offensive has the potential to upend security in the South Caucasus.

Georgia has maintained a policy of neutrality for many years when it comes to the Karabakh conflict. Having acted as a mediator on certain occasions in the past, Tbilisi could now host talks that provide a proper solution to its neighbours’ ongoing dispute.

Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh has not led to any long-term solution to the dispute. This is in part due to the official narratives of Baku, which continue to promote the idea of a total victory on its terms alone.

The Kremlin’s rationale for helping end the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also explains its attitude towards transportation infrastructure projects that have appeared as a result of the ceasefire agreement. By understanding the Kremlin’s strategy, as well as the subsequent challenges and risks, other states may be encouraged to develop their own effective counterstrategies.

Only a simplified comparison of the 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh with Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of the world could confuse readers more than a question of whether the Kremlin experienced a simple victory or defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. After all, we first ought to know what criteria Moscow may use to judge its actions during the recent war.

The opening of the Zangezur corridor will play an important role in the security of Azerbaijan’s newly liberated lands. It would cement the implementation of the November agreement and signal that the former status quo is over. This would subsequently help Baku to pursue its most ambitious undertaking in years – rebuilding the war-torn Karabakh region.

The ninth and final clause of the November 10th tripartite ceasefire agreement stated: “All economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the safety of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with a view to organising the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions.” In practice, this condition implied the opening of the so-called “Zangezur corridor” – a 43-kilometre stretch of land along Armenia’s border with Iran. In Soviet times, this area used to provide a road and railway connection between Nakhchivan and mainland Azerbaijan. However, these routes were blocked after a war over Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions erupted in the early 1990s.

There is no doubt that Nikol Pashinyan was able to connect emotionally with a section of Armenian society. The repetitive use of the slogans “you are all prime ministers”, “you decide your own future”, “it is all the previous regime's fault” has enabled Pashinyan to quickly win the hearts and minds of the Armenian public. While all these tactics certainly helped Pashinyan to win this snap election, his real achievement was to make Armenians forget about the recent war.

In 1945, Winston Churchill showed the world that winning the Second World War was not enough to get re-elected. More than 70 years later, Armenia has taught another lesson. In June 2021 Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power after the 2018 Velvet Revolution, despite a heavy defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, managed to win in the snap elections and was confirmed as prime minister. With this victory, Pashinyan was able to falsify the long-standing assumption that losing Karabakh means losing power. How was this possible?

An interview with Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe. Interviewer: Bartłomiej Krzysztan

BARTŁOMIEJ KRZYSZTAN: The second Nagorno-Karabakh war left the South Caucasus in new geopolitical circumstances. What do you perceive as the main changes from the perspective of the international order? 

THOMAS DE WAAL: This war was a defeat for the attempt to achieve a multilateral, international peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since the early 1990s that has been the vision: that this was a conflict which had not just Russian mediation, but also mediation from the United States and France. Part of the vision was that it would be some kind of multilateral peace, maybe similar to the one we have seen in the Balkans, but hopefully without its flaws, one which would take into account human rights abuses and be accompanied by some democratisation and a European integration agenda. That was the hope.

Ethnic cleansing, the abuse of civilians and prisoners of war, and cultural vandalism are well documented features of the wars over Nagorno-Karabakh.

A response to Anna Barseghyan's article on ‘The difference between Armenian and Azerbaijani lobbying activities in Europe’.

The truce was announced on November 9th and aims to end the current round of hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone which lasted for more than six weeks. This game-changing agreement, which will bring Russian peacekeepers to the break-away region, has caused protests and political upheaval in Armenia and celebrations in Azerbaijan.

The agreement to end the latest round of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has created a Russo-Turkish situational partnership in the South Caucasus. It comes at the expense of the sovereignty of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.