Since 2009, Moldova’s ruling elite have primarily based their political narratives on pro-European integration. Events that have unfolded in 2018, however, have made the continuation of this course nearly impossible.

In September 2018 Vladimir Plahotniuc, the leader of Moldova’s ruling Democratic Party and the most powerful oligarch in the country, announced that his party was set to change political course. Up until then, it had been the most important pro-European political force in Moldova. However, while preparing for the 2019 February parliamentary elections, it became a “pro-Moldovan” party. To many commentators this announcement was interpreted as a future turn towards Russia.

The case of mayoral candidate Andrei Nastase, who was blocked from assuming office in the Moldovan capital, is a warning to the whole region. Democracies are increasingly threatened by powerful oligarchs and their interests.

What are some of Moldova's most pressing challenges? The deep and structural reforms that would finalise a transition to democracy are hampered by a corrupt political class, economic troubles and geopolitics. What instruments and policies could be successful in halting Moldova's roller coaster ride through stagnation and false hope?

Moldova´s energy security depends on Russian gas and electricity delivered from Transnistria. The limited options for diversification of energy routes and supplies make the country reliant on political stability in Romania and Ukraine. Domestically, the full implementation of EU energy standards will require a strong political will of the Moldovan elite, as it would diminish Gazprom´s dominance and undermine the influence of vested interests on the energy market.

Over the past five years a counterintuitive picture has emerged in the Eastern Partnership. On the one hand Moldova, which was praised for its exemplary progress in adopting EU sanctioned reforms, has been on a downward spiral. Georgia, on the other hand, has now arisen to the status of peak performer in the region.

The most striking result from last November's Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit, held in Brussels, has been the EU’s contrasting approaches to Moldova and Georgia. The EU signalled displeasure with Moldova by withdrawing its latest funding that was intended for reforms, whilst rewarding Georgia’s progress with an increase in funding. That outcome might be because the EU has seen Georgia as the region’s last hope, with Tbilisi’s willingness to put shared values into practice through the implementation of reforms. By granting the country financial support, the EU has been able to ensure Georgia’s continuation as the role model, despite some shady performances, especially its behaviour regarding ongoing internal conflicts.

Like youth everywhere, young people in Transnistria are depressed about little things but not as anxious as their peers in the West. The lack of information and the feeling of living in a bubble make it easier for them to survive. Despite what you might often read in western media, life in Transnistria is not all that bad.

Over the past few weeks unprecedented progress in the negotiations between the government in Chișinău and the authorities of the breakaway-separatist region of Transnistria has unfolded. The progress has caused modest hope for a breakthrough in this 25-year-long frozen conflict and it should rather be seen as a tool in Vlad Plahotniuc's political game. The oligarch ruling over Moldova cleverly draws on a beneficial international environment and the favourability of Moscow and Tiraspol.

The concept of the “Eastern Partnership Plus” seems like an attempt at masking the fact that the entire Eastern Partnership programme has not achieved its goals because it could not do so. The problem of the Eastern Partnership is that its goals are in fact impossible to achieve without eventually granting its members the prospect of EU membership.

The Summit’s results have been less ambitious than some of the participants might have expected. The EU confirmed its commitment to the initiative, cautiously putting on the plate a set of limited reforms. Any more consistent steps forward seem to be unfeasible, as there are still numerous points of disagreement among the EU members and their eastern partners.

The European Union’s commitment to the Eastern Partnership region has been cemented by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but for internal reasons, the EU is trying to avoid the costs linked to the countries’ integration. For Russia, the region is vitally important but Moscow cannot muster the resources or an attractive alternative to keep the countries close.

For the EU, the year 2017 is the year of not only overlapping crises and challenges, but also new mutually intertwined lessons and opportunities. The main challenges for the EU before the 2017 Brussels Summit include the lack of room for ENP’s politicisation, balancing between security, stability and foundational values and the geopolitical rivalry with Russia in the region.

The Europarties’ engagement with non-EU parties from the Eastern Partnership countries failed to transform the party system in those states. Relying to a great extent on trustworthy personal relations with the party leaders, the Europarties contributed to further legitimisation of non-EU party structures. In this way, the Europarties acquiesced to personality-oriented party politics that are embedded in clientelistic relationships and oligarchic business circles.