A conversation with Christophe Leclercq, founder of the EURACTIV media network and the Executive Chair of Europe’s MediaLab. Interviewer: Adam Reichardt

The media landscape in Ukraine has been heavily impacted by the ongoing Russian invasion. While the centralization of media to build a common message and fight disinformation made sense at the beginning of the war, critics now argue that the president’s office is abusing its control of the media while discrediting independent journalists.

Over two years into the all-out war with Russia, Ukraine is bound to face further stress tests. Nowhere do these come into view so strikingly as in the Ukrainian media, where the authorities’ desire to maintain control; civil society’s calls for scrutiny; the opposition's political ambitions; and Moscow’s attempts to gain influence all clash.

Since 2020 the Belarusian media field has lost up to ten important independent publications. Some of them did not survive the financial crisis while others were taken over by propaganda or decided to avoid covering politics. The decline in the number of independent media outlets and the difficulty in reaching audiences within the country, where consuming truthful news can result in criminal charges, affects the overall political mood in the country.

In 2023 Belarus ranked 167th out of 180 countries in press freedom, according to Reporters Without Borders. Since the political protests in 2020, the regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka intensified its persecution of the free press. Currently, there are 35 journalists imprisoned on criminal charges, serving sentences in prisons where they face torture and isolation from the outside world and their families. From 2020 to 2023, nearly 600 journalists and media professionals were arrested, according to Press Club Belarus.

Since the outbreak of the war in February 2022, the Kremlin has abandoned any illusions of cultural freedom in Russia. Its cynical mask has been taken off completely and now we can finally see the real and purely aggressive faces of those who wield power in the state. It is clear that Russia’s priority remains maintaining national unity rallied around the flag.

“We were getting ready, but never fully believed in the war,” said Andrii Yermak, the head of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidential administration in an interview with Ukrain-ska Pravda. This conversation took place just days after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. From today’s perspective, which includes our knowledge of the hide-ous atrocities committed by the Russian army against the Ukrainian people in places such as Bucha or Irpin, we can say that Yermak’s confession was an illustration of the huge naiveté of the Ukrainian political elite. This naiveté seems even more striking when it is contrasted with the other side (Russia), where steadfast cynics spoke through propagandists and official spokespersons such as Dmitry Peskov or Maria Zakharova. The Russian side was also get-ting ready. Except, it believed in the outbreak of the war.

Russia’s invasion of its neighbour has focused the world’s attention on the struggles of Ukraine and its people. Despite this, a similarly brutal conflict in the Ethiopian region of Tigray has failed to attract almost any attention at all.

Journalists in Armenia continue to face a number of challenges. Ranging from high-profile court cases to international tensions, these issues have continued to shape a media landscape that remains fraught with problems.

The citizens of Moldova have finally elected a democratic government committed to European liberties and values after decades of struggle. However, will this fundamentally improve media freedom in the country?

The media landscape in Bulgaria seems grim at the moment – oversaturated with tabloids and politically-slanted, oligarchic-owned outlets. The few independent and professional journalists face harassment and prosecution. Boyko Borissov’s recent fall from power gives some hope that things may change in the long run. However, there are a few caveats.

Media freedom in Georgia has had a turbulent history. It is worth remembering the raid on the Imedi TV station by special forces and its closure during the Saakashvili era, or the year-long dispute over ownership rights of Rustavi 2. However, there has never been a simultaneous physical attack on over 50 media employees like the one on July 5th. Is the freedom of speech under serious threat in Georgia?

On February 2nd Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a presidential decree sanctioning Lviv oligarch Taras Kozak’s companies which owns three pro-Russian television channels. Unofficially, these channels are controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk, Putin’s right-hand man in Ukraine. The US election victory of Joe Biden has stiffened western and Ukrainian resolve to take on Russian President Vladimir Putin at a time when he is facing growing opposition at home.

The question of information warfare and disinformation have become hot topics since the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. Nevertheless, one should not assume that this threat was invented by Russian President Vladimir Putin as the Soviet Union had practised dezinformatsiya and mokryie dela (wet affairs – assassinations) for decades.

To effectively fight the information war, we have to consider many more perspectives than we are currently thinking about.

An interview with Henrik Müller, a professor of economic policy journalism at the Institute of Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. Interviewer: Markus Krzoska

MARKUS KRZOSKA: In your book, published last year, you analyse “turbo democratism” which, as you argue, poses a great threat to our social life. What characterises this phenomenon and what distinguishes it from the parliamentary democracy from which we have long been used to?

HENRIK MÜLLER: Actually my first idea for the title of my book was “turbo democratism”. It was later decided to be called Kurzschlusspolitik (a short circuit policy or a quick reaction policy). In the 2000s there was a lot of talk about turbo capitalism, which is an unstable economic system and which, as we now know, reached its peak with the 2008 financial crisis. Today, I argue that the political system, just like financial capitalism, is innately unstable. This instability comes from public opinion and society’s tendencies to have knee jerk reactions, which (at least partially) affects the traditional political structures.