It has been almost a decade since Russia’s information operations became widely recognised as a means by which Moscow can reach out to influence western democracies. And throughout almost all of that period, one question that has consistently been raised is whether or not these information operations work.

In addition to high-profile interventions of Russian disinformation, such as attempts to influence elections in the United States, there are multiple other targeted campaigns in which Russia has sought to bring about specific outcomes in target countries. This has all been happening alongside long-running operations designed simply to degrade a particular country’s societal cohesion or trust in institutions.

A conversation with Mattia Caniglia, Roman Osadchuk and Ruslan Trad, disinformation experts with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Laboratory (DFRLab). Interviewers: Maciej Makulski and Adam Reichardt

De facto pro-Russian communities are clearly consolidating in the context of the upcoming Polish parliamentary elections. The groups in question are made up of people who have contacts with entities linked to the Russian state. We can assume that the Russian Federation not only supports such groups through the Polish-language sources it runs, but also has influence on the activity of some of the people operating within these communities.

By mid-2022, the first activities of those promoting pro-Russian statements in the Polish information sphere were clearly perceptible, indicating the growing consolidation of a broad pro-Russian community with political ambitions. The start of 2023, especially the first weeks of the year, only further showed this to be the trend.

A conversation with Agnieszka Legucka, an analyst with the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Interviewer: Maciej Makulski

MACIEJ MAKULSKI: Do you see a qualitative difference in Russia’s information war strategy in recent times, especially since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Or is it rather more of the same?

AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA: We are definitely in an information war. On the one hand Russia has been challenged by several blockades, especially in the European Union, of its so called media like RT, Sputnik, or 60 минут (60 minutes, a TV show broadcasted on the state-owned Channel One Russia – editor’s note). On the other hand, Russia has adapted to this new situation by moving to the “underground”, as seen through closed Facebook groups. Russian trolls have started to be much more active in several different countries. There is evidence that the trolls are very active in countries such as Hungary and Germany, which might be seen as weak spots.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been characterised as the first full-scale “social media war”. Russia uses social media to not only spread propaganda but also the “fog of war”. Its efforts aim to both demonise Ukraine in the West and strengthen Russian support for the war.

War propaganda is the deliberate use of factual or fictitious information to sway public opinion and trigger strong feelings like fear, hatred, guilt, adulation or outrage. It has been a crucial tactic of battle throughout history and has evolved into a “necessity” of warfare that can take many different shapes. Even if Russian claims of significant successes over “Ukrainian Nazis” may be mocked in the West, these strategies have been very successful within Russia and among supporters of the country.

Other than assembling a large force on the border with Ukraine, the Kremlin is increasing the information pressure on Europe. Poland has long been a traditional target of Russian fake news. The current amount and intensity point to an organised operation of malicious influence.

To effectively fight the information war, we have to consider many more perspectives than we are currently thinking about.

Although fake news may be really dangerous, there is a lesser-known new media which might pose a more serious threat: the deep fake.

In contrast to western states, the Russian autocratic system enables the Kremlin to implement their policies faster and more efficiently, including in the information space.

By the end of the Cold War, the danger of military conflicts in Europe had been reduced. Nevertheless, European nations still face a number of threats to their national security, although the type of threats has changed significantly, as has the nature of war.