An interview with Khatia Dekanoidze, a leader of the main Georgian opposition party – United National Movement and candidate for mayor of Kutaisi, the second biggest city in Georgia. Interviewer: Wojciech Wojtasiewicz

The “Land of the Great Steppe” finds itself in a partial or even stalled transitory period, despite the departure of Nursultan Nazarbayev as president. At the same time, Kazakhstan has no choice but to continue to navigate between its Russian and Chinese neighbours, even if relations with both are deteriorating.

Georgia is currently undergoing a political crisis which has led to an unprecedented amount of European Union involvement in resolving it. The mediation of the crisis, led by the president of the European Council, has demonstrated how important Georgia had become for the EU. Yet, the government’s decision to completely annul the deal has sent signals that it may be deviating from its pro-EU path.

After coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream party officially set out to uphold democratic values and support Georgia’s European integration. However, after the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union and obtaining visa-free travel for Georgian citizens to Schengen Area states, the Georgian Dream party soon started to display authoritarian tendencies as it harassed independent media and politicised the judiciary system in order to weaken the opposition. The party was utilised as a tool by its tycoon founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, for adapting legislation to fit his personal business interests.

This month, United Russia hopes to retain its absolute majority in the State Duma during elections held between September 17th and 19th. Once again, the opposition is trying to make things difficult for Vladimir Putin and his allies by using a “smart voting” strategy. This strategy may have its problems, but it has already caused some headaches for the Kremlin.

While the GERB party was weakened further in the July snap elections in Bulgaria, dismantling the structures it left behind will require the coming together of civil society and remaining political forces.

Georgia has been trapped in a political, economic and social black hole. It is affected by crisis after crisis. There is no prospect for improvement. Thus, at a certain point apathy may turn into social eruption.

For many months now Georgian politicians have been busy. After last October’s parliamentary elections, the ruling Georgian Dream and the opposition got themselves stuck in a months-long jam from which they could not escape. The opposition accused the authorities of rigging elections and they boycotted the parliament, while the ruling coalition downplayed the accusations and claimed the opposition was unable to accept defeat.

Recent elections in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine have proven that positive democratic changes are difficult to achieve but are still very possible. Even though oligarchs retain much of their power, political newcomers, civil society and the diaspora are turning into key players shaking up the status quo.

The political transformations that occurred in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine in the second half of 2020 will have long-lasting consequences on the democratic development of these critical countries in the region. Each of them has made qualitative steps forward, leaving behind more oligarchic-centric rules of the game.

Georgian NGOs and election watchdogs have labelled the October 2020 parliamentary elections as “the least democratic and free among the elections held under the Georgian Dream government”. As a result, the united opposition parties have boycotted entering into the new parliament and protests continue on the streets of Tbilisi, calling for fresh, free and transparent elections.

Once a frontrunner in democracy in the region, Georgia now faces a crisis of democracy. What was supposed to be the country’s first predominantly proportional parliamentary elections that would strengthen representation and bring in a diverse, pluralistic parliament resulted in the opposite happening. Georgia’s 2020 parliamentary elections became known as “the least democratic and free” in the Georgian Dream’s rule by the country’s leading NGOs and election-watchdogs.

The latest parliamentary elections in Romania registered the lowest voter turnout in the country's post-communist history and ended with surprising results for everyone. Rather unexpectedly, nationalist forces gained representation in the parliament. This has seen Romania follow a similar path to many other EU member states.

The electoral defeat of the Democratic Party of Socialists in Montenegro opens a new chapter in the country's politics. It remains to be seen what the reaction of the parties representing the minorities in the country will be to the new situation of their traditional allies.

Lithuania’s general election is far from over, and the makeup of the Seimas, the 13th parliament, will not be known until after the decisive runoff vote this Sunday. We can, however, draw some tentative conclusions.

In February 2020 Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections for its National Assembly. Independent observers noted serious electoral fraud, including ballot stuffing, multiple voting and turnout manipulation. Yet the fraudulent activities around the election process were not the sole component of the Azerbaijani government’s strategy.

The early parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan took place on February 9th 2020. Through these elections, the citizens of Azerbaijan elected deputies to the one-chamber National Assembly (Milli Məclis). The official election results announced by the Central Electoral Commission showed a significant victory for the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası, YAP), whose representatives are said to have won 72 out of 125 single-member constituencies (58 per cent of all districts). Interestingly and uniquely for non-democratic post-Soviet states, YAP candidates, even though running in single-member districts, often placed second or third, and at times even last. Their poor placing was often the result of an agreement with candidates from parties who were loyal to President Ilham Aliyev, or with some formally independent candidates.