The Eastern Partnership was designed to tie the eastern neighbours to the European Union, keep Russia out and EU membership off the table. These objectives have largely been achieved – but the region has become neither more stable nor secure.

For the past decade, both Ukraine and Belarus have been members of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership Project (EaP). Has it been a useful tool for the EU in drawing these countries closer? Have its initial and long-term aims been fulfilled? Is it a project that is worth continuing?

Ten years after the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) two basic dilemmas inherent in the policy design remain unchanged: first, the six countries within the EaP framework (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) differ significantly in their domestic political trajectories and, by extension, in their ideas about their relationship with the European Union.

Instead of encouraging co-operation through the opening of potential windows for partnership, which was the guideline of the previous Ostpolitik, a new European Ostpolitik should take the concerns, direct neighbourhood and historic experiences of the more recently added EU member states seriously by developing and implementing a new strategy of partnership. The goal should not be about developing new dividing lines but establishing new platforms of communication.

Germany’s international relations are already prioritising the development of a new European Ostpolitik well in advance of July 2020, when the country is slated to assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union for six months. European Ostpolitik will likely be translated into more concrete policies during the 18-month-long rotating trio presidency of the Council of the EU that includes successive terms led by Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia, respectively.

While the West and Russia are occupied outlining the framework of an upcoming hybrid war, the fate of several post-Soviet states is largely dependent on their own capacity to change.

In many regards, the 2017 Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels illustrated that the “old normal” has disappeared. Instead, another disenchanting reality – crisis as the “new normal” – needs to be reckoned with.

The next Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in 2019 will mark the tenth anniversary of the project as a joint initiative involving the European Union, its member states and six Eastern European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Perhaps it is for this event that the partners are keeping their solemn and ambitious statements. And, moreover, they are right to do so. After surviving the Riga Summit in 2015, the 2017 Brussels Summit became a sobering moment – and not a celebration. It was the summit where mesmerism met discernment, aspiration met disenchantment and one reality met another reality.

Over the past five years a counterintuitive picture has emerged in the Eastern Partnership. On the one hand Moldova, which was praised for its exemplary progress in adopting EU sanctioned reforms, has been on a downward spiral. Georgia, on the other hand, has now arisen to the status of peak performer in the region.

The most striking result from last November's Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit, held in Brussels, has been the EU’s contrasting approaches to Moldova and Georgia. The EU signalled displeasure with Moldova by withdrawing its latest funding that was intended for reforms, whilst rewarding Georgia’s progress with an increase in funding. That outcome might be because the EU has seen Georgia as the region’s last hope, with Tbilisi’s willingness to put shared values into practice through the implementation of reforms. By granting the country financial support, the EU has been able to ensure Georgia’s continuation as the role model, despite some shady performances, especially its behaviour regarding ongoing internal conflicts.

Since ambitious geopolitical objectives are not necessarily available for the Eastern Partnership in the foreseeable future, it is worth prioritising economic activities. One instrument which supports such development is the Earth Observation for Sustainable Development programme being carried out by the European Space Agency and which has its own Eastern Partnership component.

The European Union is looking to provide assistance to countries that in the past found themselves in the exclusive sphere of Soviet influence and continue to struggle today with incessant provocations or pressure from Russia. This is precisely the aim of the EU’s active Eastern policy within the framework of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). One innovative opportunity for the countries in the region has emerged: a new programme called Earth Observation for Eastern Partnership (EO4EP). This project aims to closely co-operate with the Eastern Partnership countries so that they can better manage agricultural and environmental programmes. It is envisioned that better management in these sectors could help strengthen public management in other sectors as well as supporting the ultimate aims of the EaP.

To be able to effectively confront external security threats, the post-Soviet Eastern Partnership countries should overcome domestic problems and succeed in reforms – confirms a new survey of experts from Central and Eastern Europe.

Emmanuel Macron wants to embody the return of a dynamic Europe, even if to envisage a multi-speed Europe around a state capable of stimulating a dynamic. To take the lead in this movement, he must show that France is credible on economic matters.

The concept of the “Eastern Partnership Plus” seems like an attempt at masking the fact that the entire Eastern Partnership programme has not achieved its goals because it could not do so. The problem of the Eastern Partnership is that its goals are in fact impossible to achieve without eventually granting its members the prospect of EU membership.

Although the Eastern Partnership project has lost its momentum, there are still a few smaller initiatives being carried out, which, if there is new political will, may turn into an efficient tool for active Eastern policy. This, in turn, may prove beneficial for Polish interests.