The Hungarian parliamentary elections are in just a few days, and political polarisation amongst the two competing camps is at an all time high. Disinformation offensives – well known before the campaign as well – are intensifying across the country.

Other than assembling a large force on the border with Ukraine, the Kremlin is increasing the information pressure on Europe. Poland has long been a traditional target of Russian fake news. The current amount and intensity point to an organised operation of malicious influence.

To effectively fight the information war, we have to consider many more perspectives than we are currently thinking about.

In today’s world, intelligence and information are inextricably and even more connected; the doctrine views intelligence as information that a state finds essential in making a decision.

In contrast to western states, the Russian autocratic system enables the Kremlin to implement their policies faster and more efficiently, including in the information space.

A review of Shadow State. Murder, Mayhem and Russia’s Remaking of the West. By: Luke Harding. Publisher: Guardian Faber, London, 2020.

Ukraine not only needs to initiate an open discussion on the extreme right, but also step up its efforts in strengthening professional standards of journalism and ensuring the safety of independent journalists.

Polish authorities have blamed Russia for a cyberattack in April, which planted forged documents and news articles on various military and news websites.

Russian disinformation activities in Georgia, a front-runner in the Eastern Partnership, illustrates how Russian propaganda works on a variety of levels. Understanding the Georgian case may provide an insight into how to counter such hybrid activities in the country and elsewhere in the West.

Today, no one argues with the fact that Russian propaganda is a global challenge. Over the past few years we have witnessed how well-structured disinformation campaigns can be used as a tool for achieving certain strategic goals: to shape public opinion, increase political polarisation, influence elections, demonise opponents, undermine state security, boost nihilism and cripple democracy. As the Soviet-born British journalist, author and TV producer Peter Pomerantsev wrote: “The Kremlin weaponises information!”

To quell the impact of pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns ahead of the milestone October parliamentary elections, the government, Facebook and civil society organisations will need to take more proactive measures.

Georgia has been particularly affected by Russian information operations, especially in light of its troubled political relations with Moscow and the country’s generally unabated pro-western course. Over the last few years, large numbers of Kremlin-funded and domestic news websites and social media pages have carried out a massive information offensive against the country, undermining societal trust towards the West, public institutions and civil society organisations. They have been particularly active in the electoral periods, campaigning extensively against liberal values and liberal-minded politicians.

Interview with Hatia Jinjikhadze, Deputy Director at the Open Society Georgia Foundation. Interviewer: Mackenzie Baldinger.

In the clash of narratives between Russia and NATO states, Moscow has clearly gained an upper hand. Russian success stems not only from the fact that the Kremlin has been able to send a much clearer and more coherent message than the Alliance, but also because NATO states do not have one narrative, or counter-narrative.
One of the central concerns when analysing international security and its history is how to explain certain events and their impact on international politics. For policy-makers and societies it is crucial to define “who we are” and “what kind of world order we want”. The passing decade has been marked by a return to a crisis between the West and Russia (sometimes referred to as the New Cold War), with conflict over Russian aggression in Ukraine being the most striking example.