In recent months, Serbia has witnessed an alarming crackdown on its civic space. This has unfolded through a wave of arrests, smear campaigns, and repressive tactics aimed at silencing dissent and undermining democratic principles. These actions, exacerbated by growing Russian and Chinese influence, reveal a systematic effort of Serbia’s authorities to suppress civil society and stifle public dissent.

Civil society activists and journalists in the region are showing courage and resolve, adapting and withstanding amid war and repression. Though groups have been forced to disband, many re-emerge with new formats, ideas and alliances.

From Russia to Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia to Hungary, “foreign agent” style laws have become a preferred instrument for authoritarians to extinguish critical voices, shield their rule from scrutiny and strengthen their hold on power.

By stigmatizing independent civil society, media and other dissenting voices as “trojan horses”, “foreign agent” laws have offered a convenient framing to delegitimize and isolate them. In addition, they have also helped to impose harsh monitoring and reporting requirements and shut critics out of public life. As the promotion of democratic practices and human rights threatens authoritarians’ grip on power, foreign agent laws offer a handy tool to discredit these activities by equating them with promoting the interests of a foreign power.

The onset of dialogue between the Ukrainian authorities and the Belarusian democratic forces began in autumn 2022. However, it did not continue so strongly in 2023. This can be partly explained by the difficult situation on the battlefield in the Russian war against Ukraine, which is naturally the priority for the authorities in Kyiv. At the same time, Ukraine has maintained its diplomatic relations with the authorities in Minsk.

In February of 2022, Russian tanks used Belarusian territory to invade Ukraine through the north to try and install a puppet government in Kyiv. After Alyaksandr Lukashenka recognized Crimea as Russian at the end of autumn 2021, the question of warming relations between Kyiv and the Belarusian dictator was finally eliminated. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations remained between Ukraine and Belarus. They were not torn apart even after the outbreak of the full-scale Russian aggression with the participation of Belarus, so a certain official level of dialogue was still ongoing.

In 2021, thousands of people from the Middle East and North Africa crossed the Belarusian border into EU countries such as Poland. Polish activists who offered support say that emergency prepared them for the next refugee crisis, from Ukraine in 2022. While the Polish state’s approach dramatically shifted between the two situations, NGOs and volunteers leaned on the same skills and resources to help people on the move.

Peace and democracy are not a given, but a result of political action. This is a lesson from Ukraine to the world.

Civil society organisations are major drivers of democratic reforms in Ukraine. Underestimating the potential of this resourceful sector to impact and co-shape both internal reform and the EU integration agenda would be a strategic mistake for the EU and Kyiv’s other international partners. What can the international community do to maximise the capacities of civil society in Ukraine?

Despite some popular convictions, there are Russians who do not support their country’s war in Ukraine but decided not to leave. Instead, they are creating civil initiatives that help Ukrainian refugees who ended up in Russia. They also support their fellow Russians who are against the war and need assistance.

To attend a protest in Russia is today almost akin to suicide. This is especially true since the new law on discrediting the Russian army was passed last year. It stipulates punishment in the form of imprisonment for up to three years for those who dare criticise the ongoing war in Ukraine. In addition, another new law on spreading false information or fakes about the Russian army or volunteers who signed up for the war states that a person accused of such an act might get up to 15 years of prison.

Today, when we talk about the Russo-Ukrainian War and the future victory of Ukraine, we must remember the voice of Ukrainian civil society. This voice is significant now and it is clear that the two sides of the war will have to listen, both the aggressor (Russia) and the victim (Ukraine).

Much has been said about the Ukrainian military’s impressive performance on the battlefield. However, this would not be possible without the army of volunteers behind the front line. This active civic spirit will play a key role in determining the country’s future.

An interview with Oleksandra Matviichuk, a Kyiv-based human rights defender and civil society leader in charge of the Center for Civil Liberties. Interviewer: Igor Mitchnik.

The Kremlin has placed many repressive measures on Russian civil society. These moves are largely based on encouraging self-censorship and dividing the sector into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ organisations. This process has had a devastating effect on public policy and has caused a crisis of representation at all levels. Despite this, the Kremlin appears eager to use these same measures outside the country in order to divide civil societies across the EU states.