After almost half a year into Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine it remains crucial to keep Belarus accountable for its participation.

Politically, 2019 was a very important year for Belarus. It was dominated by two trends: the authorities pursuing relations with the West and pressure by the Kremlin to deepen the integration of both states.
Growing tensions between Minsk and Moscow, as well as continued attempts to normalise relations with the West, are the main reasons we can call 2019 a ground-breaking year when it comes to the level of meetings that Belarusian officials held with western politicians. On surface they may seem like routine activities of a sovereign state, but in the case of Belarus each meeting sends a signal to the Kremlin.

The unflinching Belarusian leader is set on a course navigating his country through increasingly rough geopolitical seas. Lukashenka is hoping he can keep the East and West at arms length, while warming up to China at the same time.

Interview with Anna Maria Dyner on the regional context of the upcoming meeting between presidents Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Interviewer: Iwona Reichardt.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings are declining in ways similar to the beginning of his previous presidential term. Then, Putin artificially boosted his own personal ratings and those of his government by illegally annexing Crimea; now, Putin may attempt yet another geopolitical power-play in Belarus.

Arguments about oil and gas prices have become a recurring feature of the Belarusian and Russian relationship. Is this year’s discord different from earlier bouts, and is there any merit to the speculation of potential changes to the Union State agreement between the two countries?

The annexation of Crimea was planned as a response to the decrease in Vladimir Putin’s approval rating in Russia. Now, after the pension reform has been introduced, the president’s rating is lower than that of the military – for the first time ever. It may happen that Belarus becomes the next goal for the Kremlin’s revanchist policies.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s foreign policy towards the countries of the socialist camp extensively followed a simple formula: loyalty of its satellites was bought with cheap natural gas and oil supplies. Today, it is widely implemented by Russia in relation to its post-Soviet neighbours, and its main client is Belarus.

Since independence, Belarus has not been able to overcome its total dependence on Russian energy supplies. With the construction of a Belarusian nuclear power plant, this dependence will only become stronger.

As is well-known, Belarus purchases crude oil from Russia and so far has earned good money from it. It imports Russian oil without any tariffs, and only after exporting the processed oil does it generate export duties, which are then transferred to its own budget. Prior to 2015 Belarus had transferred it to the Russian budget, but since the announcement of the implementation by the Russian Federation of the "tax manoeuvre" in the oil industry, Minsk requested compensation for its costs, mainly due to the ratification of the treaty on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). As a result, Moscow agreed to allow export duties on oil products from Belarus to be transferred directly to the Belarusian budget through 2024.