While the world remains focused on the war in Ukraine, an important political game is being played in the South Caucasus. The local states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia now find themselves in rather different positions as external powers attempt to jostle for position in this fractious region.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has destabilised not only Europe but also its neighbourhood and inevitably the South Caucasus. This region already has a complicated geopolitical milieu even without any external triggers. Regardless of the outcome, the war will result in a resentful spillover effect in the three countries of the South Caucasus, as they are connected to Russia through trade, remittances and tourism. The economic sanctions, imposed by the West, have enormously affected the rouble, decreasing the remittances sent from Russia by the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian diasporas. Russia is and will be isolated and this will create difficulties for the nationals of the three countries living there.

Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 triggered a reshaping of the entire security architecture in the Black Sea region and the whole of Europe. How does the expert community perceive the changes to regional security? What are the lessons learned for the international and regional actors? What could be done to restore and maintain security in the Black Sea region?

After Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020, keeping the Azerbaijan-India partnership on pragmatic rails became a hard feat to pull off. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions, however, created new opportunities for Azerbaijan and India, with the International North-South Transport Corridor at the centre of this renewed co-operation.

The September clashes were the most serious armed incident between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Karabakh war. Experts are speculating whether Azerbaijan is gearing towards a bigger offensive in southern Armenia or just trying to pressure Yerevan.

The EU’s relationship with Baku has long been marred by disagreement over Azerbaijani domestic policy. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a renewed bilateral focus on energy. A recent decision to sign a new gas deal shows that the nature of relations may truly be changing.

The US has proven itself to be a firm supporter of Ukraine in resisting Russian aggression. Despite this, however, Washington has still not taken advantage of the various opportunities now presenting themselves in Eurasia and the strategically important South Caucasus.

The war in Ukraine has also opened long-standing geopolitical wounds in the three states of the South Caucasus, which now find themselves on the frontline of the new Cold War. The modest reactions of Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine underline the precarious states the three countries find themselves in.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has geopolitical implications for Europe and beyond. This includes the three South Caucasus countries, all of which are members of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative. Yet, governmental and societal reactions have varied in all three countries, with the Georgian government being cornered into a strategy of “non-deterrence”, the Armenian government subordinate to Russia’s security interests, and the Azerbaijani government pursuing its balancing policy while also seeking a strategic partnership with Moscow.

The war in Ukraine has encouraged Baku to pursue a policy of neutrality as it tries to maintain links with both Kyiv and Moscow. Despite this, parts of the Russian media have consistently characterised Azerbaijan’s actions as an attempt to gain at Russia’s expense.

Armenia’s support for the recent CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan may seem unusual at first glance. However, this move is ultimately part of a wider strategy in Yerevan that involves both domestic and international affairs.

While China struggles to consolidate its economic position in the South Caucasus, Pakistan has cemented its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, India has entered a new phase of relations with Armenia. Even though the presence of Asian powers in the region represents an opportunity for economic development, it may also entail some risks.

Asian powers have recently shown increasing interest in the South Caucasus. In particular, Pakistan and India have stepped into the region, joining and partially balancing China's strong presence. Several factors have contributed to the entrance of these new Asian players and this is particularly true regarding the new balance of power established by the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the European Union and United States’ lack of engagement with the region has left more room for action by other external powers.

Ankara and Yerevan’s ongoing talks to normalise relations could result in radical change at both the bilateral and regional level. Despite this, various historical and contemporary issues continue to challenge this process.

Recent unrest in Kazakhstan naturally attracted the attention of a Kremlin administration eager to bolster its position as regional hegemon. Despite this, the event also further revealed Yerevan’s increasing reliance on Moscow.