The war in Ukraine has also opened long-standing geopolitical wounds in the three states of the South Caucasus, which now find themselves on the frontline of the new Cold War. The modest reactions of Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine underline the precarious states the three countries find themselves in.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has geopolitical implications for Europe and beyond. This includes the three South Caucasus countries, all of which are members of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative. Yet, governmental and societal reactions have varied in all three countries, with the Georgian government being cornered into a strategy of “non-deterrence”, the Armenian government subordinate to Russia’s security interests, and the Azerbaijani government pursuing its balancing policy while also seeking a strategic partnership with Moscow.

The war in Ukraine has encouraged Baku to pursue a policy of neutrality as it tries to maintain links with both Kyiv and Moscow. Despite this, parts of the Russian media have consistently characterised Azerbaijan’s actions as an attempt to gain at Russia’s expense.

Armenia’s support for the recent CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan may seem unusual at first glance. However, this move is ultimately part of a wider strategy in Yerevan that involves both domestic and international affairs.

While China struggles to consolidate its economic position in the South Caucasus, Pakistan has cemented its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, India has entered a new phase of relations with Armenia. Even though the presence of Asian powers in the region represents an opportunity for economic development, it may also entail some risks.

Asian powers have recently shown increasing interest in the South Caucasus. In particular, Pakistan and India have stepped into the region, joining and partially balancing China's strong presence. Several factors have contributed to the entrance of these new Asian players and this is particularly true regarding the new balance of power established by the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the European Union and United States’ lack of engagement with the region has left more room for action by other external powers.

Ankara and Yerevan’s ongoing talks to normalise relations could result in radical change at both the bilateral and regional level. Despite this, various historical and contemporary issues continue to challenge this process.

Recent unrest in Kazakhstan naturally attracted the attention of a Kremlin administration eager to bolster its position as regional hegemon. Despite this, the event also further revealed Yerevan’s increasing reliance on Moscow.

Recent clashes along a contested road between Armenia and Azerbaijan have only further revealed the weaknesses of last year’s ceasefire agreement between the two states. Despite this, talks regarding this issue may present a path towards a more durable peace.

Events over the past few weeks have seen relations between Baku and Yerevan once again hit a low point. Now focused on recent military clashes, both sides continue to hold very different perspectives on the Karabakh conflict and its future.

The opening of the Zangezur corridor will play an important role in the security of Azerbaijan’s newly liberated lands. It would cement the implementation of the November agreement and signal that the former status quo is over. This would subsequently help Baku to pursue its most ambitious undertaking in years – rebuilding the war-torn Karabakh region.

The ninth and final clause of the November 10th tripartite ceasefire agreement stated: “All economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the safety of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with a view to organising the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions.” In practice, this condition implied the opening of the so-called “Zangezur corridor” – a 43-kilometre stretch of land along Armenia’s border with Iran. In Soviet times, this area used to provide a road and railway connection between Nakhchivan and mainland Azerbaijan. However, these routes were blocked after a war over Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions erupted in the early 1990s.

The presence of Russian peacekeepers in the Armenian inhabited part of the Karabakh region and along the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh Armenians with Armenia remains a contentious issue. Officially tasked with normalising the situation on the frontier after last year’s war, this group has been accused of not supporting the finalising of peace accords between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan’s decade-long balanced foreign policy between Russia and the West took a decisive turn after last year’s war in Nagorno-Karabakh, highlighted by a greater emphasis on military alignment with an increasingly assertive Turkey. Ankara and Baku also came together to shape a nucleus for tripartite configurations with countries in different parts of the globe – Pakistan being an essential one to build a solid international base for supporting Azerbaijan’s cause on the Karabakh issue.

The Iskander missile system has become a central topic among the three sides responsible for maintaining the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh.