Kaliningrad Oblast – Russia`s westernmost region physically separated from the mainland – has reappeared in the forefront of international security-related discourse. Liberated from virtually complete isolation with the fall of the Soviet Union, this territory was hoped to soon turn into a prosperous “bridge of co-operation” between Russia and the West.

In 1855 a notorious ultra-conservative Ukrainophobe Count Peter Valuev, disgruntled with the humiliating experience of the Crimean War (1853–56) and the crumbling façade of the Russian imperial court, came up with a sobering essay, in which he rightfully captured the real state of affairs in 19th century Russia: “on the surface - glitter, inside - rot”. Indeed, it would not be a mistake to argue that the events that have befallen Kaliningrad over the past several months have made this formula fully applicable to this westernmost Russian region; in a sense summarizing the twenty five years of its post-Soviet development. This analysis seeks to provide an answer for the following question: does the image of Kaliningrad, as presented by Russian mass media and officials, have much in common with the reality?

One would find it hard to name a part of the former Soviet Union, where high expectations and great potential have been wasted so miserably as in the tiny Russian “island” situated in the heart of Europe – the Kaliningrad Oblast. Amidst tumultuous 1990s many romantically predicted that Kaliningrad would soon become either a “Baltic Hong Kong” or the “Fourth Baltic Republic.” The past twenty five years have dispelled these sentiments leaving instead merely one word applicable to the current situation of Kaliningrad – disappointment. What are the reasons of such an inglorious outcome and how is it possible that an area bordering dynamically developing members of the European Union is now reduced to the doles of Moscow in exchange for being a “scarecrow of Europe”?