As the existential philosopher Karl Jaspers once wrote, "uncertainty is not to be overcome but understood". In this issue, our aim is just that: to shed light on the uncertainties shaping our world, to inform you about these broader challenges and to explore how we might navigate them.

As long as we have different narratives concerning the real meaning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the European Union will not be able to act as a coherent and pro-active geopolitical player. The EU should attempt to find a common language to talk about the war and its implications. Only then will we be able to uphold security across the continent, both for ourselves and our partners.

The recent meeting of the UN General Assembly proved to be a focal point for all the uncertainties the world is currently facing: the ineffectiveness of multilateralism; impunity for aggression and violations of international law; and increasing problems related to climate change and sustainable development goals. In short, the international rules-based order as perceived in the West is under threat with major uncertainties as a consequence.

As Ukraine continues its resistance against Russian aggression, discussions about the potential end of the war have sparked numerous debates throughout the international community. While many are eager for a swift resolution to the conflict, Ukraine has every right to be concerned about how the war will end.

The dialogue between Ukraine and some western partners was complicated in the early stages of the full-scale war. As President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeatedly emphasized, Ukraine is unwilling to give up any of its territories to achieve peace. He often referred to the moral aspect of the issue, even if some believed that it was not realistic. He stressed that Ukrainians living in the occupied territories are suffering under Russian occupation and enduring torture and human rights abuses.

A conversation with Borja Lasheras, advisor on Ukraine to Joseph Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Interviewer: Iwona Reichardt

While the Eastern Partnership marked its 15th anniversary this year, its adaptability to current geopolitical developments has raised questions. Russia’s war in Ukraine and Ukraine’s and Moldova’s progress in EU accession have challenged the relevance of this policy. Yet, despite some shortcomings, the EaP can be a viable instrument to promote the regional agenda of the EU, invest in democratisation of individual countries and foster linkages with the key region of Eastern Europe. There are concrete steps that can increase the relevance of this policy.

Launched in 2009 in Prague, the European Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy has been one of the most visible and efficient tools of EU foreign policy over the past decade and a half. On the occasion of its 15-year-anniversary, which we celebrated in May 2024, a proper stock-taking of the current state of play is in order. This is particularly important since the EaP is undergoing some fundamental changes, being challenged particularly by the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine as well as by the Kremlin’s aggression against its other neighbours, of which six are united within the regional policy framework of the EU.

One year ahead of Czechia’s parliamentary elections, polls show a substantial lead for ANO, the populist party founded by one of the richest oligarchs and former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. Like it or not, Babiš’s comeback seems inevitable. Yet with this inevitability comes uncertainty regarding with whom and how Babiš will govern again.

Czechia’s Andrej Babiš has been a heavyweight political player since the 2013 parliamentary elections. At that time, ANO had its first electoral success. Unexpectedly, it placed second in the race, capturing over 18 per cent of the vote, trailing only behind the Social Democrats, who secured the top position. This electoral success allowed Babiš to join the coalition government as finance minister. Four years later, in subsequent parliamentary elections, ANO won decisively. A score ten per cent higher than in 2013 gave it an absolute victory and first place in the race. Second was the right-wing Civic Democratic Party or ODS, which received only 11.32 per cent of the vote. In 2021, even though ANO lost by a minimal margin to the ODS-led Spolu (Together) coalition, it still recorded a good score of more than 27 per cent of the vote.

For the third consecutive decade, North Macedonia finds itself at a critical crossroads. The newly elected government is grappling with a myriad of challenges related to EU integration and its relations with neighbouring countries. The situation has only gotten worse since the EU decided to decouple North Macedonia’s membership bid from Albania.

"Anticipated but painful" – this sentiment captures the reaction of many Macedonians upon hearing the news that the European Union has decoupled the country from Albania on the road to EU membership. For years, both nations had advanced together and the announcement came as a disappointment to many. It is clear that North Macedonia was once seen as a frontrunner in EU integration. However, due to unresolved bilateral disputes with neighbours and missteps by its political leadership throughout the years, the country now finds itself lagging behind in a region that is steadily moving forward.

The Serbian Jadar lithium mine project is one of the largest projects of its kind and has the potential to generate around half a billion US dollars in annual revenue. Yet, the environmental concerns that go along with such a project have led thousands to come out and protest in Belgrade and elsewhere. Nevertheless, President Aleksandar Vučić recently told the Financial Times that the mine is expected to open in 2028 and will produce 58,000 tonnes of lithium annually.

At the beginning of September, 21 Serbian activists were placed on a blacklist of the so-called "environmental terrorists" created by an anonymous group known as Kopaćemo (“we will dig”). This came in the wake of a large protest in Belgrade on August 18th, which drew a crowd of around 50,000 people. Following the protest, police arrested three activists and a judge promptly sentenced them to 30 to 40 days in prison. Surprisingly, the charges were not related to the blocking of railway traffic, which the activists had staged in protest of proposed lithium mines in southern Serbia, but rather an alleged assault on a journalist from Informer, a pro-government tabloid known for its sensationalist stories and support of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party.

Serbia has become well known for its geopolitical position between East and West. Despite this, sharp divides also exist at every level of the country’s society. While Belgrade has eagerly embraced a neoliberal model, it still promotes its role as a defender of traditional values. The effects of such contradictions can be seen throughout Serbia.

Serbia is a country of contradictions. It is very close to the European Union, in fact almost in the centre of Europe, but at the same time it is very far from it. Serbian labour migrants have always chosen Western Europe as a destination for emigration, but the heart of the nation beats in the East, with a cultural and sentimental link to Russia. In Serbia, joining the EU is more a matter of national and social prestige – joining a club of rich and well-ordered countries – than a necessity. To the contrary, many of the rules laid down by the EU are seen as an obstacle and a hindrance to EU candidates.

The Serbian-Russian friendship is a politically constructed myth that emerged during the Milošević era but gained prominence after changes in Russia and the strengthening of Putin's position. Serbia, with its anti-NATO and anti-western sentiments that were caused mainly by the 1999 bombings and the activities of the Hague Tribunal, became a useful partner for Russia, opening a window for renewed influence in the region.

After reading a series on Serbian history of the 19th and early 20th centuries by Slobodan Jovanović, a highly esteemed Serbian historian, lawyer, philosopher, literary critic, diplomat and politician from the early 20th century, one might wonder why the myth of Serbian-Russian friendship appears so enduring in contemporary Serbian policy, culture and society. Indeed, Russia's historical presence was less significant than that of other European powers. The answer lies in the political construction of this historical friendship over recent decades. This myth serves both nations. For Russia, it helps maintain influence in the Balkans and counter EU presence, while for Serbia it supports its position in the ongoing Kosovo issue and reinforces illiberal policies.

The small Balkan state of Montenegro has been an official European Union candidate for many years. In spite of widespread support for integration, the political situation in the country has made accession an increasingly unlikely prospect. This challenge is compounded by growing influence of Serbia’s autocratic regime, which poses an immediate threat to Montenegro’s EU aspirations.

In a recent article, the New York Times suggested that Russia poses the primary external threat to Montenegro’s aspirations to join the European Union. This narrative, while appealing to many western officials and pundits, is misleading. Russia certainly plays a disruptive role in Montenegro and the broader Balkans, but it is Serbia, under the increasingly autocratic regime of Aleksandar Vučić, which presents a far more immediate and significant challenge.

Russia’s war in eastern Ukraine has dramatically impacted the areas that used to make up the coal mining industry. Since 2014 most of the mines on the territories of Donbas not controlled by Ukraine have been closed down and many of them subsequently began to flood. If the coal region remains in a state of uncontrolled flooding over the next five to twelve years, then two-thirds of the territory of Donbas will become uninhabitable for normal life.

Despite Russia's full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian government remains committed to its pledge to phase out coal after 2035, the former deputy energy minister, Yaroslav Demchenkov, said in the summer of 2023. By 2021, Ukraine, as well as the country's largest energy company, DTEK, had already joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), an initiative aimed at a phased transition to carbon-free energetics. In addition, during the COP28 climate summit, German Galushchenko, the energy minister, also announced plans to create a “de-carbonized mix of Ukraine's energy system” from renewable energy and nuclear power.