The Vatican’s unholy circus in Moscow

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s meeting with Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher in Moscow, August 2026. Source: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In 2009, Intelligence Squared staged a debate in London on the proposition that “The Catholic Church is a force for good in the world”. Arguing against, Stephen Fry and Christopher Hitchens more than halved the number of its supporters and grew the opposition by 70 per cent, for a damning 268 to 1,876 eventual poll.

Much of their case concerned history, including clerical abuses, opposition to progress, and the Church’s accommodations with egregious regimes of the 20th century. One might reasonably say that institutions, like people, should be allowed to learn.

This past August, Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, effectively the Holy See’s foreign minister, travelled to Moscow to meet Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, and “identified several areas of convergence” on major international issues. He then called on Russia and Ukraine to show “openness and goodwill” and to respect international and humanitarian law, especially regarding civilians, infrastructure, the wounded and prisoners.

In this argument, “Russia and Ukraine” are put on a totally equal footing. Yet, one country launches an assault across an internationally-recognized border, occupies and annexes the other country’s land, and continuously and openly denies its right to exist and identity. The other has spent four and a half years trying not to be erased. Somehow, the Holy See speaks as though the central problem was not Russian aggression, but an unfortunate shortage of goodwill on both sides. This would be merely ludicrous if it were not divinely useful to Moscow.

Archbishop Gallagher knows better

Gallagher knows perfectly well what has happened in Ukraine. This past July he travelled to the country, visiting bombed sites in Kyiv, including a residential area where a Russian strike had killed 24 people, three of them children. Vatican News itself described Bucha and Irpin as symbols of the horrors “unleashed by Russia’s invasion.” (note the proper use of Russian invasion).

Four days before the meeting with Lavrov, UN human rights monitors reported that two Russian drones had struck a crowded shopping centre in Kryvyi Rih, killing at least 16 civilians and injuring 128, including at least 23 children. In the first seven months of 2026, the UN mission verified 1,839 civilians killed and 10,638 injured in Ukraine.

Then the Vatican envoy tells “Russia and Ukraine” to mind civilians and that “to be clear, this war must end”.

Some may retort that the Vatican grasps the situation, but must play an agreeable intermediary, calling for humanity and kindness, for diplomacy to be effective. But what expectations would they have for what happens next? Is Lavrov expected to report to Putin and his henchmen and announce: “Look, this is getting serious. The Holy See says humans are suffering and war is unpleasant. Good God, they are right.  Should we reconsider?”

Besides common sense, the Vatican knows the futility of unleveraged appeals to Russia’s fictional goodwill from its first-hand experience. An effort to use its much-vaunted diplomacy to secure the return of thousands of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia fell through, as “the results have not met expectations”, even in Gallagher’s own words. By the way, irrefutable evidence of this particular crime is the basis for the warrant out for Lavrov’s boss by the International Criminal Court.

The same article in Vatican News contains another telling detail. The humanitarian conditions of the Russian POWs were witnessed first-hand by the Nuncio in Kyiv. On the Ukrainian POWs “similar assurance … was given by the Ombudswoman of the Russian Federation”, with “the Holy See … unable to verify their situation” otherwise.

The Vatican does have potential leverage

The Kremlin has heard well-meaning appeals for four and a half years. There were UN resolutions, papal pleas, peace plans, and varied expressions of concern. Yet Russia did not invade Ukraine because nobody had reminded it of goodwill, and could not care less. Moscow does not respect goodwill; it respects costs and understands propaganda.

The Holy See has a combination of diplomatic access, moral standing, and reach across countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia where Russian narratives find receptive audiences. In these regions, resentment towards the West often overrides empathy for Ukraine.

The Vatican could make the war more politically expensive by saying that peace begins with the aggressor ending its pursuit of conquest, challenging Moscow’s colonial vocabulary of “historic lands” and “one people”, and spelling out that opposing western hegemony does not justify endorsement of invasion.

Instead, it does the opposite. By speaking of abstract “suffering” and “goodwill”, and avoiding plain language on who invaded whom, the Holy See is effectively giving a papal benediction to the Kremlin’s primary talking point: that this is a rather complicated quarrel, not a colonial land-grab. That does nothing to pressure Moscow towards peace, it only reduces Russia’s diplomatic isolation and blurs responsibility for the war.

The Vatican has influence that could raise the political price of aggression without firing a shot or imposing a sanction. Confusing dialogue with legitimization, it invests that moral capital into making the aggressor look respectable.

Losing a moral compass does not help mediation

Moscow does not expect the Holy See to sanctify its war. It needs prominent institutions to perform a narrative laundering service weaponized by Russian propaganda. Invasion is converted into a “conflict” or “hostilities,” and the victim into one of two unfortunate “parties” that should find common ground.

Some may say that this is the price of mediation. A mediator must speak to everyone. Sure, meet with Patriarch Kirill or Vladimir Putin. But speak truth. Diplomacy does not require intellectual dishonesty. A mediator can urge restraint on both sides while still saying plainly who is who.

In fact, refusing to speak truth makes mediation worse. It teaches the aggressor that sustained violence eventually earns diplomatic recognition. Keep bombing long enough, and you become a side to the “conflict” whose wild demands must be accommodated to “alleviate suffering and … restore … trust between the parties”. In a war of aggression, moral equidistance is not neutrality – it is a diplomatic subsidy to the aggressor.

Gallagher’s call not to remain “prisoners of the wrongs of the past” deserves special recognition. The wrongs of the past? Russian missiles are destroying apartment blocks now. And calling such things “wrongs” is itself grotesque. Double parking is a wrong. Invading a neighbour and attempting to extinguish its very identity is something else. “Wrongs of the past” must be prosecuted and result in exactly that – convicted war criminals.

 Moral authority requires upkeep

Nobody expects the Vatican to field the Swiss Guard. Moral authority is its claimed power tool. That makes precision in moral language rather important.

The Vatican could have gone to Moscow and said something more substantive; such as that “Russia invaded Ukraine and must stop. It must stop attacking Ukrainian civilians. Humanitarian questions should be addressed immediately. Ukraine, too, must comply with international humanitarian law”.

That would pressure the aggressor but leave plenty of room for diplomacy. Instead, it issues a plenary indulgence with “both sides” vocabulary and “areas of convergence” with Lavrov.

Far from advancing peace, that legitimizes the Russian regime, obscures responsibility for a hellish war, and promotes the moral nihilism on which Moscow thrives: everyone lies, everyone is guilty, all are but competing narratives. It is not building a bridge to peace; it is paving a road that allows the Russian war machine to continue driving, with a papal escort.

Stephen Fry and Christopher Hitchens delivered that crushing chastisement in London many years ago. Sadly, the Vatican keeps proving their point. Unless the Holy See finds its way, it will exit this conflict not as a peacemaker, but as a useful accomplice to the very suffering it claims to deplore.

Maryna Tymchenko is an independent multimedia producer blending cultural heritage with contemporary digital production. She holds an MA in Journalism from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv.

Nurbek Mukambetov is a volunteer with Ukraine Defense Support and a professional manager and consultant. He holds an MPA from UC Berkeley and an MBA from INSEAD.

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Holy See, Russia, Ukraine, Vatican