How Russia turned terrorism into a tool of power
Counterterrorism narratives in Russia have become a justification for centralizing the Kremlin’s power. Unity, discipline and loyalty became security requirements. The more terrorism was framed as a national survival issue, the easier it became to portray pluralism, criticism, and civil society activism as potential vulnerabilities.
September 11, 2026 -
Adam Reichardt
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AnalysisIssue 5 2026Magazine
The Crocus City Hall attack in 2024 is an example of how terrorism can be used within a wider political frame. Even when the responsibility for an attack may not fit the Kremlin’s preferred geopolitical story, the event can still be used to reinforce claims about hostile forces, western indifference, Ukrainian danger, or the need for stronger state control.
Photo: CC - commons.wikimedia.org
Russia’s use of counterterrorism narratives has become one of the central features of its domestic and foreign policy. Since the Chechen wars, the Kremlin has repeatedly presented terrorism not simply as a security problem, but as an existential threat to the Russian state, Russian society, and the wider international order. This framing has allowed the state to justify exceptional measures at home, expand its influence across the post-Soviet space, legitimize military intervention abroad, and present itself as a necessary global security actor. Counterterrorism has become a corner stone of Russian policymaking.
Russia’s contemporary counterterrorism narrative emerged from the trauma and instability of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union produced a deep political, social and geopolitical crisis. Russia lost territory, influence, allies and status. Its economy was weak, its state institutions were fragile, and its military capacity was exposed as limited. At home, the transition to democracy and capitalism was associated by many Russians not with freedom and prosperity, but with crime, corruption, inequality, inflation and uncertainty. Internationally, Russia felt marginalized and humiliated. Western triumphalism after the Cold War, NATO enlargement, and the limited benefits of western financial assistance all fed a wider sense of grievance.
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narratives, Russia, terrorism, War
