“On our own European path”. Why most Moldovans fear unification with Romania, even though their president supports it

Border crossing between Romania and Moldova in Albita. Photo: Ducu Rodionoff / Shutterstock

The idea of unifying Moldova with Romania is not a new one in the public discourse of these two neighbours.

It had suddenly resurfaced in the late 1980s, during the period when a national revival movement was taking place in Moldova, calling for the reintroduction of the Romanian language and an end to Russification. The movement culminated in Moldova’s independence from the Soviet Union, which was to collapse definitively at the very initiative of its former creators.

Unlike the Baltic countries, which have a long tradition of statehood and governance, Moldova and its politicians have seriously considered uniting with Romania, with which they share the same language, history, identity, culture, traditions, and even ethnicity.

After the fall of the communist dictatorship of the Ceaușescu, Romania was a country very different from what it is today. It had only very recently been liberated and was not enthusiastic about any unification scenario, especially since tensions were running high within Romanian society. There were interethnic conflicts between Romanians and Hungarians in certain parts of Transylvania where Hungarian speakers were the majority. Moreover, the Romanian economy was in shambles. The idea that Moldova would be incorporated into its borders – a territory that, although predominantly Romanian-speaking, had politically influential Russian-speaking minorities – frightened Romanian politicians. These figures preferred the model of “two Romanian states and one nation” (inspired by the model of Austria and Germany) rather than a reunification like that of 1918.

What happened 108 years ago in present-day Moldova

One-hundred-and-eight years ago, on March 27th 1918, Bessarabia (the Moldavian Democratic Republic) was united with the Kingdom of Romania. The unification took place against a backdrop of international tension marked by the Bolshevik threat, which was waiting for the right moment to seize control of the territory.

The decision to unite was made by the Moldovan (Romanian-speaking) intelligentsia in Moldova’s major cities, as well as by Moldovan soldiers who were still formally part of the Imperial Russian Army. It was viewed differently by the general population, who were both curious and passive in their response to events, but by no means opposed to them, as Soviet historiography – and later Russian historiography – claims.

The Bessarabian parliament that decided on unification with Romania (the Sfatul Țării) was considered one of the most democratic legislative bodies of its time, as it ensured representation for all ethnic minorities and socio-political organizations in the region. In order to secure a clearer majority vote, extensive and passionate debates were required during parliamentary sessions.

Supporters of unification with Romania in today’s Moldova

After analysing all the opinion polls conducted in Moldova and Romania, as well as other indicators such as election results, we see that support for unification in Moldova does not exceed 35 per cent (including Moldovans living abroad), while in Romania it exceeds 60 per cent. In Moldova, the idea of joining the EU as an independent state (not through unification with Romania) is more popular, enjoying the support of approximately 60 per cent of Moldovans. This reality was confirmed by the results of the latest parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as by the results of the referendum on EU accession.

In Moldova, political parties that have advocated for unification have rarely garnered the votes needed to enter the supreme legislative bodies, while their leaders have often used pro-unification slogans solely for political or economic gain, ultimately compromising their credibility for good.

A major boost to support for EU accession came with the launch of accession negotiations with Moldova and the remarkable speed with which Moldova committed to aligning itself with EU standards. Moldova’s goal – and by extension that of the current pro-European administration led by President Maia Sandu – is to join the EU by 2029–2030, that is, immediately after or concurrently with Montenegro.

Although she has stated that she would vote in favour of unification with Romania if a referendum was held, Sandu has repeatedly emphasized that the priority remains EU accession as an independent state. Her pro-unification statements regarding Romania, and the limited resonance they have had within Moldovan society (following Sandu’s remarks, the number of Moldovans supporting EU accession has increased, while the number of supporters of unification with Romania has remained the same) explain current trends. Moldovans are willing to wait a few more years to be certain that they will join the EU on their own, and not through the “shortcut” that unification with Romania might offer.

Why Moldovans fear or avoid unification with Romania

Many Moldovans are wondering what would happen after unification. There is a fear that the territory of the Republic of Moldova would be neglected economically and would not feature on the map of Romania’s major investments and national projects. This fear is historically justified: part of medieval Moldova’s territory, which is now in Romania – including the major cities of Iași, Suceava, and Galați – was economically neglected by Bucharest. These areas are considered the poorest in all of Romania. Iași, once a capital city, lost this status in 1859 to Bucharest, which became the centre of all of Romania following the union of the two Romanian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. However, viewed from another perspective, unification could bring together the influence and civic efforts of regionalist groups in the Moldavian region of Romania with those in the Republic of Moldova, thereby exerting dual pressure on Bucharest to grant greater local economic freedoms and improve the ability to attract investment autonomously in the two eastern regions.

In 1940, as a result of pressure and threats of “total war” from the Soviet Union, as well as diplomatic pressure from Nazi Germany, Romania ceded Bessarabia to the USSR. Russia – whether under the tsars, during the revolution, or under the Soviet regime – never recognized Bessarabia’s union with Romania in 1918. Although much has been written and much has been said about the events of 1940 – including the offering of many justifications and excuses – the fact remains in the consciousness of Moldovans. They feel they were abandoned and neglected on the eastern border with the USSR and then forgotten by Bucharest. The ease with which Romania ceded the territory of present-day Moldova to the USSR in 1940 has led Moldovans to view with suspicion any unification project that lacks international support and recognition, particularly from Europe, the United States and Türkiye.

There is also fear of extremist nationalist tendencies in Romanian politics, which could jeopardize interethnic harmony in Moldova. This is shared by representatives of Russian-speaking minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, and to some extent Bulgarians and the small Jewish community). However, certain political trends in Romania that seem to be sliding towards the far right are also generating discussions and debates among Romanian speakers in Moldova.

Areas with Russian-speaking minorities also fear a firmer Romanian cultural identity policy, which would encourage assimilation. These groups have become accustomed to the tolerant, liberal legislation and social framework of Moldova. Specifically, Moldova allows them to use Russian in public spaces and at work in relations with clients and employers. In addition, most of them enjoy a high professional status, being concentrated mainly in the country’s large cities, the capital Chisinau, and the northern city of Balti. In the event of unification, the Russian language would lose its influence, and the Romanian language would strengthen its presence. But more importantly, it would become an indispensable professional tool for them. Compared to the Moldovan legal framework, Romanian legislation makes no concessions and is quite firm.

Although there were historical periods when the centralizing nature of Romania’s territorial organization brought benefits to the country, this model no longer seems to be a solution when talking about unification with Moldova. After the formation of the modern Romanian state, the unification in 1918, the transition to communism and until today, there has never been a serious discussion in Romania about possible decentralization. Even after Romania’s accession to the EU and NATO, inequalities in terms of living standards, salaries and large strategic investments and infrastructures have continued to increase. The eastern regions of Romania that border Moldova are proof of the outdated nature of the administrative organization system inherited from the French several centuries ago. It is becoming increasingly clear that any unification cannot ignore the possible reform of Romania’s territorial organization. The solution of a confederation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, and for the division of large investments and the equalization of economic standards between the regions, including the allocation of some to the eastern counties of Iași, Suceava, Galați, etc., could prove indispensable. In addition, Bucharest could no longer be the only and major centre of economic and political gravity under these conditions. The creation of “two capitals”, Bucharest and Chișinău, with the division of major governmental and administrative institutions on the model existing in the Netherlands (Amsterdam and The Hague) should not be ruled out. At this moment, however, neither Moldova nor Romania have any political discussions taking place about a plan for the economic and administrative integration of the two countries. Many Moldovan citizens, including the elites in Chișinău, are wondering what solutions would be required so that a unification would not generate a massive influx of Moldovans to Romania and Bucharest. If unification would mean that most young Moldovans would leave the country en masse towards Romania, accelerating the local demographic decline, unification would bring more disadvantages than advantages.

In Transnistria, the pro-Russian separatist area controlled by the Russian army and FSB agents, the idea of ​​Moldova uniting with Romania is rejected by the majority of residents. Moldova’s separate accession to the EU also has difficulty finding supporters. Things are the same, and in many ways even worse, in the Russified Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia. Although many of the residents of these two centrifugal areas also hold Romanian citizenship, they do not sympathize with Romania, the Romanian language, and the Romanian mentality. It is worth noting that the fear of Romania among many Transnistrians and Gagauz is not objective, in the sense that it is not based on coherent economic, political or social arguments. In most cases, it is about myths originating from former Soviet and current Russian propaganda, with many narratives recycled and brought back to influence the current events of the day. For the inhabitants of Gagauzia and Transnistria, maintaining a distinct administrative status in a hypothetical union with Romania could be a non-negotiable issue, even though Transnistria has never had such a status within Moldova. This is because the area has not been controlled by Chisinau de facto for 34 years and Gagauzia has failed as a Gagauz identity project.

Romania and Transnistria – a historically painful relationship

Romania’s only “real physical contact” with Transnistria took place during the Second World War, and is related to perhaps the most shameful and horrific subject in Romanian history.

During the war, after the liberation of Bessarabia from Soviet occupation, the pro-Nazi military dictator Ion Antonescu ordered Romanian troops to cross over from Romania, east of the Dniester, into what was then considered a non-Romanian area, Transnistria, then larger, encompassing a number of territories currently Ukrainian, then part of the Ukrainian SSR.

After occupying the region, Marshal Antonescu transformed it into the so-called Government of Transnistria, which became a large laboratory for identity experiments, but also a death pit. Here, according to some estimates, approximately 300,000 Jews were murdered, both from eastern Romania and from Bessarabia, Bukovina, northern Bukovina, Transnistria proper, but also many Ukrainian Jews gathered from the Ukrainian territories where the Romanian army was conducting offensive operations. In addition to them, over 10,000 Roma gathered from all over the country were murdered on racial grounds. Some of the murdered were former soldiers of the Romanian Army who fought during World War I for Greater Romania in 1918, but neither their merits as veterans nor their medals would save them.

Only after the fall of communism, and accession to the EU and NATO, did Romania acknowledge its direct responsibility for country’s role in the Holocaust. But although Romania has made efforts to promote the Holocaust as a great tragedy in Romanian history and has worked with the descendants of the victims, Romanian Jews, to encourage memory policies, including the creation of research institutes – the Romanian state’s approach towards non-Romanian Jews (Ukrainians and Russian-speaking) from the east and west of the Prut has been ambiguous.

To date, no high-ranking Romanian official has visited the places where dictator Antonescu ordered the massacre of Ukrainian and Russian Jews – the former Transnistria, including the city of Odesa and other locations, and no commemorative or research policy has been carried out.

This vulnerability was exploited by Russia in the current Transnistria, including during the Moldovan-Russian war in the region (1991-1992), when local Russian propaganda portrayed the Moldovan military in dehumanizing poses, and attached labels to them from the Soviet propaganda apparatus (“Romanian-fascists”, “Moldo-Romanian occupiers”, “descendants of Antonescu’s executioners”). The propaganda hit not only Romania, which Russia tried to discourage from militarily helping the Republic of Moldova by reminding it of the crimes committed by Antonescu five decades ago, but also Moldova, which after the collapse of the USSR recognized its common identity with Romania, Romanian descent and common past.

An important judicial gesture by the Romanian state towards the surviving victims of the Holocaust outside of Romania (Odesa, Transnistria, northern Bukovina, Bessarabia) and their direct descendants is the allotment of monthly compensation.

Other reasons

There is also a fear of discrimination based on ethnicity, language and dialect. Although they speak Romanian, most Moldovans use their own dialect in their speech. Not infrequently, Moldovans who have worked, studied or travelled in Romania have reported cases of discrimination. Although the cases cannot be generalized, such a perception exists in Moldovan society. However, most Romanians have a positive and even curious opinion about Moldovans and their way of speaking Romanian, and some treat the Moldovan dialect with respect, considering it an ancestral heritage.

In the absence of discussions on territorial reorganization, there is a fear in Moldovan society that most of the costs of unification would be paid by Moldovans, and economic inequalities would increase, which would turn such a project into a disaster. The question is if Romania does not have the economic power that the Federal Republic of Germany had when it integrated the GDR, and where there are still great inequalities, what other solution besides a confederation would be truly sustainable for the two Romanian-speaking states.

The fear of a Russian military threat is fairly widespread in Moldovan society. It is believed that Russia could instrumentalize or exacerbate possible cases of discrimination against Russian speakers in Moldova to justify a possible military aggression. Although it is not clear how Russia could attack Moldova if it were to unite with Romania (being in NATO), Moldovans seem to be quite cautious when it comes to the geopolitical context. This could also explain the very tolerant societal framework in Moldova towards Russian-speaking areas. In addition, some pro-Russian politicians in Moldova are spreading narratives that in the event of unification, a civil war would break out on the territory of Moldova. This would generate a simultaneous military intervention by Russia and Romania on the territory of Moldova for the protection of Romanian speakers on the one hand, and Russian speakers on the other.

Constantin Dicusar is a journalist and historian from Moldova. His areas of interest and research include Moldovan-Romanian relations, political issues in the post-Soviet space, ethnic minorities in Romania, and the history of international relations in and with Eastern Europe.

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Moldavia, Moldova, Moldovan politics, Romania, Romanian politics, Romanian-Moldovan relations