Building trust across borders: Rethinking Ukrainian–Romanian relations in a changing Europe

Flags of Ukraine, Romania and the EU at a border crossing between the two countries. Photo: Mircea Moira / Shutterstock

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the political and security landscape of Central Europe, bringing issues of sovereignty, resilience, and interethnic relations to the centre of regional debate. In this context, relations between Ukraine and Romania have become increasingly strategic, while also revealing long-standing sensitivities around history, identity, and national minorities. These issues are no longer peripheral. Indeed, they are directly linked to Ukraine’s EU accession process and to the broader question of building stable and trust-based relations in Central Europe. At the same time, these issues remain highly vulnerable to political instrumentalization by external actors, as well as by domestic populist forces such as the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR).

In this interview, the Romanian analyst, historian, and former advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Armand Goșu, reflects on the current state of Ukrainian-Romanian relations in the context of the war and shifting regional dynamics. He discusses how minority issues are perceived in Romania’s political landscape and why they remain both a sensitive and strategically important topic. The conversation also explores how Ukraine and Romania can move beyond historical tensions and external manipulation toward a more structured and forward-looking partnership.

LILIIA SHUTIAK: Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Romania has emerged as one of Ukraine and the West’s key allies in the region. This was particularly evident during the blockade of the Ukrainian-Polish border and the Black Sea, which affected Ukrainian grain exports. The presidents of Ukraine and Romania announced a shift in their relationship to the level of strategic partnership in 2023. In 2024, Romania delivered the Patriot missile system to Ukraine while in the midst of its own election campaign. How would you describe Ukrainian-Romanian relations today, especially following the controversial Romanian presidential elections? What are the main characteristics of these relations and their key drivers?

ARMAND GOȘU: Romania’s attitude after 2014, and especially after February 2022, is a pleasant surprise, at least for me. I’ve been closely following the relations between Bucharest and Kyiv since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The tensions between the two countries were mostly artificial and were largely the result of manipulations, from which Moscow was no stranger. Of course, it is not only Moscow that is to blame for the fact that Bucharest and Kyiv have not been able to build a trust-based partnership. None of the contentious topics (the Bystroye Canal, education in the Romanian language in Ukraine, minority rights, or the subordination of churches with services in Romanian) are unsolvable. We just need a dialogue in good faith not only between diplomats, but also between our societies. It is only after February 24th 2022, with the influx of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees (very few of whom have actually stayed in Romania), that the Romanians’ desire to know more about Ukraine, and the Ukrainians’ desire to know more about Romania, have increased. So, it was only then that many found out (with surprise, I would say!) that Ukrainians are not Russians, that they have their own language and culture and that they are fighting with great courage and enormous sacrifice against an extreme manifestation of the Russian empire.

I know it may seem ridiculous, but for many Romanians the level of knowledge of Eastern Europe, of the Slavic peoples, is ridiculously low.

Ironically, I think this is a good time for Romanian-Ukrainian relations. I know that the rise in the polls of the populist group AUR to 40 per cent is worrying Ukraine. This is due to the aggressive anti-Ukrainian rhetoric practiced by this political party. However, elections will be held in three years’ time, and a lot will have changed by then. The president, the foreign minister, and the prime minister will not produce anti-Ukrainian rhetoric or promote anti-Ukrainian policies in the public space. On the contrary, I believe that Ukraine has never had more sympathizers in Romania’s leadership than now.

What is important for Ukraine to know about contemporary Romania, its updated political landscape, and its current foreign policy?

Romania is an atypical country, especially for the European Union. What I am about to tell you will surprise you. But the fact that you have a good understanding of how Russia works will actually help you understand Romania. But, to understand Romania, you first need to know who is who. In Romania, there has been no renewal of the elite after communism, no negotiation like in Poland in 1989, and no lustration. The roots of the current political and economic elite go back to the communist period and the events of December 1989, when Nicolae Ceușescu was shot. His shooting was the price the former nomenklatura and the Securitate men paid to save themselves. They are the ones who controlled the subsequent post-communist transition and the ones who became its main beneficiaries. Now that you understand this, you have to realize that the Social Democratic Party (which has nothing to do with social-democratic ideology, but is the party of the administration) has ruled Romania for 22 years. That is 60 per cent of the time since the break with communism. Even though the party was in opposition, it still controlled the foreign ministry and the foreign intelligence service. This mattered in charting the political line in the relationship with Ukraine. This explains why so little has fundamentally changed in the bilateral relationship. Now, on the occasion of President Zelenskyy’s visit to Bucharest, the ethnic and national issue was still important for President Nicușor Dan and part of the Romanian press. The fact that President Zelenskyy declared August 31st as the day of Romanian language in Ukraine was a very intelligent move. I believe that the foreign ministry in Kyiv has very correctly read Romania and its interest in ethno-nationalist issues. Another issue most certain to raise tensions between Bucharest and Kyiv (when it will come up) will be that of granting Romanian passports – a big ethno-business at the level of the Romanian Foreign Ministry and secret services.

Do not be scared of AUR – it is a political organization created by the secret services, first and foremost by the SRI. They are created to make noise. At the crucial moments, you’ll see they respond to orders. Recently, AUR voted on the budget and left the Social Democratic Party offside.

Why? Because they’re being controlled. Romania cannot afford to follow Hungary’s political line at the moment, although many of its political-military elite would like to.

Without money from Brussels, Romania is too weak, it has no chance of survival. This is why political developments in Hungary have been closely watched. However, following Orban’s electoral defeat, the regional dynamic may shift in a more pro-European direction. Still, if Trump comes out stronger out of the Iran war, the chances of a PSD-AUR government with anti-Ukrainian policies coming to Bucharest are higher.

But these things are unlikely to happen. Romania is too weak, with too many internal political crises to afford populist and sovereigntist excesses.

Romania has gone through a complex process of EU integration, particularly regarding the rights of national minorities. Which lessons from this experience could be most useful for Ukraine today, and what mistakes should be avoided?

Romania has a Hungarian minority of six to seven per cent that is politically represented in most of the governing coalitions with ministers, secretaries of state, etc. The Hungarian minority has posts in local administration. The counties in central Transylvania with Hungarian majorities (Harghita, Covasna) have Hungarian prefects and Hungarian-only schools, all generously funded from the Romanian budget.

It was a successful operation to seduce Hungarians in Romania.

At least the seduction of the Hungarian elite succeeded.

They got high positions in the administration, they are present in most governments, and they are well regarded in Romanian public opinion. So today it is difficult – but not impossible – to generate a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians.

The pressure from Brussels has been useful, as it has sanctioned any slippage from Bucharest, even if only verbally.

The networks of associations and NGOs have been the best agents of Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement and have been very important. And here, George Soros’ foundations played a key role. The biggest problem has turned out to be the mentality of politicians who, for a long time, continued to use the emotions of ethnic conflicts to score political points. Only the change in the attitude of voters, who no longer responded to such stimuli, forced them to give up.

Unfortunately, Hungary’s place as an enemy in the Romanian collective mentality has been taken over by Ukraine, which for almost two decades became Romania’s “problem” neighbour.

Romania and Ukraine are geopolitically similar in that they both face multiple fronts. Romania is simultaneously a Central European, Black Sea, and Balkan country. What experience does Romania have in building regional partnerships, fostering reconciliation with neighbours, and forming small regional alliances that Ukraine could draw on in the context of both European integration and strengthening its own resilience?

Romania has a long tradition of regional alliances. In the interwar period, Romania formed the “Little Entente” alongside Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. This was done to maintain the borders established at Trianon in the face of Hungarian revisionist pressure. It was initiated by Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, but the idea was immediately embraced by Bucharest.

Another alliance was the “Balkan Entente”, which was organized alongside Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to block Bulgarian revisionism.

After 1990, Romania has been promoting trilaterals on the eastern border with Ukraine and Moldova, and with Ukraine and Poland since 1997-98. Cold relations between Bucharest and Kyiv have prevented these partnerships from realizing their potential. Over the last two decades, Romania has developed a set of well-functioning strategic partnerships that may be of interest to Ukraine. For example, there is a Romania-Poland-Turkey trilateral where security and defence issues are discussed.

For EU and NATO accession, the process of improving relations with our neighbours was essential.

In 1997, Romania signed a bilateral treaty with Ukraine when it hoped to catch the wave of NATO enlargement. Many good things happened under external pressure, because there was insufficient political will in Bucharest.

There was enough political intelligence not to block these processes. Consequently, Romania has been a member of NATO for 22 years and of the EU for almost 20 years.

Northern Bukovina is a region where the issue of Ukrainian-Romanian coexistence has a very concrete, human dimension. How should regions like this, which serve as frontier zones, be approached so that they transform from points of tension and disinformation into laboratories of good-neighbourliness and trust, rather than areas for political speculation?

I believe in patiently explaining the situation in the Chernivtsi region to the Romanian public several times, inviting journalists to report from there, as well as coverage by the Ukrainian media of Ukrainian minority life in Romania. Such actions could reduce the room for action available to populist politicians and Russian propaganda. The most effective tool to counteract the false narratives that plague the bilateral Romanian-Ukrainian relationship is by direct and widespread public knowledge of the actual situation of the Romanian minority in Ukraine – direct visits, people-to-people contacts, direct journalistic reporting from the field, not intermediated by third parties who have a vested interest in sowing discord (usually entities with some degree of connection to the Romanian Orthodox Church).

The most vehement “advocates” of the Romanian minority in Ukraine have never been to Ukraine in their lives. They have no interest in going there, but they are happy to have found a “cause” to support. Perhaps there could be more active involvement on the part of representatives of the Romanian community in the Chernivtsi and Odesa regions, who would come to the public arena with alternative points of view to those promoted by nationalist politicians and revisionist associations.

I am telling you this from my experience as a journalist, who worked in Moscow, Kyiv and Chisinau in the BBC World Service offices for eight years, starting in 1995. Romania and Ukraine have communicated through the Russian press in Moscow for decades. For Ukrainians, Romania was Ukraine’s greatest enemy and the greatest threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. And for Romanians, Ukraine was worse than the Stalinist Soviet Union. Chisinau, where the Russian press was translated into Romanian, also played a role, and not exactly a positive one. This is how Romanians’ minds ended up viewing Ukraine as a great enemy. Today in Ukraine there are about three to four competent people writing about Romania.

Because of the war, there are a few dozen people in Romania who follow the political scene in Kyiv and the evolution of the war. Interest is decreasing more and more, year by year. I count myself among those who believe that disinformation should be fought with the truth, not with anti-disinformation campaigns, which are usually done for big money. In the long term this is the best policy. The more contacts between Romanians and Ukrainians, the more books translated, movies seen, tourism, mixed marriages, the harder it will be to manipulate the population.

Why does Romania support Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO? Please explain the logic, and could this support change in the future? What conditions would ensure that Romania’s support for Ukraine remains steady, and what actions should Ukraine take whether in terms of gestures, policies, or other measures to maintain it?

The support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO, i.e. the institutionalized West, is the best Romanian foreign policy invention of the last few decades. For the first time since the Crimean War, the political frontier of Europe, which was the western border of the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union, is now moving eastwards by one thousand kilometres. For the first time, Romania is no longer a frontier territory, but will be inside Europe, which will translate into advantages not only in terms of security but also economically, politically, culturally and in the psychology of a nation that has always considered itself under threat from Russia.

Yes, support can change. Romania is very vulnerable to foreign influences, so the support it gives to Ukraine will depend primarily on what happens on the front, on whether Ukraine will confirm its sovereignty and independence with a gun in its hand. Of course, it also depends on the US, which has a great influence on Romania politically and militarily. At the same time, the EU also counts, especially France and Germany, which dominate in terms of investment. The Zelenskyy administration has found the key to open the door to Romania. The Bucharest authorities are sensitive to Ukraine’s cultural policy towards the Romanian minority. The fact that Zelenskyy responded promptly to Bucharest’s anxieties has robbed the Bucharest elite of the pretext of identifying Ukraine as an external enemy.

Now, the important thing would be for Ukraine to push relations with Romania to another level, but there will be a lot of work to do here. But I think it is worth the effort, as the longest border with an EU and NATO member state is the Romanian-Ukrainian border. The bilateral relationship should overcome the ethno-nationalist register (a thing of the past) and must advance towards serious economic, social, security, defence, cultural and educational projects.

The projects should be direct, Romanian-Ukrainian projects, not to be taken over by other states, such as Poland or Moldova.

If you were tasked with drafting a strategic partnership agreement between Ukraine and Romania, what would you focus on – five to seven key issues or themes?

• Unconditional support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO.

• Close cooperation in the field of security and defence (in the defence industry, joint military units, joint training, a joint military fleet for the Black Sea, joint manufacturing, etc.).

• Cultural and educational exchanges (of pupils, students), a policy of financial support for studies about Romania in Ukraine and about Ukraine in Romania (training a set of experts in history, literature, translators etc). A policy of financing the translation and exchange of artistic movies and documentaries. The Romanian language in Ukraine and Ukrainian language in Romania should not just be for minorities but for wider studies and research. We need to get to know each other better, without arrogance, without exercises of narcissism, as we are, and understand the real issues.

• A policy to support mutual investments and Ukrainians in Romania and Romanians in Ukraine.

• Supporting the development of infrastructure connecting the two countries as a matter of priority, with more customs points, highways connecting the two countries, railroad lines on which the average speed of travel is 160 kilometres per hour. The highway would go as far as Siret, from where it would cross into Ukraine.

• Encourage inter-regional twinning projects (e.g. Constanta – Odesa, Suceava – Chernivtsi, Galati – Mykolaiv, etc.)

This publication was compiled by the Institute for Central European Strategy (ICES) with the support of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation within the framework of the “Whole-of-Society Accession” project. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation.

Armand Goșu is a Romanian analyst, historian, and former advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

Liliia Shutiak is the regional coordinator of the Re:Open Ukraine initiative.

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border, Cross-Border Cooperation, interview, Romania, Romanian foreign policy, Romanian politics, Ukraine