When elections are managed: what Georgia and Hungary’s campaigns have in common

Flags of Georgia and Hungary / Shutterstock

Recent investigative reporting, including a BBC documentary on the election campaigns of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, highlights systematic strategies of voter coercion, intimidation, and the strategic use of administrative resources. Georgia presents an even more challenging environment in this regard. Over the past thirteen years, particularly in the regions I have directly overseen, elections have increasingly relied on managed processes involving vote-buying, manipulation of social benefits, and the use of threats against public employees and opposition candidates. In addition, organized street groups and local criminal networks have been mobilized to influence voters directly, and there have been reports of conditional incentives, including access to narcotics for users, tied explicitly to support for the ruling party.

For European observers, these dynamics are especially concerning. Unlike Hungary, Georgia is not an EU member, external oversight is minimal, and safeguards against electoral coercion are weak. This creates a political environment in which undemocratic practices are not only pervasive but systematically entrenched, with the ruling party consolidating control over both formal institutions and informal mechanisms of voter influence. Understanding these dynamics is essential to assessing the country’s democratic trajectory and the broader risks for governance in EU-adjacent states.

Beyond candidate-level manipulation, Georgia’s electoral environment since 2016 has been systematically shaped by broader coercive and manipulative tactics that have intensified over successive election cycles. In numerous elections since 2017 issues such as vote-buying, intimidation, and administrative pressure have been pervasive. Opposition-leaning voters were frequently threatened with the loss of social benefits, pressured by public officials to vote for the ruling Georgian Dream party, or, in some cases, had their identification documents confiscated to prevent participation. Election day operations often involved the organized transportation of select voters to polling stations, while others faced physical intimidation or harassment. In 2024 alone, during the parliamentary election week in the city of Zugdidi, my daily briefings reported that over 1,000 voters were denied the ability to cast their ballots through ID confiscation. Many ultimately did not report these abuses out of fear. Socially vulnerable citizens were directly told that access to welfare payments depended on supporting the ruling party, while public employees faced threats of dismissal for non-compliance.

In addition, informal groups, including so-called “street mafias” or organized criminal elements, were mobilized in multiple municipalities to influence voter behaviour. Independent investigative reporting, such as the aforementioned BBC documentary on the election campaigns of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, illustrates parallel methods of voter coercion, intimidation, and the strategic use of administrative resources. However, Georgia presents a more challenging environment. Electronic voting introduced in 2024, for example, compromised ballot secrecy: markers on ballots allowed party operatives to trace voter choices before insertion into envelopes, effectively enabling the systematic monitoring of all votes. Furthermore, the deployment of “captains” or call-centre operators facilitated real-time oversight of voter turnout, creating additional layers of control over opposition-leaning constituencies.

Throughout this period, I personally reported these systematic abuses, by name and location, to both international and local observation missions. These reports highlighted the multi-layered strategies employed by the ruling party – combining legal, administrative, and extralegal mechanisms – to consolidate electoral control. Conditional incentives, such as access to social benefits or even narcotics for supporters, further reinforced party dominance, demonstrating the highly coordinated and pervasive nature of electoral manipulation in Georgia.

However, comparing Georgia to Hungary today requires acknowledging a far more brutal escalation in Tbilisi. While Viktor Orbán is still constrained by some EU institutional norms—forced, for instance, to navigate European Court rulings on the “Russian Law”—Bidzina Ivanishvili has demonstrated a complete disregard for such safeguards. In Georgia, the reintroduction of this legislation was a direct declaration of war against civil society, aimed at the total liquidation of NGOs and the explicit threat of banning opposition parties altogether. This moves Georgia beyond the “illiberal democracy” of Hungary and closer to a total authoritarian model.

This institutional collapse is accompanied by a campaign of physical terror that has no modern parallel in Hungary. The pre-election period in Georgia is defined by a state-sponsored strategy of fear, involving the systematic beating and torture of young activists and political opponents. Furthermore, the regime has increasingly relied on the taking of political prisoners to decapitate opposition leadership and intimidate dissent. While Orbán primarily uses the law and administrative pressure to suppress, Ivanishvili employs physical retribution, judicial persecution, and the mobilization of criminal networks—the so-called “thieves-in-law”—to maintain control over the streets and the ballot box.

Furthermore, Georgia’s structural vulnerability is exacerbated by extreme economic hardship. As a significantly poorer nation than Hungary, Georgia’s rural populations are far more susceptible to systemic vote-buying, including the unique “know-how” of confiscated ID cards to prevent opposition participation. While Hungarian institutions maintained a degree of residual resilience, Georgia faces total state capture, where every public agency and the monolithic “Judicial Clan” operate under the direct, vertical control of Ivanishvili, functioning as a punitive arm rather than a legal institution.

The 2024 Peter Magyar phenomenon in Hungary adds a critical layer to this analysis, effectively shattering the myth that “mechanical unity” of heterogeneous parties is the only path to victory. Magyar proved that an authentic, value-driven alternative can be more effective than an artificial, heterogeneous alliance. Yet, for Georgia, the challenge is intensified by geography; while Hungary is an Eastern European nation within the EU safety net, Georgia exists under the immediate, suffocating shadow of Russian influence and 20 per cent territorial occupation. Ivanishvili’s actions represent a strategic shift away from the West toward Moscow’s sphere of interest.

Despite these hurdles, the shifting tide in Hungary is a beacon of hope. A victory for democratic forces in Hungary would signal a direct blow to Putin’s primary ally within the Union, diplomatically isolating the Georgian regime. For the Georgian people, it serves as a powerful reminder that even the most entrenched illiberal systems have an expiration date. When the “Hungarian bastion” falls, it will not only weaken Russia’s foothold in Europe but will provide the Georgian resistance with the ultimate strategic hope: that the path to Europe remains open, and the struggle for dignity is far from over.

Ana Tsitlidze is a PhD Candidate in Political Science and a researcher focused on democracy and governance. She is a former Member of the Parliament of Georgia and has been twice elected to the Zugdidi City Council. A leading member of the United National Movement, she also serves as a guest lecturer at Caucasus University in Tbilisi.

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democracy, election campaigns, elections, Georgia, Hungary, illiberalism