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From support to strategy: Europe’s unfinished role in Ukraine

Europe has provided unprecedented support to Ukraine since 2022. Yet as the war enters a prolonged phase, the absence of a coordinated long-term framework risks turning this effort into a reactive and fragmented response.

April 16, 2026 - Elkhan Nuriyev - Articles and Commentary

Protest against the war in solidarity with Ukraine in front of the European Parliament in Brussels. March 1st, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock

Now in its fifth year, the Russia-Ukraine war presents Europe with a different challenge — not of immediate response, but of its capacity to maintain strategic coherence. The conflict has evolved into a protracted and costly confrontation, testing Europe not only in its solidarity, but increasingly in its capacity to shape the outcome.

Europe’s reactive approach

While European governments, together with the United States, have provided extensive military, financial, and humanitarian assistance, their approach remains largely driven by events. It is shaped by battlefield developments rather than guided by a clearly defined end state.

This distinction is critical. Sustaining Ukraine’s defence is essential, but it is not sufficient. Without a coordinated long-term vision, European support risks becoming a patchwork of measures that may prevent defeat but fail to shape conditions for a durable outcome. The question facing Europe today is not simply how to maintain support, but how to define its role in influencing the trajectory of the war and the future security order in Eastern Europe.

Since 2022, European commitments have expanded significantly, including advanced air defence systems, macro-financial assistance, sanctions regimes, and training missions. Yet these efforts remain uneven and often inconsistent. National political cycles, fiscal constraints, and differing threat perceptions continue to shape decisions, limiting the emergence of a shared strategic framework. In this sense, Europe is still managing the war rather than actively shaping its direction.

Limits of defence coordination

The limitations of this approach are particularly visible in the defence domain. Despite repeated pledges to scale up production and improve coordination, joint procurement and defence-industrial cooperation have struggled to keep pace with wartime demands. The European Union’s initiative to supply one million artillery shells exposed these shortcomings, highlighting delays, fragmented national approaches, and insufficient industrial capacity at a critical moment. While Europe has demonstrated significant economic strength, translating this into sustained military coherence remains an ongoing challenge.

For Ukraine, the consequences are immediate. Uncertainty surrounding the timing and scale of military assistance complicates operational planning and reinforces a cautious, incremental approach among its partners. At the same time, persistent gaps in air defence coverage leave critical infrastructure vulnerable to continued Russian strikes. What emerges is a form of support that is substantial yet uneven. It is effective in parts but lacks overall strategic cohesion.

This situation reflects not only policy choices but also structural constraints. Political divisions within Europe, debates over burden sharing, and the economic pressures of a prolonged war all influence national decision-making. Moreover, while the United States remains a central pillar of support, its long-term role cannot be taken for granted, particularly as Washington’s commitment shows signs of reduced engagement in Ukraine. In this context, greater European strategic ownership is no longer optional — it is becoming a necessity.

From endurance to strategy

A more coherent European approach would require several interrelated steps.

First, political objectives need to be clarified. General expressions of solidarity cannot replace a shared understanding of what constitutes success. Whether defined as the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the consolidation of a sovereign and defensible state, or a negotiated settlement underpinned by credible guarantees, the absence of clarity weakens both policy direction and deterrence.

Second, burden sharing within Europe must become more predictable and institutionalized. Moving beyond ad hoc national contributions towards coordinated, long-term commitments in defence production, financial assistance, and military support would significantly enhance effectiveness. Strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base is central not only for Ukraine’s immediate needs but also for the continent’s broader security.

Third, Europe must play a more active role in shaping a credible long-term security framework for Ukraine. Questions surrounding NATO membership, bilateral security guarantees, or alternative arrangements remain unresolved. Yet without clearer direction, deterrence will remain uncertain. A sustainable framework — combining continued military support, deeper institutional integration, and long-term political commitments — will be essential to reduce the risk of renewed instability in the region.

Ultimately, strategic endurance should not be mistaken for strategy. If European governments fail to align their military support with a clear political and security vision, the war risks being shaped more by inertia than by deliberate policy. Ukraine may continue to resist, but without a coherent framework, the conflict could harden into a prolonged and costly stalemate.

The window for shaping the outcome is narrowing. Europe has demonstrated its capacity to act in moments of crisis. The challenge now is to move beyond reactive policymaking and articulate a coherent framework that aligns with its ambitions — for Ukraine today, and for European security tomorrow.

Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev is a Senior Fellow with the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Berlin and a Senior Expert on Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia at LM Political Risk and Strategy Advisory in Vienna. He previously served as a Fulbright Scholar at The George Washington University and an Eastern Europe-Global Area Fellow at Leipzig University, and has held senior positions at leading think tanks across Europe and the United States.

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