The hunt for peace: unsuccessful attempts to mediate Ukrainian-Russian peace from 2022 to 2026

Potemkin Steps in Odesa, Ukraine. Photo: Sergii Figurnyi / Shutterstock

The unagreed Istanbul communiqué of 2022

The first meeting between Ukrainian and Russian delegations after the start of the full-scale invasion took place in Homyel, Belarus, on February 28th 2022. Subsequently, throughout March, negotiations were held in Istanbul, the capital of Turkey. No concrete results were achieved beyond attempts to organize humanitarian corridors.

Specific proposals and demands from both sides remained known for a long time only through accounts from delegation participants, rumours, and information from journalistic sources. It was only in June 2024 that the New York Times published full draft versions of the peace agreements developed in the spring of 2022. The documents cover versions from March 17th to April 15th 2022. According to the journalists, the authenticity of the documents was “confirmed by participants in the negotiations and other people close to them,” although neither Kyiv nor Moscow officially recognized them.

According to the documents, Kyiv was considering significant concessions: the constitutional enshrinement of neutrality with a refusal to join NATO (while preserving the possibility of EU accession), de facto reconciliation with the occupation of Crimea without legal recognition, and unilateral restrictions on the army without substantial disarmament.

The main stumbling block was the article on security guarantees: the agreement envisioned guarantors (the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia) who would provide Ukraine with military assistance in the event of an attack. However, Moscow insisted on consensus-based decision-making among the guarantors, effectively retaining a veto right for itself, which undermined the entire protection system. Moreover, the negotiations took place without representatives from the countries that were to provide security guarantees. As a result, their consent still needs to be obtained.

The documents contained highlighted sections that were not agreed upon between the participants, and it was the discrepancies in these sections that proved critical. In addition to security guarantees, the parties sharply diverged on the future of Ukraine’s armed forces. Kyiv proposed quantitative indicators for the maximum size that were close to the real capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as of early 2022. Moscow, in contrast, demanded draconian restrictions — 85,000 personnel, a reduction of nearly 85 per cent for some types of armaments, 342 tanks, and missile range limits to 40 kilometres. This would have meant the virtually complete disarmament of Ukraine.

The issue of withdrawing Russian troops from the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts remained unaddressed in the text, with reference to a non-existent annex containing a map. Putin later stated that the discussion concerned withdrawal only with guarantees of a land corridor to Crimea. Also unagreed by Kyiv were Russian demands that included: official status for the Russian language on par with Ukrainian, legislative changes regarding “denazification”, the cancellation of all sanctions and legal claims since 2014, and restrictions on cooperation with the International Criminal Court.

Russian propaganda, and even some European politicians such as Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, claim that the “Istanbul agreements” in the spring of 2022 were already “almost signed” and fell apart due to “external interference” (most often blaming then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson). However, an analysis of the available information on the content of the negotiations and the published documents shows that the parties were in fact very far from aligning their positions on critical points. Russia’s demands, which Ukraine did not accept — particularly in the areas of international security guarantees and restrictions on military capabilities — effectively amounted to a de facto capitulation by Kyiv and the abandonment of its ability to defend itself.

There were vaguely worded provisions regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territories. If Ukraine had agreed to Moscow’s demands, then it would have lost any ability to influence subsequent political and military processes within its own borders and would have been left vulnerable to the further establishment of de facto control by the Kremlin — whether through direct occupation or through the presentation of new demands in the future.

Putin’s “ultimatum” of 2024

On June 14th 2024, on the eve of the Peace Summit in Switzerland, Putin delivered a statement he described as a “real peace proposal”. For the first time, he explicitly demanded that Ukraine fully cede four oblasts: Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk. This would have included Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, cities that Russian forces had not even approached at that point; Kherson was liberated in 2022, while Zaporizhzhia has remained under Ukrainian control throughout.

Putin emphasized that the surrender of these territories was merely a “precondition” for beginning negotiations, during which “demilitarization and denazification” would be discussed. In addition to the territories, the Kremlin also demanded: Ukraine’s refusal to join NATO, recognition of the annexation of Crimea, and a neutral, non-aligned status for Kyiv. Putin claimed that “these parameters were agreed upon during the Istanbul negotiations.” In the event of a refusal, the Russian president threatened “continued bloodshed”.

Ukraine’s foreign ministry called these statements an attempt to sabotage the Peace Summit, noting that “Russia is afraid of true peace.” Zelenskyy described the demands as ultimatum-like and compared them to Nazi Germany’s policies before the Second World War: first demanding parts of Czechoslovakia, then seizing Poland, and ultimately aiming to occupy all of Europe. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte even called the proposal “insane” and a sign of Putin’s panic.

In this ultimatum, Putin demanded not only Ukrainian territories but also strategically vital areas from military and economic perspectives: defensive lines in the eastern Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration, Kherson with a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro, and industrial Zaporizhzhia with the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Station. Fulfilling these demands would sharply undermine Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and, as with Russia’s demands in Istanbul, open the path to further occupation.

Putin’s statements in 2024 fit into the broader pattern of Kremlin propaganda tactics: “Agree to our conditions now, or things will get worse later.” In particular, Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, commenting on his boss’s words, stated that the situation in spring 2022 was better because Russia was not officially demanding the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts at that time, and “the situation will be different going forward.”

Zelenskyy’s formula for peace

Ukraine’s peace plan, known as “Zelenskyy’s Formula”, was first presented at the G20 Summit in November 2022. The proposals frame the aggression against Ukraine and its consequences within a broader global context. For instance, the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is presented as an issue of global nuclear safety, the export of Ukrainian grain as an essential component of food security, and the integrity of Ukraine’s energy system as an inseparable part of global energy security. Environmental protection in Ukraine and ecological security are also closely intertwined with the worldwide context.

At the same time, the plan addresses Ukraine’s core interests: the cessation of hostilities and the full withdrawal of Russian troops, the return of prisoners of war and deported persons, fair compensation for victims of aggression, and trials for the organizers and perpetrators of the aggression. Zelenskyy’s peace formula emphasizes the creation of a clear and reliable post-war global security architecture, including security guarantees for Ukraine and a definitive end to the war.

The Ukrainian peace formula has received official support from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Turkey, India (with reservations), the European Union as a whole, and several individual EU member states. On February 23rd 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (ES-11/6) that incorporated key elements of Ukraine’s proposed “peace formula”, titled “Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. It passed with strong backing (141 votes in favour), demonstrating broad international endorsement. The formula showcased Ukraine’s agency and commitment to peaceful negotiations on the global stage, significantly undermining Russian propaganda narratives that Ukraine does not want peace. The Russian leadership angrily rejected the Ukrainian initiative.

Subsequent summits in Copenhagen (June 2023), Jeddah (August 2023), and Switzerland (June 2024), focused on implementing Ukraine’s peace formula and mobilizing worldwide support for Kyiv. Participants at these meetings signed communiqués on nuclear safety and prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia, but these did not lead to any agreements or peacekeeping steps from Moscow.

Proposals from the Global South

In 2023 and 2024, a series of initiatives emerged reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of the so-called Global South. China, Brazil, Indonesia, and African states put forward various “plans” that were driven by a desire to enhance their influence on the world stage, mitigate the negative economic impacts of the war on their own economies (such as rising grain and fertilizer prices), and position themselves as neutral mediators. However, these initiatives often overlooked Ukraine’s key demands, such as the full withdrawal of Russian troops, rendering them ineffective and leading to Kyiv’s rejection. 

On the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China’s foreign ministry released its “peace plan”, consisting of 12 points. The initiative included recommendations for a ceasefire, respect for the sovereignty of all countries, the abandonment of a “Cold War mentality” (a critique of NATO expansion), the resumption of negotiations, humanitarian aid, the protection of nuclear facilities, the facilitation of grain exports, the cessation of unilateral sanctions, and the stabilization of supply chains.

Ukraine’s leadership and western allies received the document sceptically, criticizing its lack of concrete steps to end the war — such as the withdrawal of Russian troops. Beijing offered no mechanisms to engage the parties in talks and made no effort to secure UN-level recognition for the initiative. China’s motivation lay in positioning itself as a global peacemaker and rival to the United States, while indirectly supporting Russia to preserve its strategic partnership and economic ties, including energy trade. The plan served more as an informational tool to boost influence among Global South countries than as a genuine path to peace.

In early 2023, Brazil’s new administration under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva began advocating for peace in Ukraine. It proposed forming a contact group or “peace club” that would include China, India and Indonesia to help broker an agreement between Ukraine and Russia. 

However, no practical steps or roadmap for resolution were outlined. Lula refused to supply weapons to Kyiv, citing a commitment to neutrality, and even suggested that Ukraine might need to cede Crimea for peace. Brazil’s motivations included restoring its global influence as a leader of the Global South, alleviating the war’s economic fallout (rising food and fertilizer prices), and advancing Lula’s personal ambitions as a peacemaker.

African diplomats also pursued peace in Ukraine, advancing ideas for negotiation formats involving non-western states. In June–July 2023, a delegation of leaders from seven African countries (South Africa, Egypt, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Comoros, Zambia and Uganda), led by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, visited Kyiv and Moscow. They presented a ten-point plan that included the recognition of both sides’ sovereignty, a ceasefire, humanitarian aid, the return of abducted children, and unimpeded exports of grain and fertilizers.

The mission was motivated by the war’s economic consequences for Africa: soaring food prices (with 15 African countries, including Eritrea, Egypt, Benin, Sudan, Djibouti and Tanzania importing over 50 per cent of their wheat from Ukraine and Russia), food insecurity, and aspirations for a greater global role. African leaders sought to apply moral pressure by highlighting the continent’s suffering. However, the plan did not require troop withdrawal and was rejected as insufficient. South Africa, as the mission’s leader, emphasized its equidistance from Kyiv and Moscow, though accusations of a pro-Russian tilt (e.g., joint military exercises with Russia) diminished its credibility.

Indonesia also advanced a peacemaking initiative. In June 2023, Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, proposed a plan that included an immediate ceasefire along current lines, the creation of a demilitarized zone with troop withdrawals of 15 kilometres on each side, the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and a UN-supervised referendum in “disputed territories”. Indonesia’s motivations included safeguarding global food security (given its reliance on wheat imports from the region), positioning itself as a bridge for peace, and advancing Prabowo’s ambitions as a future national leader (he was elected president later that year). Ukraine rejected the plan, viewing it as legitimizing the occupation by entrenching front-line realities and outsourcing territorial decisions to a referendum under contested conditions.

The initiatives from third countries in 2023–24 diversified approaches to resolution, engaging global stakeholders and highlighting economic dimensions (grain exports, sanctions relief). They signalled the Global South’s desire to amplify its voice in world politics and minimize domestic losses from the war.

However, most plans remained abstract, failed to demand Russian troop withdrawal, and were perceived as favouring Moscow, ultimately widening the gap between positions rather than bridging it. These efforts yielded no breakthroughs but illustrated an evolution from bilateral talks to multilateral dialogue, underscoring the need for stronger security guarantees and coercive mechanisms to achieve genuine peace.

Trump’s plans

With Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in January 2025, the peace track took on a new tone. In March 2025, the United States and Russia initiated direct talks in Saudi Arabia. On April 25th, Reuters published details of what became known as elements of the “Trump plan”, which included freezing the front lines for a ceasefire; US legal recognition of Russia’s status in Crimea; de facto acceptance of other Russian territorial gains in Ukraine; a ban on Ukraine’s NATO membership; US management of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant; the return to Ukraine of certain districts in Kharkiv Oblast; the lifting of US sanctions on Russia; and the restoration of Ukrainian control over the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Dam in Kherson Oblast and the Kinburn Spit between the Black Sea and Dnipro-Buh Estuary.

Additional elements reportedly involved a US-Ukraine agreement on critical minerals, with security guarantees for Ukraine largely delegated to Europe. Trump described Russia as having made a “quite significant concession” by allegedly halting plans to seize the entire country. Russia rejected even a 30-day ceasefire proposal. 

In November 2025, the United States unveiled a new initiative: a “peace plan” developed jointly with Russia. It featured territorial freezing (Russia retaining Crimea and Donetsk Oblast); limits on the Ukrainian armed forces to around 600,000 personnel; permanent exclusion from NATO; sanctions relief for Russia; the use of frozen Russian assets (approximately 200 billion US dollars, with half attributed to Russia) for Ukrainian reconstruction; the joint management of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant; and a full amnesty for war participants on both sides.

Moscow deemed the plan “insufficient” and distanced itself from authorship. European allies of Ukraine criticized it as pro-Russian, leading to revisions: a 19-point version increased the troop ceiling to 800,000, added reliable guarantees, and removed amnesty for crimes. By late December 2025, Ukraine’s 20-point counterproposal included demilitarized zones in the east and linked any ceasefire to the ratification of an agreement.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Moscow had received no 20-point peace plan for Ukraine. During talks in Abu Dhabi, a prisoner exchange occurred, with 157 Ukrainians returning home. The next peace talks were also held in Abu Dhabi in early March – again without any results so far.

Conclusions: The deadlocks of 2022 to 2026

Reviewing peace initiatives from 2022 to 2026 reveals not merely a chronicle of failures but a systemic trap in global diplomacy: each proposal, from the Istanbul communiqué to Trump’s plans, serves as a tool for power redistribution rather than a genuine end to the war. Russia’s demands evolved from veiled military restrictions in 2022 to overt ultimatums in 2024, not only entrenching territorial seizures but attempting to rewrite international order rules — turning Ukraine into a buffer zone in an attempt at hybrid warfare against the West. Global South initiatives, while adding multicultural nuance, often masked economic pragmatism, with “neutrality” concealing geopolitical manoeuvring. 

Trump’s 2025 involvement introduced a commercial dimension — focusing on assets and minerals — highlighting an irony: peace becomes a commodity traded without the victims’ full consent. Absent a shift in Moscow’s aggressive policy or robust enforcement mechanisms, a true resolution remains elusive.

Dr. Lesia Bidochko is a Policy Fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK), Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, and a Non-Resident Researcher at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt-Oder, Germany.

Kostiantyn Zadyraka is an analyst at the Detector Media Research Center in Ukraine.

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Crimea, diplomacy, peace talks, Russian invasion of Ukraine