The EU must balance ambition with caution while navigating the dynamic neighbourhood of the South Caucasus

Monument to Mother Georgia towering above Tbilisi. Photo: Alexey Smyshlyaev / Shutterstock

It is a common cliché in international affairs that geopolitics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Before the dust has settled at any flashpoint around the globe, middle and great powers alike usually begin scrambling to pursue their collective, competing, and distinct interests.

If ever there were a textbook example of this phenomenon, it would be found somewhere in the South Caucasus. The region sits at the crossroads of the former Russian, Persian and Ottoman empires. The three states that comprise it – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – continue to experience the consequences of regional influence exerted by both Türkiye and Iran, while remaining firmly within what many describe as Russia’s “near abroad”.

Notoriously complex, the region has recently attracted increasing political attention as Moscow has been compelled to divert resources and focus to the Ukrainian frontlines. A shift of this sort carries significance, as the South Caucasus also lies directly along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or so-called “Middle Corridor” – a strategic vector for China’s wider geoeconomic ambitions. It has simultaneously drawn US attention as well, most notably when the Trump administration brokered the Armenia–Azerbaijan agreement (TRIPP) in August.

The European Union, otherwise reluctant to assume a geopolitical role in its eastern neighbourhood, has also emerged as an increasingly engaged actor, viewing the region as a strategic opportunity to extend its influence amid a shifting landscape of trade routes and economic prospects.

Currencies of power

Alas, the EU has often struggled to convert intent into a coherent strategy in the South Caucasus. Brussels has long aspired to be the region’s geoeconomic anchor, an objective only fitting for President von der Leyen’s vision of a “geopolitical Commission” and the Union as a truly global player. However, the bloc’s approach in this part of the world is frequently seen as fragmented, cautious, and largely reactive. Hesitation of this sort usually comes at a price, especially when pragmatism and economic interests compete with ideological leanings among those the EU engages with in the post-Soviet neighbourhood.

Growing connectivity in the region has emerged as a key source of power in the South Caucasus. Railways, energy corridors, and digital routes now extend beyond trade flows and increasingly shape geopolitical posture, allowing those who control key networks to benefit from strategic partnerships with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

While the United States has pushed forward with its high-profile connectivity project linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia – further highlighted by Vice President JD Vance’s recent visit to the region – the EU has stalled on advancing its own comparable flagship proposal. Instead, the Union continues to rely mainly on initiatives under its Global Gateway strategy, which, though effective, do not necessarily constitute a large-scale strategic framework for the South Caucasus.

This hesitation is all the more striking given what is at stake for the EU, as the ever-growing matter of European security will ultimately be shaped not only by the bloc’s decisions on its security architecture, but also by the geopolitical alliances it forges. Nonetheless, as it navigates an ever more contested arena, the EU should be wary of partnerships that carry deal-breaking limitations – even with those who initially appear to share its objectives.

Transit routes and transit alliances

There is an increasingly common consensus that the European Union cannot afford to circumvent Türkiye in the region. The relationship between the two is often perceived as being built on results and pragmatism, if not necessarily on shared values. Through energy and transport initiatives, Ankara remains a key transit hub for Caspian resources heading to Europe, serving as a bridge between the West, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.

At the core of this, from Azerbaijan en route to European markets, lie the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and its extension, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The EU’s 2022 Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan to double gas imports by 2027 explicitly recognizes Türkiye’s role in this corridor, emphasizing Ankara’s indispensability in the EU’s evolving energy architecture. Similarly, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), carrying natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field through Georgia to Türkiye, anchors the Southern Gas Corridor through which Caspian energy ultimately flows westward.

Interconnection in this context also manifests in transport infrastructure, where Türkiye’s support for the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway aligns with the EU’s investments under its Global Gateway strategy. All of this occurs within a shared commitment to promoting energy and transport diversification, a priority that has grown more urgent for the EU as it seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian supplies. With these objectives in sight, some would argue that overlooking Ankara would constitute a strategic mistake, undermining the impact of EU engagement with the region at a time when a strategic vacuum is emerging.

However, Türkiye’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, and especially under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has evolved considerably. What was once a strategy focused on regional integration and mediation, based on free-trade arrangements and diplomatic initiatives from the Middle East to the Western Balkans, has given way to a notably more assertive and ad hoc approach. Erdoğan’s government has become notorious for effectively striking one-off deals, whether by leveraging refugee flows or NATO membership approvals to extract concessions, rather than building on consistent multilateral policies. Ultimately, when it does, Ankara has sought closer relations outside its conventional alliance framework, becoming a dialogue partner to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and, more recently, applying to join BRICS.

As much as the country’s increasingly transactional approach seems consistent with a global trend, it carries profound consequences for its potential to be seen as a reliable partner in its wider neighbourhood. Türkiye’s retreat from the role of mediator is evident particularly in the South Caucasus, where its alliance with Azerbaijan spearheads its regional policy. President Erdoğan famously describes both countries as “one nation, two states”, a slogan reflecting a shared Turkic identity that has defined Ankara-Baku relations since the 1990s.

Through military training, arms transfers, and the supply of advanced drones, Türkiye played an instrumental role in Azerbaijan’s victories over Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and its subsequent 2023 campaign. Both reverberated across the region, as this not only reconfigured the Armenia-Azerbaijan balance but also showcased Turkish defence technology and resolve. However, by tying its potential rapprochement with Armenia entirely to Baku’s preferences, Türkiye effectively granted President Ilham Aliyev’s government veto power over Turkish–Armenian relations, underscoring Ankara’s often limited ability to act as an honest broker in the region.

These self-imposed limitations and Türkiye’s preference for scoring bilateral wins over the goal of long-term regional stability should raise a red flag for the EU. If Türkiye’s commitment in the Caucasus remains contingent on Erdoğan’s domestic calculations, a plausible risk is that the country could keep making ad hoc shifts that eventually leave the EU sidelined.

Strategic risk and the limits of alignment

Admittedly, the Union’s approach to the South Caucasus has often been haphazard and reactive rather than strategic, as its engagement in the region remains largely country-specific. However, with a strategic opening in sight, the EU is increasingly better positioned to view the South Caucasus not merely through the narrow lenses of energy, post-conflict aid, and ad hoc engagement, but as a geopolitical space in which it must compete for influence, and which it should not treat as peripheral.

Though securing continued access to key transit corridors linking Europe and Asia is undeniably important, the EU should pursue this through mutual trust and sustained, genuine investment in its partnerships. At first, Türkiye might appear to be a logical ally in this effort, but its commitment to the same objectives is sometimes uneven. Its tendency to effectively instrumentalize alliances also suggests that its relationship with Europe might be driven by cold calculations rather than a shared vision. The European Commission recently published a major analysis of how to scale up transport along the Trans-Caspian corridor, which further stresses the need for regulatory harmonization with the bloc’s rules, including by Türkiye, as a promising step in the right direction.

Ultimately, for the EU, taking a risky approach while ignoring the standards it has championed could jeopardize its prospects in a region of growing geostrategic importance. As the Union decides how to move forward, it should carefully balance its regional commitments on a path toward credible partnerships, and remain mindful of who accompanies it along the way.

Stoycho Velev is a Master of Laws (LL.M) graduate from Sofia University. He is part of the 100th Hague Academy of International Law class at the International Court of Justice and the 2021-2024 European Politics and Society ‘Vaclav Havel’ Master’s Degree cohort. He studied in Prague, Kraków, and Leiden, with an academic focus on European security and defence policy in a transatlantic context and conducting research on the perspectives of Eastern European states. He is the Bulgarian representative at the 2025-2026 European Diplomatic Programme by the EEAS. Stoycho has held positions in the Bulgarian civil service and the European Commission, while authoring articles that cover regional and global affairs for various outlets, both domestically and internationally.

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Azerbaijan, geopolitics, Georgia, South Caucasus, turkey