“In conditions of intensifying systemic rivalry, it is no longer sufficient to invoke past narratives about the universality of values.”

Professor Agata Włodkowska. Photo: Vistula University

The years 2025 and early 2026 have confirmed that the international order based on liberal multilateralism is undergoing a phase of profound erosion. The mechanisms that for decades stabilized relations between states—the primacy of international institutions, the predictability of alliances, and the normative power of the West—are increasingly yielding to the logic of great power competition and the politics of fait accompli. In this sense, we are not witnessing a momentary crisis, but rather a process of the structural transformation of the global order.

The return of realism as the dominant analytical perspective does not, however, signify a simple regression to the 19th-century concert of powers. Contemporary great power status is no longer exclusively a function of military strength or economic potential. Technological, informational, and normative factors are playing an increasingly important role—from artificial intelligence and control over data to the ability to shape narratives and destabilize adversaries’ societies. Consequently, systemic rivalry is assuming forms that are less visible yet potentially equally destructive.

In conversation with Professor Agata Włodkowska, we examine how the West found itself on the defensive in the face of this new multipolarity, and what strategic errors have contributed to the weakening of its position. We also analyze whether the present moment signifies the enduring twilight of the liberal order or rather its painful reconfiguration. Ukraine occupies a particular place in this reflection—a state that has become one of the principal testing grounds for the future of European security and the meaning of western integration.

IGNACY GRZELAK: What sparked your interest in questions of great power politics and rivalry, as well as Poland and Europe’s security?

AGATA WŁODKOWSKA: My choice of international relations was very deliberate and stemmed from my passions developed during secondary school. I was greatly influenced by lecturers such as Professor Bieleń and Professor Zięba, as well as by the international situation of the late 1990s. My master’s thesis concerned Polish-Russian relations, which revealed to me how difficult the relations between a medium-sized state and a great power can be. Over time, at my supervisor’s suggestion, I narrowed my research to focus on Russia’s great power status in the CIS region, and later expanded this to include analysis of global and regional rivalry.

Does your research suggest that a great power system is the default state of international relations, from which there is no escape?

Yes, a great power system is the natural state, because states strive to strengthen their power and influence. Since antiquity, we have observed the cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of great powers, which result from conflicts and the ambitions of new players. Currently, modern technologies constitute a new field of rivalry, where China is becoming a challenge to the power of the United States and the West.

Are we living at a turning point where the era of western dominance is ending?

We are decidedly living in a moment of crisis and inevitable transformation of the order. We are observing the relative weakening of the position of the United States and Europe in favour of Asia—India, China and Indonesia—as well as the growing significance of formats such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Moreover, liberal democracy is losing its appeal in favor of “sovereign democracies” or hybrid models. The West must redefine itself, which is made more difficult by internal divisions, populism, and threats from artificial intelligence and Russian disinformation.

It is often said that history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. Does the current division into blocs resemble those from the past?

History indeed rhymes, and these analogies, for instance, to the period before the Second World War, provide us with valuable insights. However, the context is different: we have globalization, which makes the complete isolation of blocs difficult, and technologies such as drones and AI that target civilians through disinformation. A key difference is the role of China, which operates with tremendous patience, strengthening its economic influence in Africa and Latin America. Today’s multipolarity also creates thematic blocs based on economic interests, which complicate the picture of the world.

Has the West made strategic errors that have led to this weakening?

Yes. One error was an excessive belief in the “end of history” and the universality of democracy. Another was the forcible imposition of democracy, for example in Iraq, based on falsified information about weapons of mass destruction. This weakened the credibility and soft power of the West, exposing its hypocrisy regarding international law. Other weakening factors include the 2008 crisis, the weak response to the annexation of Crimea, Brexit, and Donald Trump’s presidency, which undermined allies’ trust.

How do democratic values appear in this arrangement?

These values are under enormous external and internal pressure. Europe’s chance to “awaken” lies in shocks: the Russian aggression of 2022 and Trump’s second term. These events are forcing Europeans to take responsibility for their own security, rather than relying exclusively on the American umbrella.

Let us turn to Ukraine. Is the scenario of its entry into the European Union by the end of the decade realistic?

This is a very ambitious scenario, but not unrealistic. The path will be bumpy, as Ukraine must adapt to EU standards in conditions of war or reconstruction. We must also remember that after accession, Poland and Ukraine will become competitors regarding EU funds and agriculture. As for NATO, obtaining security guarantees may make actual membership less of a priority for allies reluctant to take risks. For Russia, a democratic and prosperous Ukraine represents an existential challenge that could weaken support for the Kremlin regime.

Do the events from the recent World Economic Forum in Davos reveal any premises confirming the direction of global political development that we are discussing here? Was any speech particularly symptomatic for you?

The meeting in Davos confirms the end of the world order as we know it and the necessity for Europe to “awaken” in order to strengthen its autonomy and power. Regarding the second part of your question, since medium-sized states fall within my research interests, my attention focused on the speech by Canada’s prime minister, Marc Carney. He noted that the rules-based order (largely established by the West) is eroding, which means that medium-ranked states such as Poland can no longer feel relatively secure. He also emphasized that medium-sized states should not remain passive, and certainly should not act alone, but rather should jointly strengthen their own agency with other states of this rank and actively engage in the global game, while simultaneously being able to withstand pressure from great powers.

This conversation with Professor Włodkowska demonstrates that contemporary great power politics has not only regained central importance but is also increasingly shaping the norms according to which the entire international system functions. This signifies a departure from the logic of predictable rules toward a variable game of interests, in which trust becomes a scarce resource and stability a fragile and conditional value. For medium-sized and smaller states such as Ukraine and Poland, this transformation carries fundamental consequences. Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is not merely a developmental project but also a civilizational and geopolitical decision—an attempt to permanently exit the Russian sphere of influence and anchor itself in an order that, despite its own weaknesses, still offers greater predictability than alternative models of order. At the same time, this process will be neither swift nor free from tensions—including within the Union itself.

Ultimately, the stakes involve not only the future of one state but also the answer to the question of whether Europe and the West more broadly are capable of strategic “awakening” and redefining their role in the world. In conditions of intensifying systemic rivalry, it is no longer sufficient to invoke past narratives about the universality of values. It becomes necessary to combine norms with the real capacity to defend them—politically, technologically, and socially. It is precisely in this space that the future shape of the global order will be determined.

Agata Włodkowska is a professor at Vistula University, where she conducts research in the field of international relations in the post-Soviet area, the foreign policy of Poland and Russia, and the theory of foreign policy and international relations. The issue of gender in international politics also plays an important role in her research. She is a member of the Polish Political Science Association and the author of numerous publications on great power politics.

Ignacy Grzelak is a third-year student in International Relations at the Vistula University. He is interested in the sociological aspects of politics, research on the future of the international order, and Middle Eastern affairs. He has completed internships at the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Warsaw and the Centre for International Relations think tank.

geopolitics, multipolar world, West