The collapse of the European security order
The sense that Europe is adrift in the emerging world order reflects both external shocks and internal shortcomings. On the one hand, the United States is signalling that Europe is no longer the central theatre of American strategy. On the other, Europeans remain divided on how far they are willing to go in assuming real strategic responsibility, or the so-called European strategic autonomy.
February 23, 2026 -
Wojciech Michnik
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NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte (left) has recently that warned that Europe “can’t” defend itself without America. This begs the question as to whether Europe sees itself as a fully‑fledged strategic pole in the emerging world order or remains resigned to being a permanent junior partner in a US‑led system.
Photo courtesy of NATO
The future of transatlantic relations looks increasingly fragile, with Europe caught between a less reliable United States, a revisionist Russia, and a more assertive China. The erosion of the post‑Cold War liberal order exposes a deep mismatch between Europe’s economic weight and its still-lagging capacity to act as a strategic and military pole in its own right.
The post‑war Euro-Atlantic security architecture was designed around an American security guarantee, NATO as the central institutional pillar, and a liberal economic order that benefitted not only the West but many non‑western powers. That order has been steadily fraying: Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, the tightening Russo‑Chinese partnership, and the resurgence of great power rivalry have turned what used to be framed as a “rules‑based” order into something much closer to a transactional arena. Russia’s war in Ukraine has already produced a partial “revival” of NATO, with the Alliance declaring Russia a “long‑term threat” at successive summits and moving to rearm after decades of underinvestment. Yet this revival has unfolded alongside a second Trump presidency that openly questions US obligations, making NATO’s newfound military ambition, symbolized by the commitment to spend five per cent of GDP on defence by 2035, highly contingent on domestic US politics.
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Europe, European Security, NATO, transatlantic relations, United States
