Western geopolitics and Balkan corruption: How US and EU justice reform efforts fuelled power centralization and failed justice
The prospects for European integration in the Western Balkans remain difficult to measure. While regional capitals continue their attempts to show progress in various fields, related actions often present only a facade of reform. This is particularly true in the highly contentious spheres of the rule of law and corruption.
January 29, 2026 -
Luka Petrović
- 
Articles and Commentary
Pyramid of Tirana. Photo: Shutterstock
European integration in the Western Balkans remains an open-ended and deeply contested process. Despite sustained efforts by regional governments to demonstrate progress, reform initiatives often struggle to translate into meaningful institutional change. This tension is particularly visible in the areas of the rule of law and anti-corruption, where formal compliance and outward performance have increasingly taken precedence over democratic substance.
Over the past several decades, the United States has played a central role in shaping political and institutional developments across the Balkans. This engagement has produced mixed outcomes and has frequently been aligned with the European Union’s enlargement agenda, particularly in countries such as Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania. Yet while diplomatic relationships remain strong, reform outcomes have proven far less convincing.
Across the region, EU accession candidates continue to grapple with entrenched institutional weaknesses, political malpractice, and corruption. One contributing factor lies in the accession process itself. In practice, it has often emphasized enforcement outcomes—arrests, indictments, and the rapid construction of new institutions—over procedural safeguards and due process. This dilemma is not unique to EU enlargement. Any state seeking entry into international legal or economic regimes, whether the EU, ICC, or WTO, faces similar pressures. Where institutions are fragile, governments may resort to performative compliance, prioritizing visible action over sustainable reform.
From the perspective of Brussels and Washington, the Western Balkans have long represented both a strategic and economic opportunity. NATO membership for countries such as Montenegro and Albania reinforced this perception, positioning them as frontrunners for eventual EU accession. Successive US administrations, including those of Presidents Obama and Biden, quietly supported ambitious justice-sector reforms in Albania aimed at aligning domestic institutions with European legal standards. These efforts, supported by the US State Department, EU bodies, and organizations such as the Open Society Foundation, were intended to strengthen democratic governance and curb corruption. Yet, as with many externally guided reform initiatives, the combination of incentives and institutional design choices generated consequences that were neither anticipated nor fully addressed.
Judicial reform throughout the Balkans has repeatedly encountered structural obstacles. In several cases, foreign-backed reform models have favored strong prosecutorial authority insulated from democratic oversight. Rather than reinforcing accountability, this configuration has increasingly drawn criticism for enabling selective justice and political persecution. The pursuit of reform credibility abroad has, in some instances, coincided with a quiet consolidation of power at home.
The experiences of Montenegro and Serbia reflect these broader dynamics. EU assessments have noted that Montenegro made little progress in judicial reform despite implementing a Justice Reform Strategy and related action plans. Political stalemate, weak institutional dialogue, and limited judicial accountability persist, even after the creation of new anti-corruption bodies. In Serbia, the suspension of USAID funding in early 2025 exposed how reform narratives can be rapidly repurposed for domestic political control. Government actions targeting NGOs critical of transparency and human rights—justified through claims of foreign interference—raised concerns within the EU and underscored the fragility of rule-of-law commitments when external incentives shift.
Albania offers perhaps the clearest illustration of these tensions. The establishment of the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) following the 2016 constitutional reforms was widely promoted as a cornerstone of judicial renewal. Both US and EU actors were closely involved in shaping and supporting the process, with more than 27.5 million US dollars in American assistance directed toward Albania’s justice sector. The expectation was that a robust and independent prosecutorial body would finally confront high-level corruption.
Instead, the reforms produced a judicial architecture marked by imbalance. SPAK emerged as a powerful, prosecutor-driven institution operating with limited checks and minimal democratic oversight. Early concerns that Albania was becoming a testing ground for an expansive interpretation of prosecutorial independence were initially dismissed. Over time, however, those warnings have gained traction. Critics increasingly argue that SPAK’s authority is exercised in ways that reflect political convenience and external expectations rather than impartial justice.
🎙️ Listen to the latest Talk Eastern Europe podcast episode:
The incentive structure surrounding anti-corruption reform helps explain this outcome. Measured against EU benchmarks and international perceptions, success is often equated with visible enforcement actions. High-profile arrests generate headlines and signal commitment, even when investigations remain opaque and judicial review limited. Analysts and civil society observers have raised concerns that prosecutions are applied unevenly, targeting politically vulnerable figures while sparing others.
These concerns have been amplified by a pattern of extended pre-trial detention in several prominent cases. The detention of former President Ilir Meta prompted accusations of politicized prosecution, while the arrest of ethnic Greek mayor Fredi Beleri raised alarms among minority rights advocates. Most notably, the case of Tirana Mayor Erion Veliaj has come to symbolize broader procedural deficiencies within Albania’s justice system.
Veliaj has been held in pre-trial detention for nearly a year on corruption-related allegations, despite the absence of a finalized indictment and repeated requests for alternative measures. In November 2025, Albania’s Constitutional Court ruled that his removal from office was unconstitutional, formally reinstating him as mayor. Nevertheless, he has remained in detention, unable to exercise his mandate. International legal analysts have cautioned that prolonged detention of an elected official without trial risks undermining democratic representation and public confidence in judicial independence.
While guilt or innocence can only be determined through a fair judicial process, the handling of the case has reinforced concerns that pre-trial detention is increasingly used as a substitute for due process. In the context of EU accession, such practices risk conflating visible enforcement with genuine rule-of-law reform, blurring the distinction between accountability and expediency.
A shift in US policy in early 2025 marked a further turning point. President Trump’s decision to suspend USAID operations and halt funding for Albanian judicial reform programs, including support for SPAK, signalled an implicit acknowledgment that earlier initiatives had become politicized tools rather than vehicles for institutional justice. While the withdrawal of funding alone cannot resolve underlying problems, it underscored the fragility of externally driven reform models.
The Western Balkans—and Albania in particular—undeniably require deep and sustained judicial reform. However, progress depends not on the volume of arrests or the creation of powerful institutions, but on adherence to democratic principles. Restrictions on pre-trial detention, regular judicial review, transparency in prosecutorial decision-making, and alignment with European due-process standards are essential. Without these safeguards, reform risks undermining the very rule of law it claims to advance.
Luka Petrović is a political analyst of Balkan descent based in Germany, with a focus on the Western Balkans, international relations, and human rights. He studied IR at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU). His research interests include regional politics, post-conflict societies, and EU engagement in South-Eastern Europe. Luka has contributed research and analysis for major international NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with a focus on human rights monitoring, minority protection, and conflict-affected communities in the Balkans.
