The Ukrainian model of societal resilience: why the country did not collapse under full-scale war

Volunteers clear debris at the site of a Russian missile attack on December 31, 2022. Photo: Shutterstock

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many analysts in Moscow and several western capitals assumed that the Ukrainian state would collapse within days. This assumption was rooted in a long-standing narrative portraying Ukraine as institutionally weak, politically fragmented, and deeply affected by corruption. Some western intelligence assessments initially echoed this view, forecasting that the central government in Kyiv would be unable to maintain control, societal order would deteriorate, and the armed forces would lack the cohesion necessary for prolonged resistance. For example, a CNN article published on February 25th 2022, a day after the full-scale invasion began, says: “US intelligence officials are concerned that Kyiv could fall under Russian control within days, according to two sources familiar with the latest intelligence.”

Yet the opposite occurred. Ukrainian society demonstrated extraordinary collective resilience, quickly mobilizing resources to create logistical networks and volunteer centres, everything to ensure the country’s security without the involvement of the state authorities. While state institutions faced enormous strain, social solidarity and civic initiative compensated for structural weaknesses. Volunteer networks organized evacuations, supplied troops, and filled logistical gaps often faster than the government. Trust in the Armed Forces surged, while community self-organization became a defining feature of wartime endurance.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine challenges conventional assumptions about state strength. It has shown us that societal resilience is rooted in civic activism, shared identity, and decentralized networks of power, which can be crucial to a nation’s survival in the face of total annihilation. Resilience demonstrated by Ukrainian society in 2022 did not emerge spontaneously. It is the result of a long process in which citizens developed a strong sense of will and responsibility for public life. Centuries of subjugation and repression, the destruction of language and culture, as well as genocides and man-made famines – all of this shaped a deep-seated rejection of the Moscow regime among Ukrainians. The Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-14 put an end to everything and played an important role in shaping national unity, strongly influencing the vision of the future of Ukraine by its citizens. Both moments reaffirmed that political legitimacy in Ukraine stems not only from institutions, but also from public participation and the willingness of citizens to defend democratic principles.

Over the past two decades, Ukraine has developed one of the most vibrant civil societies in Eastern Europe. Grassroots organizations, volunteer groups, student initiatives, veterans’ networks, journalists, and local community associations have formed parallel structures of participation that operate independently from political elites. According to the research “Ukraine’s Decentralization Reforms Since 2014” conducted by Chatham House in 2019, the effectiveness of these civic networks grew significantly after 2014, particularly as Ukraine confronted both hybrid war and ongoing reforms. This tradition of bottom-up activism fostered a sense of collective responsibility that proved critical when the invasion began. Rather than waiting for centralized instructions, Ukrainians activated pre-existing networks of trust and cooperation, which made rapid mobilization possible. In this sense, societal resilience was not merely a reaction to the war, but the latest expression of a civic identity shaped by decades of struggle for self-determination.

One of the most defining features of Ukraine’s wartime resilience has been the unprecedented scale and speed of civic volunteerism. Within hours of the invasion, decentralized volunteer networks mobilized across the country to fill logistical and supply gaps that the state, under immense pressure, could not immediately cover. These efforts were not improvised – they relied on already existing civic infrastructures, many of which emerged after 2014 and had experience supporting the military during the early phase of the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The effectiveness of these networks lies in their flexibility. They operate through horizontal coordination rather than formal hierarchy, allowing for the rapid distribution of resources and immediate decision-making. Thousands of grassroots groups, local foundations, and informal community groups organized the delivery of medical supplies, protective gear, vehicles, and drones for frontline units. For many Ukrainians, contributing to the war effort became not an act of charity but a routine civic responsibility.

In the first days of the full-scale invasion, there was a surge in the self-organization of the population: men actively joined the ranks of the Territorial Defence (TRO) detachments to protect cities and villages and build checkpoints. Due to the prohibition on men aged 18 to 60 from leaving the country, women took the lead in organizing the transportation of humanitarian aid from abroad. Volunteer centres were created in each community, where aid was redistributed and sent to frontline cities. Even in schools, students and teachers still gathered to weave camouflage nets. I spent the first months of the full-scale invasion in a town near the Polish border, where I joined local volunteer efforts in sorting humanitarian aid, forming medical first-aid kits for the military in a volunteer centre that my family created in the premises of our store, which operated before the war. In addition, I participated in community meetings every day, where we actively discussed the current situation, community needs and proposals. I also helped the city council register internally displaced persons who arrived in the city from eastern Ukraine. Some of them could not leave Ukraine for various reasons and we settled them in the houses of city residents, among whom was my grandfather – two families settled in his house with whom we established friendly relations.

While Ukraine’s resilience rests primarily on internal civic activism and social cohesion, international support has played a crucial reinforcing role. Military assistance, financial aid, and diplomatic support provided by the European Union, the United States, and allied democratic states enabled Ukraine to sustain its defence and stabilize key state functions. However, the significance of this support extends beyond material resources. It also carries a powerful psychological dimension: the understanding that Ukraine is not fighting alone. Surveys by the Razumkov Centre and the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation indicate that a majority of Ukrainians view international support not only as strategically necessary, but as morally validating. The visible solidarity expressed through foreign aid, refugee support programmes, and sustained diplomatic engagement strengthened public confidence and further legitimized the collective effort. The knowledge that partners were willing to invest political and economic capital in Ukraine’s survival helped transform resilience from a reactive response into a sustained national commitment. International support also contributed to maintaining social unity. The perception of belonging to a broader democratic community countered narratives of isolation and vulnerability that Russia sought to impose. This sense of shared struggle fostered a deeper belief that defending Ukraine was not just a national matter, but part of a global effort to protect the principles of sovereignty and democratic self-determination. Thus, the resilience of society and the commitment of allies functioned not as parallel forces but as mutually reinforcing components of Ukraine’s capacity to endure.

The military aspect of state institutions should not be ignored, as one of the most revealing dynamics of Ukrainian resilience is the sharp contrast between the exceptionally high trust placed in the Armed Forces and the comparatively lower trust in state institutions. According to polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), trust in the Armed Forces has remained consistently above 90 per cent since the first months of the full-scale invasion, an unprecedented figure in European political sociology. In contrast, trust in key state institutions such as courts, law enforcement agencies, and political parties remains significantly lower, often below 25 to 30 per cent. The Razumkov Centre’s surveys demonstrate a similar dynamic, with the Armed Forces and volunteer organizations ranking as the most trusted institutions in the country. This asymmetry does not indicate institutional collapse. Instead, it reflects a distinctive form of societal contract that has emerged during the war. The Armed Forces are perceived as the direct protectors of collective survival, as well as an institution that embodies national unity and sacrifice. Meanwhile, civilian state institutions continue to carry the legacy of decades of corruption, administrative inefficiency, and uneven reform. Yet the crucial point is that this gap has not led to political fragmentation or destabilization. Instead, society has effectively “locked in” its trust where it matters most for wartime endurance: defence, local communities, and horizontal civic networks. Ukrainians have developed a pragmatic understanding of institutional roles: the state provides structure and legitimacy, the military provides security, and society provides the connective tissue that sustains both.

In summary, Ukrainian experience challenges established assumptions about what constitutes national strength in wartime. Traditional western security thinking has long emphasized institutional capacity, centralized command structures, and advanced military technology as the primary determinants of resilience. Ukraine demonstrates that these elements, while important, are insufficient on their own. A nation’s ability to endure existential threat depends fundamentally on the strength of its society – its civic agency, collective identity, and willingness to assume responsibility for the state’s survival. This model has direct implications for Europe. The war has exposed the vulnerability of conventional security frameworks that rely on deterrence without societal preparedness. NATO’s Eastern Flank, from Poland to the Baltic states, has already begun to reform defence strategies around territorial defence, civilian preparedness, and whole-of-society resilience. Ukraine stands at the centre of this transformation – not as a passive recipient of western support, but as a source of conceptual innovation in security thinking. What Europe must realize is that resilience cannot be imported or manufactured quickly. It must be cultivated through inclusive political participation, trust within society, and the recognition of citizens as co-authors of statehood. Ukraine’s wartime experience offers a model of how democratic societies can defend themselves when institutions alone are not enough. As the war continues, the task for Europe is not only to support Ukraine’s defence, but to learn from the Ukrainian model, in which national security is sustained not only by the state, but also by the collective will of its people.

Maksym Sydorchuk is a master’s student in National Security at the Gdańsk University. His academic interests focus on security policy, international relations and strategic development in Central and Eastern Europe. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Spatial Planning.

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resilience, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukrainian society