The European Union’s Black Sea strategy

The Black Sea port of Mangalia, Romania. Photo: Ana Maria Tone / Shutterstock

The Black Sea region has become one of the most strategically contested spaces in today’s security environment. Its importance has grown dramatically since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has transformed maritime infrastructure, regional stability, and connectivity into matters of urgent security priority. Debate is ongoing as to the ways to make this region more secure even as the Russian aggression continues, and, also, about what can be done for regional security in a more distant, post-war future. There are several players out there that have the interest and potential to influence the security situation in the Black Sea area. One of them is the European Union.

The response of the European Union to the current security challenges of the region has come at a time when a new strategic approach was recently adopted in May 2025. Formally it aimed to reshape the Black Sea into a region of stability, resilience and cooperation. The document articulated a more ambitious vision than previous frameworks, yet its ultimate success will depend on addressing the significant obstacles that accompany the region’s volatility and political complexity. Several months have passed since this strategy’s inception, so some first conclusions can be made as to its chances for success.

The EU strategy is built on the premise that security, prosperity, and environmental sustainability in the Black Sea are deeply interconnected. It acknowledges that the post-2022 security shock has revealed deep structural vulnerabilities. It attempts to balance immediate security challenges with long-term development goals, recognizing that no durable stability can emerge without governance reform, economic resilience, and functional regional cooperation. The focus here, as, perhaps, expected, is not on hard security but on the issues where the EU can actually play a bigger (and more familiar to it) role.

The strategy is structured around three broad pillars. The first, which involves enhancing security, stability and resilience, addresses the urgent threats arising from militarization, mine contamination, cyberattacks, and hybrid operations. The second pillar of fostering sustainable growth and prosperity focuses on improving connectivity through transport, digital and energy corridors, encouraging investment, and supporting regional trade integration. Finally, the third pillar – environmental protection and climate resilience – acknowledges the severe ecological degradation of the Black Sea basin.

The most innovative element is the proposed Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, designed to centralize information-sharing, support de-mining efforts, monitor maritime traffic, and safeguard critical underwater infrastructure. This responds directly to the growing mine threat, increased military activity, and the presence of non-transparent “shadow fleet” vessels circumventing sanctions.

The strategy represents an important conceptual shift. For the first time, maritime security sits at the centre of the EU’s approach to the Black Sea, reflecting the reality of Russia’s aggressive posture and the fragility of navigation and commercial routes. Despite its breadth, the strategy faces several challenges that could limit its impact.

First, the document is officially a “strategic approach”, not a fully-fledged “strategy”. This reflects a lack of dedicated funding, binding commitments, or a detailed action plan with timelines and measurable milestones. Second, operationalizing the Maritime Security Hub will require unprecedented cooperation among states with divergent political priorities and varying levels of trust in one another. Deep regional tensions – especially those involving Russia – are to impede intelligence sharing and coordinated maritime response capabilities. Third, the strategy relies heavily on partner countries’ progress in governance reform, anti-corruption efforts, and democratic consolidation. Fourth, Moscow’s hybrid tactics of mine deployment, maritime intimidation, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns pose direct challenges to the implementation of EU initiatives and could erode regional confidence in cooperative structures. Finally, persistent environmental risks and climate vulnerabilities require long-term commitments from all partners, yet these may be difficult to sustain during periods of economic pressure or political instability.

The new EU strategic approach to the Black Sea is timely, comprehensive, and more geopolitically attuned than earlier frameworks. It offers a vision of a secure, resilient and interconnected region grounded in democratic governance and sustainable development. However, its effectiveness will depend on political will, resource allocation, and the willingness of both EU member states and regional partners to undertake difficult reforms, share sensitive information, and build trust. The strategy lays out a promising roadmap. However, its success will hinge on turning ambition into implementable, well-funded, and resilient policy action.

Volodymyr Dubovyk is a professor of International Relations at Odesa’s Mechnikov National University and Senior Fellow at CEPA.

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Black Sea, Eastern Europe, EU foreign policy, Russian invasion of Ukraine