Russia’s next step in the “sovereign internet” – towards full isolation?

Passengers on their smartphones while riding the Moscow metro in December 2024. Photo: Oleg Elkov / Shutterstock

Russia’s path towards developing a “sovereign internet” – its effort to control and govern its own cyberspace – is not a sudden reaction to western platforms or recent geopolitical tensions. It is rather the result of a long and deliberate process of digital centralization. Over the past two decades, the Kremlin has gradually extended the same control it established over television and print media into the online sphere. The current bans on western social media, restrictions on YouTube and promotion of state-backed alternatives represent the next phase of this ongoing effort to isolate and nationalize Russia’s digital space. This strategy reflects the Kremlin’s long-term objective of establishing informational sovereignty – not only to shield its population from external narratives but also to centralize control over digital infrastructure.

Online control

In the early 2000s, only about 13 per cent of Russians were using the internet. This number was not significant, as most of the population still relied on television as the main source of information, a medium the Kremlin had already begun to control by bringing the private NTV under state ownership. TV networks became one of the main tools for shaping political thought and securing electoral victories.

Less than a decade later, however, almost a third of the Russian population was using the internet, and its influence had become significant. During the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, for example, the country’s main search engine, Yandex, reported that the most-clicked news was about the Russia–Georgia war, overshadowing even the Beijing Olympic Games. This was a signal to the Kremlin. Authorities pressured Yandex to filter the news according to the government’s vision. At the end of 2009, Yandex sold its “golden share” to the state-owned Sberbank for one euro, giving the Kremlin decision-making power over the future of the internet giant’s algorithms and business deals. The episode demonstrated to the Kremlin that digital spaces could amplify or undermine official narratives faster than traditional media.

The situation intensified in the following years as the number of internet users rose and the internet became an alternative to state-controlled media – a place to access uncensored political views, share independent information, and coordinate initiatives. By 2012, more than half of Russia’s population used the internet, actively participating on social media platforms like Vkontakte, Facebook, YouTube, local news websites, and blogs. This online freedom of expression made the mass protests of 2011-2012 possible. In response, the Kremlin tightened its control by adopting the internet “Blacklist Law”, legislation formally intended to protect children from offensive content, but in reality aimed at taking down any website opposing the government, often without due process. For Moscow, the protests underscored that digital freedom translated directly into political mobilization potential, making internet governance not a technical issue but a question of regime stability.

The process reached its peak in 2019 with the introduction of the “Sovereign Internet Law”. The law aimed to ensure that the Russian segment of the internet could continue functioning even if disconnected from the global network. Officially presented as a security measure against potential US or European shutdowns of Russia’s access to global infrastructure, in reality it created new mechanisms of information control.

Under the law, internet providers were required to install state-controlled equipment, giving authorities the power to monitor and filter online traffic in real time. This enabled selective blocking and throttling of platforms such as social media networks and websites, and enhanced state surveillance, allowing authorities to identify and restrict VPN traffic, censor specific content and disrupt access to foreign media. Unlike earlier censorship measures that targeted specific content, the 2019 law institutionalized systemic control. It transformed internet regulation from reactive blocking into an anticipatory model of governance, embedding state authority within the architecture of the Russian internet.

Acceleration of digital isolation

The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine provided the Kremlin with both a pretext and public justification for intensifying its online isolation. Security narratives reframed censorship as defence against “information warfare”, effectively normalizing digital restrictions in the eyes of many citizens. Since the invasion, the Kremlin blocked Facebook, Instagram, Twitter (now X), Discord, Viber, Snapchat, Signal and the gaming platform Roblox. In 2025, users in Russia experienced difficulties or interruptions when trying to make calls via WhatsApp, Apple Facetime and Telegram. Recently, customers were unable to register with Russian phone numbers on these messenger services and government officials have hinted that both apps could eventually be banned in the country. Even though these apps and services are banned or limited, people in Russia still use them via VPNs. However, the Russian government is steadily taking steps toward a full cut off from foreign services.

The introduction of the “White List” a set of services and websites accessible even without an internet connection is one such step. Although the Kremlin claims it is a security system for emergency situations, it resembles the beginnings of China’s Great Firewall, which blocks foreign websites and creates a separate online space for domestic users. From the start, Russia has developed its own alternatives to global platforms: VKontakte (alternative to Facebook), Yandex (alternative to Google search, maps, and Uber), Ozon and Wildberries (similar to Amazon and eBay). Recently, the government introduced the super app “Max,” primarily a messaging platform meant to replace WhatsApp and Telegram, but also integrating access to government services – potentially allowing users to verify ID documents, pay utility bills and sign documents directly through the app. Russian authorities are aggressively promoting the Max messenger – state institutions, housing services, and schools are required to adopt it, since September 1st, all new mobile devices sold in Russia must have Max preinstalled. The app is heavily advertised by Russian influencers as well. Through Max, the Kremlin can gain full control over user data and communications. The measures also reflect a strategic decoupling from western tech dependencies, aligning with Russia’s broader effort to achieve technological self-sufficiency amid sanctions.

The bigger picture

Russia is actively moving towards digital isolation. The necessary infrastructure already exists, and the country is modifying its digital systems to make the “Sovereign Internet” a reality. Some services, however, are not well received by Russian users (even by pro-kremlin war correspondents and lawmakers) – such as the YouTube alternative “Retube,” and the lack of a proper Instagram replacement. These two platforms are especially important: YouTube has around 95 million monthly local users and hosts voices of opposition, foreign channels and news agencies. The Kremlin has hesitated to fully block YouTube because it would also disrupt other Google services, such as cloud storage and the Android operating system. Unable to offer a viable alternative, the Kremlin instead throttles YouTube, making it increasingly difficult to use.

In the case of Instagram, the Kremlin banned advertising on the platform. This step was aimed at controlling influencers who had previously been financially independent of the state, even when spreading Kremlin-aligned content. With advertising now banned, influencers must align fully with government positions to maintain income and visibility. No one can now gain popularity without Kremlin approval or participation in Kremlin-run social media platforms, forcing influencers to switch to VK. The Kremlin has created a dependency: influencers now seek cooperation with the state rather than independence. This not only strengthens government control over content but also drives audiences to domestic platforms.

What’s next

Russia’s model increasingly mirrors China’s concept of cyber sovereignty, where state control over digital infrastructure is equated with national security and political stability. Yet unlike China, Russia’s approach is reactive rather than strategic – a response to geopolitical confrontation, sanctions, and internal insecurity rather than a long-term plan to develop a self-sufficient digital ecosystem. Beijing built its digital control on a foundation of technological innovation, domestic platform dominance, and carefully cultivated public acceptance of online surveillance. Moscow, in contrast, is attempting to impose isolation on an already globalized digital society, lacking both comparable technological capacity and the social consensus that legitimizes such control.

Significant level of isolation seems to be an imminent outcome – it is only a matter of time before the Kremlin takes the final step. The infrastructure already exists, but adoption of local services is still limited, and many Russians remain dependent on foreign platforms, particularly Instagram, YouTube, and Telegram, where the content base is large and influential. Shutting down the global internet entirely would entail enormous material, administrative, logistical, and technological costs. Russia still depends on global internet access for trade, technology development, and essential systems. Therefore, it is not a realistic scenario, even a Chinese level of isolation is doubtful. Unlike China, which centralized internet gateways from the 1990s and can control access more easily, Russia has dozens of international transit points and hundreds of autonomous systems peering directly with foreign networks. This makes traffic control far more difficult, as there is no single “border” to enforce a firewall. Additionally, China benefits from strong local IT and manufacturing capabilities to build custom systems and devices – a capacity Russia lacks.

The current Kremlin approach brings Russia closer to models seen in Turkmenistan or Iran. Turkmenistan controls all traffic through a single state internet provider and a national gateway, with strict censorship and nearly all foreign sites blocked. Iran operates a dual-internet system: a national internet providing local sites and apps at low cost or free, and a heavily filtered global internet. For Russia, the Iranian-style model appears more feasible, as it requires fewer technological changes, material investment and does not severely disrupt business, banking, research or international trade – while still achieving the Kremlin’s goals of controlling information, monitoring traffic and promoting domestic alternatives.

Even so, as the Kremlin continues to push local services and restrict foreign platforms, adoption will gradually follow. Over time, Russia may increasingly resemble the Iranian or Turkmenistan model of sovereign internet, with controlled domestic alternatives and restricted foreign access while balancing economic and technological dependencies. Further sanctions, infrastructure pressures or mass protests could push Russia toward stricter control resembling Turkmenistan or even China, measures that would require significant material investment and public support, implemented gradually in a step-by-step process.

Beka Iromashvili is a final year MA student within the Central and Eastern European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CEERES) programme jointly run by the University of Tartu, the University of Glasgow, and the Jagiellonian University. He is also an editorial intern with New Eastern Europe.

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freedom of speech, internet, internet freedom, Putinism, Russia, Russian society