Czechia between 1989 and 2025: From Velvet hopes to right-wing populism

Preparations for a evening concert on Wenceslas Square in Prague to celebrate the anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, November 17th 2025.

On November 17th 1989, 36 years ago, citizens of Czechoslovakia – following crucial events in Poland, Hungary and East Germany – went into the streets to do away with communist rule and reclaim their freedom and democracy. The non-violent Velvet Revolution soon spread beyond Prague and other major cities, with citizens gathering in public squares to demand democracy, liberty and human rights. These values were embodied by the personality of the writer and dissident Václav Havel, who was later elected by the parliament as the first post-communist president of Czechoslovakia and, in 1993, of the independent Czech Republic. The shift from socialist dictatorship to pluralist democracy also meant a shift from unequivocal geopolitical identification with the Soviet Union to a “return” to the West. Becoming a full-fledged member of NATO, the European Union, and the OECD became the ultimate and unquestioned goal of Czech foreign policy in the 1990s.

Cut to autumn 2025. Based on the results of the October general elections, a government is being formed by a businessman-turned-politician, whose populist ANO movement is about to lead a coalition containing the far-right, xenophobic, anti-EU and anti-NATO SPD, as well as the conservative and petro-masculine coded Motorists for Themselves. In their draft programme declaration, the coalition takes a confrontational tone with the European Union, fails to commit to fulfilling NATO spending targets, does not acknowledge the threat coming from Russia, and argues for a pragmatic rather than “activist” foreign policy – in reaction to the previous government’s involvement in relations with Taiwan and strong support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia. On paper, this government, consisting of two members of the Patriots for Europe group and one member of the Europe of the Sovereign Nations group, will be the most extreme in the European Union.

As profoundly opposite as these two snapshots of political moods in the country are, they of course do not indicate a linear shift within Czech society away from the values of liberal democracy towards whatever it is that the upcoming coalition represents. Why is it that a significant portion of Czech society seems to have put the values associated with Václav Havel aside for the moment?

A slow process

The thing is that neither the idealized version of the events of 1989 nor the darkest interpretation of the current political situation in Czechia presents a fully realistic picture. More than three decades ago, Czech society was not that idealistic, and the current Czech society is not that cynical. While the people in the cold November streets authentically wished for democracy, freedom and human rights, they no less wished for socio-economic living standards comparable with those of Western European states. Liberal democracy comes with capitalism. All they had at the time, however, was hope that society would manage to achieve those things – and do so rather sooner than later. After forty years of communist rule, the challenge of building a democratic system and a capitalist economy was huge and came with unforeseen (at least by some) side effects. Disillusionment resulted from things like the unequal distribution of wealth resulting from the process of privatization of state-owned companies, a rapid increase in crime in the 1990s, or the fact that reaching the economic level of West Germany with corresponding wages would definitely take more than a few years.

Just like other post-socialist countries in Central Europe, Czechia, amid the chaotic 1990s, not only tried to consolidate its liberal democratic and capitalist system so that the state and society could effectively function, but also, importantly, to “catch up” to the West. This process was achieved by acceding to NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. From that point on, instead of enjoying a peaceful existence as a full-fledged part of the West, two unfortunate developments followed. First, Europe has faced almost constant crises ever since 2008 – the financial and economic crisis, the so-called migration crisis, the pandemic, and then the war in Ukraine – all accompanied by the need for the EU to reinvent itself, resulting in more or less serious political divisions within the Union. Second – as is also demonstrated in discussions about EU reinvention – it turned out that the catching-up of the “new” member states has by no means ended with EU accession and, economically and arguably even politically, cannot be viewed as finished even today. Meanwhile, Czech politicians very early on learned to adopt a successful strategy of blaming the negative impact of these crises on Czechia on the incompetence of the European Union, rather than on the shortcomings of their own policies. The developments of the 1990s and 2010s inevitably led to a certain sobering up of Czech society after the hopeful spirit of 1989. “Belonging to the West” has, on one hand, been successfully achieved in terms of accessing the institutions, while on the other it remained a constant and abstract notion in Czech politics, present in campaigns and the rhetoric of political parties to this day.

Local pessimism

Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, Czechia managed to build a stable and quite resilient system of democratic institutions with functioning checks and balances, as well as a strong civil society. Looking especially at other countries in the region, Czechia may for a long time have seemed remarkably stable. Looking at various indicators in international comparison, Czechia is safe and economically prosperous – compared to other Central European economies, at least judging by macroeconomic data. These facts, however, are seemingly not reflected in the opinions of the Czech public. More than half of the Czech population thinks that the situation in the country is generally developing in the wrong direction. Looking at the reasons for this assessment, 24 per cent of these respondents blame the transition to a market economy and the western orientation of the country, including EU accession, while 21 per cent think the reason for pessimism is the multiple crises of the last decade. Only 18 per cent think the opposite, i.e. that Czechia is developing in the right direction. The last time more people held an optimistic rather than a pessimistic view was in 2020.

When it comes to trust in institutions, 73 per cent of people trust the army, 60 per cent trust NATO, 57 per cent trust the president, and around half of the population trust public media. However, only 45 per cent trust the EU and 30 per cent the lower chamber of parliament. Only one in four people trusts members of the government. Also, looking at interpersonal trust, 63 per cent of Czechs do not believe that most people can be trusted overall. Considering the importance of societal cohesion as a necessary precondition for resilience in these dangerous times, these numbers do not look particularly good.

Bloc politics

Due to trends and phenomena not unfamiliar to other Central European states, political competition currently consists of two “blocs” of parties with limited inter-bloc mobility. Each of these party groups, unfortunately, has been neglecting crucial issues vital for the country and society – one in domestic policy, the other in foreign policy.

First, there are the parties of the outgoing coalition, led by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and Petr Fiala. This includes other centre-right parties and the centre-left progressive Pirate Party, which, however, left the coalition before the end of the term. The second group is made up of the currently largest party, Andrej Babiš’s ANO, and its coalition partners, Motorists and the far-right SPD. Fiala’s government was quite successful in its foreign and even European policy (despite the historically rooted euroscepticism of the ODS). This was especially true when it came to support for Ukraine, including the so-called ammunition initiative. It is these parties who repeatedly emphasize that Czechia belongs to the West. The SPOLU coalition (ODS, TOP 09, and the Christian Democrats) intended to use this claim against ANO by implying that, if elected, Andrej Babiš would take the country away from the West – in reaction to which Babiš promptly declared that the membership of Czechia in the EU or NATO is not to be questioned. The problem with the notion of the West is that, as it pertains to the vision of the “pro-western” Czech political parties, it is quite vague. It is seen as the bearer of key values such as democracy, the rule of law, and the rules-based international order – contrasted with Russia, but also Slovakia and Hungary and their current political leaderships. On the other hand, the approaches of Western European countries to issues like gender equality, fair taxation, or affordable housing are not embraced, especially by ODS. Nevertheless, the lack of attention devoted to finding solutions to the economic hardships of certain parts of the population, or even acknowledging their situation, contributed to SPOLU being defeated by ANO in the October elections. Looking at public expectations for the future government, ensuring social security ranks second, behind improving the performance of the Czech economy. Particularly, people would like to see a reduction in the national debt and an increase in the affordability of housing.

On the other hand, Andrej Babiš and ANO, in a typically populist manner, have been promising a lot in many areas to many people. As unfulfillable as that is, the election results show that ANO successfully managed to attract relatively poorer voters in socio-economically disadvantaged peripheral regions. ANO also managed to take some voters from anti-system parties, such as the SPD and also the far-left Stačilo! (Enough!), both of whom argued for a referendum about the membership of Czechia in the EU and NATO. That is good news and shows that Czech voters are not particularly interested in leaving these institutions. Crucial damage to Czechia’s international position is about to be done by ANO partnering with the SPD and the Motorists, both of whom are close to the right end of the political spectrum and highly confrontational towards the European Union. There are also considerable shortcomings in their foreign and defence policy programme mentioned above.

Reinventing 1989

For Czechia and its society to be strong and resilient vis-à-vis the many threats of today’s world, it is not enough to go back to the ideas of 1989. They still provide a valuable basis for the functioning of politics and society. However, both Czech society and the world around these values have changed – social inequalities, external military and hybrid threats, climate change, insufficient economic competitiveness, migration, demographic decline, radicalization, etc. For the ideals of 1989 not to remain a nostalgic monument to a world that no longer exists, they need to be updated with current challenges in mind.

Pavlína Janebová is the Research Director of the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in Prague. Her research focuses on Czech foreign and European policy and on the politics of Central European countries.

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Central and Eastern Europe, Czechia, EU accession, NATO membership, Post-soviet transformation, Society, Velvet Revolution