Slovenia’s security paradox: from UN leadership to domestic regression

Samuel Zbogar, Special Representative of Slovenia to the Security Council poses during ceremony of flags installation for Security Council at UN Headquarters in New York on January 2, 2024. Photo: Lev Radin / Shutterstock

Slovenia’s election to the United Nations Security Council, with 153 votes against Belarus’s 38, was more than a victory over an authoritarian competitor. It confirmed Slovenia’s status as a reliable democratic actor, trusted to contribute to global stability amid geopolitical fragmentation. 

This symbolism now sits uncomfortably besides the country’s domestic reality. With its term at the Security Council coming to an end, the Šutar Law came into force: a measure that would allow police to designate entire neighbourhoods inhabited by Roma as “security zones”; grant sweeping powers to conduct identity checks without suspicion; enter homes without warrants; install surveillance equipment; and issue fines that dwarf annual household incomes, among others. And this is the case despite the global visibility of outraged Roma voices, urgent statements from international human rights organizations and a direct appeal from the European Union to avoid violations of fundamental rights, institutional safeguards and EU anti-discrimination standards. 

The disconnect becomes clearer when placed against Slovenia’s actual security conditions. It ranks among the safest countries in Europe, outperforming France, Belgium and Sweden, which face genuine debates about violent crime and policing capacity. It is also striking given the ostensibly socially liberal roots of Prime Minister Robert Golob’s centrist governing coalition. Nations with Slovenia’s safety profile and stated commitment to upholding civil liberties and rule of law do not typically adopt emergency-style policing regimes. When they do, the decision often reveals a political calculus rather than a response to genuine threats, as seen in France’s extended emergency powers, Austria’s “Operation Sharp Sword” or Denmark’s so-called “ghetto laws”. 

It is also a model familiar across Europe: extraordinary powers rarely begin with the majority population. They begin where political cost is lowest – with groups already subjected to disproportionate policing. Surveys consistently show that Roma experience stop-and-search rates several times higher than national averages. Slovenia is not an exception; it is part of the pattern.

Slovenia’s Security Council candidacy gained traction because it was considered a dependable, rights-respecting partner. It aligned with western positions on Ukraine, sanctions and humanitarian access. It signalled predictability at a time when many small states hedge their bets between blocs. For countries of Slovenia’s size, reliability translates to hard power. But this also means domestic missteps carry greater weight. A state trusted for its democratic reliability cannot quietly dilute those standards without undermining the alliances that elevated it.

The repercussions are three-fold.

First, there is the economic impact. Across the EU, research shows that policing disparities feed directly into economic disadvantage. The Šutar Law’s fines – ranging from 3,000 to 20,000 euros – will fall heaviest on households already living in deep economic insecurity. Most Roma in Slovenia rely on informal income well below the national poverty threshold. With the at-risk-poverty line set at 981 euros per month, a single fine can exceed several months – even a full year – of income for low-income families. These are not token penalties. They entrench long-term financial precarity and harden existing barriers to economic mobility. Embedding these disparities into law risks deepening inequality in ways that clash with Slovenia’s reputation for social cohesion. 

Second, it introduces new technological risks. Under the EU AI Act and similar audits, facial-recognition systems show false-positive rates five to ten times higher for minority populations. Without rigorous verification safeguards – which the Šutar Law does not provide – algorithmic bias becomes automated discrimination. The shift from human misjudgement to machine-driven error does not solve the problem. In fact, it only scales it. 

Third, there is potential for regional spillover. Identity-based policing measures do not remain confined to where they originate. They spread through political imitation. There is an alarming possibility that Slovenia could now provide cover for governments in younger EU member countries to adopt similar legislation. A precedent set by a liberal democracy travels further than one set by an openly illiberal state.

At the domestic level, the Šutar Law will reshape Slovenia’s institutional structure by creating a gap between enforcement and oversight. Police powers would take effect immediately. Constitutional review typically requires around 90 days. Ombudsman investigations take at least a month. In that window, extraordinary powers can become routine practice long before legal scrutiny is completed. Slovenia’s recent history shows that temporary policing measures introduced since 2016 have tended to become permanent. The Šutar Law risks accelerating that trajectory.

Then come the financial ramifications. The EU initially froze over 22 billion euros to Hungary and 36 billion euros to Poland under the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism. If applied to Slovenia, the potential exposure ranges from 1.6 to 3.2 billion euros in cohesion and structural funds – a significant budgetary shock for a 63 billion-euro economy. Foreign investment responds even faster than EU institutions do. When legal certainty declines, FDI contracts sharply. Hungary saw drops of 65 to 75 per cent during its judicial restructuring. Slovenia risks a similar pattern if investors interpret the Šutar Law as a sign of weakening rule of law.

Slovenia won its seat in the UN Security Council by presenting itself as a democratic alternative to authoritarian models. But international credibility is not symbolic theatre. It shapes how allies respond, how markets behave and how institutions judge domestic reform. A country entrusted with contributing to global security must ensure that its internal choices strengthen – rather than weaken – the principles it claims to uphold. Slovenia cannot afford this contradiction, and neither can the institutions that placed their trust in it.

Mensur Haliti is Vice President for Democracy and Governance at the Roma Foundation for Europe, focusing on public governance, corruption control and strengthening Roma political participation.

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Roma, rule of law, Slovenia, Slovenian politics, Society