Europe must learn from Ukraine: how combat experience shapes Europe’s new security

Drone operator of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Photo: Shutterstock

After the incident with Russian drones in Poland in the autumn of 2025, Europe began to seriously discuss the possibility of building a so-called . The project involves creating an integrated network of systems for detecting, classifying and neutralizing drones that violate EU airspace.

This idea was supported by European countries that directly border Russia and are most vulnerable to direct or hybrid aggression from the Kremlin.

However, not all European leaders supported the development of such a defence system, and a significant number of researchers from European think tanks shared this view. Analysts and experts identified this project as too expensive and time-consuming to implement, pointing to the need to strengthen strike capabilities and develop new missile weapons as a priority.

At the same time, the construction of a “drone wall”, and even more so the design and production of a European missile, faces two main problems: a lack of real combat experience and excessive bureaucracy.

The EU has already acknowledged that work on the “drone wall” is currently limited to a concept rather than actual defence. Brussels believes that the EU lacks the solutions that Ukraine has, noting that Europe should learn from Kyiv.

The concept of the “drone wall” itself emerged in Ukraine as a direct response to the realities of the modern battlefield. The Ukrainian army was the first in the world to begin the large-scale use of drones to create a multi-layered defence — a zone of destruction up to 15 kilometres deep, where any enemy equipment or manpower becomes an easy target. This tactic arose out of military necessity in the spring of 2024, when Ukraine faced a critical shortage of artillery shells and needed a cheap and effective alternative to deter the Russian offensive.

For example, in October 2025, Ukrainian drones destroyed 77,000 enemy targets. In addition, drones perform logistical functions on the front lines. For example, drones delivered nearly 300,000 kilograms of supplies to units, evacuated the wounded, and carried out mining and combat missions.

The volume of Ukrainian drone production shows an impressive development: from several thousand units in 2022 to at least four million in 2025. According to Bloomberg, this is 40 times more than the US, which produces about 100,000 drones per year. Ukraine currently has more than 500 drone manufacturers offering over a thousand models of various types, with 96 per cent of government purchases made from domestic companies.

Therefore, Ukraine can indeed help Europe strengthen its security, particularly in the use of drones. It has both experience in using and producing relevant security solutions. All that remains is to overcome the scepticism of some European elites regarding the effectiveness of drones as a separate type of weaponry and in combination with missile weapons. However, Ukraine can serve as an example for others to learn from in this regard as well.

The European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative, which was launched in July 2024 and is supported by France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, aims to develop European missiles with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometres. However, the implementation of the project faces problems typical for Europe: according to estimates, the system will only be ready by the 2030s, i.e. Seven to ten years after the start of development.

Ukraine, on the other hand, is demonstrating a diametrically opposite approach. The country’s missile programme is developing at an unprecedented pace. It is worth mentioning that Ukraine has Long Neptune and FP-5 Flamingo missiles, as well as Palyanytsia, Bars and Ruta jet drones, which are actively used to strike legitimate targets on Russian territory. Ukraine is also developing a domestic ballistic missile, which has already undergone combat testing at a distance of almost 300 kilometres. In 2025, Ukraine plans to produce about 3,000 cruise missiles and missile drones.

In addition, Ukrainian designers are offering an even simpler solution: long-range drones and “middle strike” systems that can replace a limited number of traditional expensive cruise missiles, exhausting the enemy’s air defence system through mass production and low cost. The key difference between the Ukrainian defence complex and its European counterpart is the flexibility of production: Ukrainian enterprises fulfil orders in months, while European ones take years. Of course, this pace of Ukrainian arms production is explained by the needs of the front line, but Ukrainian industry is also focused on the latest technological challenges and innovations, which is driving the acceleration of production.

The combat experience of the Ukrainian military has already become the basis for NATO training programmes. Ukrainian instructors teach and transfer skills in countering drones to Polish and other Alliance military personnel. However, as already noted, in addition to transferring Ukrainian experience of modern warfare, Europe should also be interested in Ukrainian weapons.

The most promising model of cooperation, both for Kyiv and Brussels, remains the “Danish model” under which European countries invest directly in the production of Ukrainian weapons at Ukrainian enterprises. Danish-Ukrainian cooperation is an example of a structured and transparent support mechanism that can be scaled up by other EU countries and integrated into the EU’s common defence policy. In addition, this model allows for dividends in the form of combat technologies and products that strengthen the defence capabilities of European countries.

Overall, Ukraine’s integration into the European security architecture should give impetus to innovation in the European defence industry, resolve the issue of reducing the “front-manufacturer” cycle for the rapid implementation of changes, and increase arms production volumes.

Ukraine continues to restrain Russian aggression, buying time and creating a window of opportunity that Europeans must use to strengthen their own security. At the same time, excessive bureaucracy in the EU remains the main threat to effective cooperation, which risks delaying even the best initiatives for years. Europe has the resources, and Ukraine has the technology and combat experience, which is an ideal symbiosis that can guarantee the security of the continent for years to come.

Serhii Kuzan is a military and political expert who is the Co-founder and Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center. He previously served as an adviser to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2022-23), as well as an advisor to the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (2014).

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defence, drone warfare, Europe, European defence, innovation, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukrainian army