Taking Ukraine’s corruption seriously

Young protesters came out in the streets to protest the Ukrainian parliament decision to shut down the country’s anti-corruption bodies. As a result of social pressure, President Zelenskyy quickly reversed the decision. Photo: Vitaliy Holovin / Shutterstock

Corruption remains one of Ukraine’s most systemic challenges, a pervasive force that erodes democratic governance, undermines justice, weakens social welfare, and touches all socio-cultural levels of life. Against this backdrop, Ukrainian civil society has been the principal engine of anti-corruption reforms: vibrant, resilient, and uniquely positioned to expose abuses and advocate for a fairer political system. Yet, its role is now under severe strain due to unprecedented pressures, including strong interference from the country’s political leadership. The latest setbacks in Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts jeopardize its path to membership in the European Union, but also place Brussels in a politically delicate position, compelling it to take a decisive action.

Unmet expectations

Corruption has been an entrenched challenge for independent Ukraine since 1991, inherited in part from Soviet-era practices. For decades, graft and bribery were not isolated abuses but systemic practices of everyday life, sustained by politicians, oligarchs and criminal networks. This pervasive issue stifled economic growth, undermined the development of a more accountable political system, weakened social welfare, and slowed the country’s aspirations toward EU membership.

With millions of Ukrainians taking to the streets in 2014, the Revolution of Dignity (or Euromaidan) made clear that the people were fed up with corruption and demanded both a genuine renewal of the political elite and a firmly pro-EU course. The presidencies of Petro Poroshenko (2014–19) and Volodymyr Zelenskyy initiated relevant anti-corruption reforms aimed at transparency and accountability in public administration, including improvements in asset declaration, public procurement, management of state-owned enterprises, and the delivery of public services. Moreover, in response to people’s demands and pressure from civil society, specialized bodies were established to investigate high-level corruption in the country, such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) in 2015, and the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2019.

Nonetheless, the public expectations raised by Euromaidan were not fully met. During Poroshenko’s tenure, high-level scandals continued and the presidency failed to deliver on many important fronts so that, by 2017, the majority of Ukrainians still viewed corruption as the country’s most pressing problem. Although his “zero-tolerance” approach has curbed the misappropriation of public funds, Zelenskyy’s track record has been uneven. Mismanagement of procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic, corruption scandals within the governmental team, and limited progress in judicial reform have undermined earlier anti-corruption momentum and tempered public optimism.

To date, despite the undeniable progress in the last decade, Ukraine has not succeeded in eradicating corruption, a cultural challenge that still permeates all levels of political, social and economic life, and thus proves especially difficult to eliminate. The relevant authorities continue to uncover serious corruption cases across public sectors, while recurring high-profile scandals expose the fragility of anti-corruption efforts. These setbacks cannot help but deepen public disillusionment with a political system that, though born out of the 2014 protests and promises of radical change, has repeatedly failed to deliver.

Since corruption adapts to historical circumstances and thrives in times of instability, Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 adds another layer of complexity. Draft-evasion schemes based on bribery have emerged, alongside scandals involving overpriced food supplies for soldiers and unfulfilled arms contracts, fuelling widespread public anger. At the same time, the influx of urgently needed international military and humanitarian aid, together with billions of euros in massive foreign financial assistance for Ukraine’s recovery, create fertile ground for even more corruption.

Beyond undermining social welfare, economic development, and political stability, Ukraine’s high level of corruption also slows its path towards EU membership. Under Chapter 23 of the EU acquis communautaire, candidate countries are required to make tangible progress in areas such as judicial independence, the rule of law, and public sector transparency. The European Commission and EU member states have repeatedly emphasized anti-corruption policies as a critical benchmark for Kyiv.

Tackling corruption

Civil society organizations, or CSOs, in Ukraine are among the most vibrant and resilient in post-Soviet Europe, especially when compared to the more fragile civic spaces in many neighbouring countries. Despite the breadth of civil society activity in Ukraine, a number of specialized CSOs have been some of the primary driving forces behind the anti-corruption agenda since 2014.

As part of their actions, they also act as watchdogs regarding public institutions, especially in the judiciary and law enforcement sectors, in order to expose corrupt practices and prevent politically motivated nominations. CSOs inform Ukraine’s international partners about corruption-related developments in the country and hold the Ukrainian political leadership accountable on anti-corruption reforms. As these measures often encounter widespread resistance, CSOs coordinate relevant efforts to keep them on track and in the public spotlight. In addition, they collaborate with European counterparts to exchange knowledge, contributing not only to strengthen domestic initiatives but also to integrate into the broader European civil society network (ex. EU Anti-Corruption Initiative).

Most importantly, the civil society contributes directly to Ukraine’s legal and institutional anti-corruption framework. Beyond driving the creation of institutions such as NABU and SAPO, Ukrainian CSOs also pressed for more transparent procurement systems (such as ProZorro), open property registers, and the electronic declaration of assets for public officials. Influential coalitions like the Reanimation Package of Reforms have functioned almost like think tanks, helping draft legislation, advocate for key reforms, and build public consensus.

Thanks to CSOs’ activities focused on education, citizens are better mobilized against corruption. Organizations such as ACREC, based at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, for example, offer training and online courses for legal professionals and civil servants. Others work with local communities, particularly youth and activists, to foster public oversight and civic participation in anti-corruption initiatives.

Through this array of activities, Ukrainian CSOs play not only a reactive role by fighting new corruption cases, but also a proactive one, seeking to prevent the perpetuation of this problem and promote long-term transparency. In this sense, civil society works as a catalyst for a cultural and societal transformation that addresses corruption at its very roots, problematizing it as a systemic issue, promoting political accountability, and laying the groundwork for meaningful and lasting change in Ukraine.

Unprecedented challenges

Today, Ukrainian anti-corruption CSOs face unprecedented challenges. These include, first and foremost, financial uncertainty, especially after Trump’s re-election and the suspension of USAID funding for programmes. Anti-corruption groups also have to deal with organizational fatigue as three years of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression have clearly taken a toll on capacity, morale, and long-term sustainability. Similarly, security threats, even far from the frontlines due to Russia’s ongoing capacity to strike across Ukraine, creates additional burdens. At the same time, legislative pressure in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, to tighten regulations on NGOs and foreign-funded organizations is still present.

As highlighted at a recent European Policy Centre event on Ukrainian civil society and anti-corruption agencies, these organizations are facing political attacks from national ruling elites, undermining their ability to monitor and report on anti-corruption developments. Such pressures are consistent with what the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O’Flaherty, has described as “alleged intimidation and other forms of harassment” involving Ukrainian journalists, lawyers, civil society, and political and opinion leaders who have criticized the government. O’Flaherty also denounced the so-called “personal sanctions” imposed by Ukrainian state authorities, which may restrict certain individual rights and bypass regular judicial mechanisms.

After NABU and SAPO conducted high-level investigations this year, Ukrainian security and law enforcement agencies carried out some raids against their staff, raising public concern both domestically and internationally. Official charges range from traffic violations to alleged links with Russia, but many observers viewed these actions as attempts to undermine the independence of Ukraine’s two key anti-corruption bodies. Concerns deepened when, on July 22nd, the Verkhovna Rada approved (and the President signed) a new legislation granting the Prosecutor General greater control over NABU and SAPO investigations. This move sparked widespread protests in the country and pressure from the EU, prompting Zelenskyy a week later to sign a new bill that restored much of their independence. Still, one key amendment remained in place, leaving doubts about prosecutorial independence and the fairness of top-level appointments.

While the situation appears calmer now than in the summer, concern still persists. Soon up for a second reading in the Rada, draft law n. 12439 does not solely include significant business-friendly reforms, but also controversial provisions limiting the Bureau of Economic Security’s power to investigate embezzlement of state funds and property. Similarly, draft law n. 13423 would grant impunity for crimes committed by certain defence companies during the execution of defence contracts.

This environment reflects harsh political pressure on entities that are active in fighting high-level corruption, including not only governmental agencies but also civil organizations. According to Clemens Mueller (DG ENEST, European Commission), such attacks are likely to persist as long as these organizations deliver effectively on their mandate, though they may increasingly take subtler and more sophisticated forms. The reason is clear: anti-corruption bodies have come too close to the heart of the political establishment. At the same time, that establishment is undermining Euromaidan’s core promise: namely, that no one is above the law.

What the EU can do

While some political measures have been embraced, deeper systemic reforms proposed by specialized anti-corruption institutions and civil society have often been delayed or resisted by Ukraine’s political elites. Given Kyiv’s determined path towards EU accession and the high level of public trust Ukrainians place in Brussels, the EU has significant political leverage to alter the cost-benefit calculus of Ukraine’s ruling class, making genuine anti-corruption reform not only unavoidable but also the most advantageous path forward.

To achieve this, however, the EU should be stricter in criticizing recent developments in Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts. Political solidarity with Kyiv is a matter of justice, but it should not translate into overlooking persistent issues. At the same time, policymakers in Brussels must ensure that their criticism remains constructive and is framed in a way that strengthens Ukraine, rather than providing opportunities for its adversaries.

To turn this commitment into action, the EU should consider the following measures:

1) Apply informal, non-public pressure on Ukrainian senior representatives during every meeting to convey the EU’s strong disappointment with the current state of anti-corruption in Ukraine. Key political figures have not fully grasped the extent to which the EU, as well as public trust, was damaged after the July events. The EU should consistently remind them of the consequences such setbacks have for Ukraine’s EU accession prospects and its democratic future;

2) Mediate a structured, genuine and substantive political dialogue on corruption among Ukraine’s state leadership, anti-corruption public institutions, and civil society. The EU must insist that this collaborative approach be inclusive, responsive and supportive of CSOs, which function both as a democratic engine and a co-pilot in reform, rather than as rivals to the state. The EU should also emphasize that such cooperation is essential for the proper implementation of the EU acquis and, ultimately, for advancing Ukraine’s accession trajectory;

3) Launch a new EU funding project to provide immediate economic support to Ukrainian anti-corruption CSOs, particularly in the aftermath of the withdrawal of USAID programmes and the July events. The Ukraine2EU Programme offers a useful precedent, but new initiatives should definitely be larger, more structured, and continuous in order to reduce the burden of fundraising on CSOs alone;

4) Open the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster to give Ukraine’s state authorities a clear institutional incentive to frame EU accession as a tangible process. This signals the EU’s commitment to enable accession, putting the responsibility on Ukraine (and, specifically, on anti-corruption reforms). Without such an incentive, there is the risk that Ukrainians may perceive the EU as reluctant to admit them in, potentially fuelling growing Eurosceptic sentiments;

5) Enhance judicial cooperation between EU member states and the Ukrainian authorities to facilitate the extradition of Ukrainians residing in the EU who have been convicted of corruption. This would show that Brussels is not merely imposing accession criteria, but is actively supporting Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts;

6) Integrate anti-corruption into the EU’s dialogue on Ukraine’s post-war recovery. At this summer’s Ukraine Recovery Conference, there was little appetite for discussing corruption issues related to the present and future recovery of Ukraine. Yet, the EU should make it a central theme of member states’ contribution. With billions in aid expected to support the reconstruction and revitalization of the country, these funds risk being wasted if diverted through graft and bribery.

Comprehensive transformation

Ukraine’s fight against corruption has become a cornerstone of both its democratic transformation and EU integration efforts. The current political establishment rose to power with Zelenskyy’s campaign promise of zero tolerance for corruption. Yet, despite undeniable progress in the last few years, it remains deeply systemic and persistent. Even if it was elected for its hardline stance, the current political class has shown resistance when anti-corruption investigations have proven too close to the core of political power.

The persistence of corruption demonstrates that it cannot be dismantled through a top-down approach from Ukrainian state institutions alone. Instead, a comprehensive transformation of the entire system is needed. The magnitude of such change requires empowering not only public anti-corruption entities but also CSOs at every level of Ukraine’s social and political life, enabling them to fully exercise their watchdogs and their informational, advocacy, policy, educational and networking functions.

Public demand for change is clear and unmistakable: a recent KIIS poll shows that 92 per cent of Ukrainians see corruption a serious problem, nearly matching the 95 per cent who cited the war. This pressure calls on Ukraine’s political leadership to find a modus vivendi with civil society and top anti-corruption organizations, as well as address a challenge that can no longer be postponed.

The EU, in turn, should leverage its political influence to strengthen and fund Ukrainian civil society, ensure that Kyiv implements necessary reforms, facilitate collaboration between state institutions and anti-corruption bodies, and foster a political environment conducive to accountability and transparency. Such support would respond to Ukrainians’ immediate demands for justice and represent a long-term political investment for a more democratic, accountable and resilient Ukraine.

The views expressed in this article are that of the author and in no way reflect the views of the European Commission.

Alessandro Vitiello holds an MA in International Politics and Diplomatic Studies from the University of Bologna. He is also a former trainee at the International Centre for Defence and Security (Estonia) and an alumnus of New Eastern Europe’s Think Tank School.        

corruption, reforms, Ukraine