Tbilisi’s high stakes bet on Beijing: what is the price to pay?

Construction of a road and tunnels by a Chinese company near Batumi. Photo: Natalia Kirsanova / Shutterstock

In late September 2025, a delegation from Abkhazia, Georgia’s Russia-backed breakaway region, travelled to China to participate in the Food2China Expo held in the city of Guangzhou. Supported by the Abkhaz Chamber of Commerce, the delegation showcased local products and signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Guangdong Chamber of Commerce, a Chinese state-linked organization.

The visit was more than a trade mission for Abkhazia. Secluded on the international stage, the breakaway territory sees any engagement with China as a potential boost to its legitimacy and an opportunity to soothe its decades-long economic isolation. Abkhaz media and social networks framed the delegation’s trip as “a strategically significant step” toward integrating Abkhazia into larger trade networks, even if tangible economic gains remain limited.

In the meantime, the Georgian government continued to court China as its strategic partner. On September 29th, during celebrations in Tbilisi marking the 76th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing’s incumbent ambassador to Georgia, Zhou Qian, reiterated his government’s desire to deepen cooperation with the country. At the same time, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze praised China as “a model for progress”, affirming Georgia’s readiness to expand economic and political cooperation with Beijing.

Amidst Georgia’s U-turn from its EU and NATO ambitions, China represents more than an economic partner for the ruling Georgian Dream party. Under current circumstances, it is increasingly viewed by Tbilisi as a strategic alternative to the West. With strained relations with the EU and the United States, Chinese investments, loans, and infrastructure projects are seen as a lifeline — offering the government both financial support and geopolitical leverage. Tbilisi hopes that Beijing can help mitigate the economic and political fallout from the country’s recent distancing from western allies. Yet, China’s dichotomous approach to Georgia may turn what seems like a lifeline into a geopolitical tightrope.

The economic allure

Georgia’s geographic position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia has long attracted Chinese attention. The country is an important node for the Middle Corridor, a transit route connecting China to European markets that has grown in importance since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted much more traditional transport routes in the north.

Chinese firms have invested heavily in Georgian infrastructure over the past decade through logistics projects tied to the Belt and Road Initiative. The 2023 strategic partnership between Tbilisi and Beijing further cemented these ties, prioritizing comprehensive coordination in economic, political and cultural spheres between the two countries, signalling Georgia’s ambition to become a major transit corridor between Europe and Asia. By 2022, trade between the two countries had grown significantly, making China Georgia’s third-largest economic partner. Projects such as the Anaklia deepwater port further exemplify the current stakes. Initially planned by the Anaklia Development Consortium in 2017, the port remains unbuilt. In 2020, Georgian Dream ditched a US-led construction consortium, selecting a Chinese-Singaporean group as the private partner to renew the project in 2024. If completed, the port would strengthen Georgia’s strategic importance within the Middle Corridor, all while bringing a significant boost to Chinese investment in the country.

An alternative to the West

Despite the economic promise, Georgia’s relationship with China carries significant political risks. Beijing’s approach is deliberate and carefully calibrated. The Abkhazia memorandum, although largely symbolic, clearly demonstrates China’s willingness to engage with Tbilisi while quietly maintaining ties with its breakaway regions, avoiding political commitments on Georgia’s territorial integrity. Chinese officials routinely sidestep questions about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the UN, China has even abstained on resolutions concerning the return of Georgia’s internally displaced persons. In practice, this shows Beijing prioritizes its strategic and economic interests over the political goals of the Georgia’s incumbent party.

For the Georgian Dream ruling party, the calculus seems simple yet perilous: by deepening ties with China, Tbilisi hopes to offset declining western support while accelerating economic development. But Beijing’s transactional diplomacy suggests that these gains may come at a high price. China’s strategy in Georgia illustrates a “double-edged” approach: strengthening ties with the recognized government while maintaining symbolic or informal engagement with a breakaway region, such as Abkhazia.

While Tbilisi gains immediate benefits, be it loans and infrastructure, deeper reliance on Beijing may bestow China subtle but strong leverage over the country’s domestic politics and foreign policy. The ambiguity of Beijing’s engagement underscores a fundamental imbalance: what Georgia perceives as a partnership, China treats as an opportunity. By carefully balancing these moves, Beijing is attempting to maximize its economic influence without committing to the political risks of territorial recognition. Over time, economic gains could evolve into strategic dependency, leaving Tbilisi highly exposed to Chinese political leverage.

The hidden cost

The Georgian Dream party must therefore navigate a delicate balance despite its ever-worsening relations with the West. While Chinese investments bring immediate economic benefits and strategic opportunities, they risk creating long-term dependencies that could limit Tbilisi’s autonomy in foreign policy and domestic decision-making. The Guangdong memorandum, the Anaklia port, and ongoing infrastructure projects reveal China’s true calculus regarding its partnership with Tbilisi. Georgian officials may hope that Beijing can serve as a reliable alternative to the West, yet the reality is far more complex. Chinese investments and loans are transactional, and the strategic partnership, while beneficial, is based on unequal terms. For Georgia, the question is no longer whether China will invest, but on whose terms. In the long run, short-term economic benefits could translate into long-term political leverage.

Importantly, China’s cautious engagement with Abkhazia, exemplified by the Guangdong memorandum, could subtly affect the breakaway region’s international positioning. While the agreement is largely symbolic, even limited recognition by a Chinese state-affiliated organization may give Abkhazia a marginal boost in legitimacy on the global stage. For Tbilisi, this balancing act highlights the delicate interplay between economic engagement and the potential for incremental shifts in the perception of Abkhazia’s sovereignty.

To navigate this complex relationship, Georgian Dream could consider several measures. Even though Chinese investment might seem attractive, Georgia should continue engaging with western partners, regional allies, and multilateral financial institutions to avoid over-reliance on a single country. It should enhance transparency and oversight, maintaining scrutiny of all major deals with China to reduce the risk of opaque arrangements that could compromise the country’s sovereignty. China’s involvement in Georgia offers both opportunity and caution. Therefore, balancing short-term economic benefits with long-term strategic autonomy will be paramount for ensuring that its high stakes bet does not come at the cost of independence.

Ioseb Dzamukashvili Sekhniashvili is a policy expert with a focus on Eastern Europe, Eurasia and Russia. Previously, he has been a columnist at Forbes Georgia and a contributing policy analyst for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. He holds an MA degree from the University of Glasgow.

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Belt and Road Initiative, China, Georgia, Georgian foreign policy, South Caucasus