Turkey’s policy in Central Asia

Registan square in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Photo: Oybek Ostanov / Shutterstock

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s foreign policy interests remained deeply tied to the western camp and NATO, with the exception of the historical rivalry with Greece and involvement in Cyprus. However, the collapse of the USSR opened the door for Turkey to engage with an area it had neglected for centuries, despite its historical significance: Central Asia.

Central Asia’s history and significance

The area has been historically relevant and the centre of migration movements, trade and empires. The Silk Road, facilitating trade and cultural exchange, showcases such relevance. Mainly Turkic and Iranian peoples inhabited the region, and during the 19th century, Russia conquered it, shaping its identity until the present day. Its oil and natural gas resources; central location between Europe and China; and access to re-emerging land-based trade corridors between Europe and East Asia (Belt and Road initiative, Middle Corridor), have placed Central Asia back in the geopolitical arena. All of the Central Asian republics (excluding Tajikistan) are speakers of Turkic languages, and thus Turkey shares linguistic and ethnic kinship with these republics. It is noteworthy, however, that the Seljuks and their successor, the Ottoman Empire, despite origins in Central Asia, focused on westward expansion and largely neglected Central Asia due to the geopolitical realities of the time. The Ottoman Empire avoided engaging in Central Asia owing to defeats, such as the Battle of Ankara (1402) against Timur, and the challenges posed by nomadic Turkic tribes. Thus, in spite of ethnic kinship, both regions and their peoples separated their trajectories and were subject to different influences that shaped their respective identities.

Turkey’s renewed engagement with Central Asia

As a consequence of the fall of the USSR, Turkey reassessed its geopolitical role and assertiveness. Since the end of the Soviet threat, as the Caucasus and Central Asia were no longer directly ruled by Moscow, Turkey could afford to broaden its scope of action to secure its interests on the one hand and to remain a relevant actor for the western camp on the other. The continued negative response to the inclusion of Turkey in the European integration process likely reinforced this stance.

Thus, Turkey welcomed the news of the independence of the Central Asian republics and initiated engagement with them. The country wanted to present its identity as a secular, relatively westernized and democratic republic as a model for the region in comparison with Islamic extremism or Soviet-style authoritarianism. Additionally, it supported the idea of pan-Turkism in order to engage with the area, envisioning a united Turkic world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China in which Turkey would be the leading country.

Turkey created the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) in 1992 and the Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) in 1993, establishing cultural and educational cooperation that, over time, attracted students from Turkic countries to Turkey, strengthening cultural ties. Coupled with the use of media outlets such as TRT, Turkey used these soft power tools to reinforce its cultural presence in the region.

Unfortunately for Turkish policymakers, the country’s projection in Central Asia remained limited due to Turkey’s constrained capacity, which was showcased through a lack of economic and military resources compared to China and Russia. But perhaps most importantly, the Central Asian states regained freedom after centuries of rule from Moscow, and their priority was setting their own individual national identity separated from their Soviet identity. This was instead of coming under the umbrella of another power, albeit with shared cultural ties. As an example of this stance, Turkmenistan opted for an isolationist policy of permanent neutrality, which is officially recognized by the UN. To this day, the country remains the only Turkic Central Asian republic which is not a full member of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) but an observer. Moreover, Russia pressured Central Asian states to avoid engaging with Turkey in pan-Turkic rhetoric, which forced Ankara to comply with the realities on the ground and to reassess its strategy, renouncing its initial aspirations of establishing a Turkic common market or a Turkic investment bank.

Cooperation in security, energy and economic development

Realizing the situation and the limited capabilities of Turkey in the region compared to Russia and China, the country changed its approach to a more pragmatic and incremental one, emphasizing cooperation in security, energy and economic development and establishing institutionalized forms of cooperation.

In 2013, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia established the Organization of Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status (TAKM), whose goal was to increase cooperation between law enforcement bodies, including in the fields of terrorism, smuggling and border security. Along with the increased collaboration, countries willing to join TAKM received preferential offers for Turkish military hardware, and Ankara regularly conducts military exercises with Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The Russian war in Ukraine and the total Azerbaijani victory over Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh increased the region’s appetite for the products of the Turkish defence industry. This has been indicated by the purchase of Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones by Kyrgyzstan and the manufacture in Kazakhstan of TAI Anka drones.

When it comes to broader economic and energy cooperation, in 2009, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan established the Turkic Council, known as OTS since 2021. Uzbekistan joined in 2019, and Hungary became an observer in 2018. Apart from the previously mentioned TURKSOY, the organization established cooperation mechanisms in diverse areas and closely collaborates with affiliated institutions. Within these structures function the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries (TURKPA), the Turkic Investment Fund (TIF), the Turkic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TCCI), the Turkic Academy, and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation. Thus, even if cultural cooperation remains relevant within the OTS framework, as indicated by the creation of a Turkic alphabet, cooperation in economic development and energy matters remains the cornerstone of the organization.

The role of energy is hard to overlook, as the Central Asian region and Azerbaijan are rich in oil resources and their economies are highly dependent on such exports, while Turkey is a transit region for energy flows from Central Asia towards European markets. Additionally, Central Asia aims to reduce their dependence on Russia for energy transportation, and

Turkey wants to position itself increasingly as an energy hub, further reducing reliance on Russia and increasing its strategic leverage. In this regard, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on the country opened a window of opportunity to achieve these goals, diversifying energy flows away from pipelines across Russian territory towards alternative routes. This can be seen in the emergence of a major project aligning with the interests of the OTS: the Middle Corridor.

The corridor seeks to integrate ports, roads, rail and energy infrastructure from China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Turkey, bypassing both Russia and Iran. The project constitutes a very appealing prospect not only for Turkey and Central Asia but also for the EU, as shown by the supply of Azerbaijan’s natural gas to the EU and Macron’s visit to Kazakhstan in 2023. Already from January to March 2022, cargo transported along this route increased by more than 120 per cent compared to the same period in 2021, with a likely increasing tendency owing to the continuing war in Ukraine.

Looking to the future, the OTS has established Turkic World Vision 2040, which builds on the cooperation and infrastructure projects of the Middle Corridor to create a cohesive economic space through investments. This has helped foster entrepreneurship and the creation of SMEs, build physical and digital infrastructure for trade and logistics, expand energy cooperation to renewable energies, and strengthen supply chains and the economic and energy security of the partner countries. Milestones in the process include the creation of TuranSEZ, a special economic zone in Kazakhstan, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project.

Turkey’s plans

Turkey’s presence in Central Asia through the strengthening of the OTS, the Middle Corridor and related partner initiatives is likely to not only remain in place but to gradually increase over time, with progress primarily focused on the development of infrastructure, energy cooperation and economic integration. For Turkey, Central Asia constitutes a relevant region for its foreign policy along with the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. Its presence in the area is also a geopolitical asset, increasing Turkey’s leverage on matters concerning the region. For the Turkic Central Asian republics, their collaboration with Ankara provides an additional partner with shared cultural ties and somewhat aligned geopolitical goals, such as reducing their dependence on Russia, allowing them additional leverage vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

Nonetheless, challenges regarding this cooperation remain owing to the realities on the ground, as Turkey cannot compete with China in available capital for investments, nor can it compete with Russia in the sphere of security. Turkey remains a member of NATO, a reality unlikely to change in the near future in favour of any prospective Turkic security alliance. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan remain within the CSTO, the Russian-led military alliance. In the case of Kazakhstan specifically, the balancing between Russia and other actors has to be carefully managed owing to Astana’s shared border with Russia and its ethnic Russian population. Because of this, pan-Turkic rhetoric is also carefully balanced, as pan-Turkism may be perceived as a threat by China due to Uyghur separatism, as well as by Russia given that the country is home to various Turkic peoples and their respective republics.

The future of cooperation between the parties will be influenced by the results delivered on the proposed projects and the success of the Middle Corridor, as well as by the situation concerning the rest of the actors. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the strategic dilemma it poses to Russia, possibly forcing it to overlook other theatres, along with increased involvement of the EU in the initiative, could prompt increased cooperation.

Adrian Santano holds a BA degree in Political Science from the University of the Basque Country and an MA degree in European Studies from the University of Wrocław. Having lived in Spain, Poland, Turkey and Finland, his interests include European political economy and geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe.

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Central Asia, Organization of Turkic States, turkey, turkish foreign policy