Stopping the war through coercion: Can Trump still bring peace in Ukraine?

A Tactical "Tomahawk" Block IV cruise missile escorted by a F-14D Tomcat durinng a test in southern California in 2002. Photo: United States Navy / wikimedia.org

Despite US President Donald Trump’s constant attempts to achieve peace and his optimistic expectations, the process has reached a deadlock, and hostilities risk moving into next year. While the new sanctions are important, they do not change the position on the battlefield and the plans of the Russian command. Maintaining the current status quo is not enough to stop the war, which will further push American diplomacy into a deadlock due to Russia’s destructive position. A game changer is needed that will give movement to real negotiations.

Coercing the Russian side is the only way towards a diplomatic settlement and Trump still has the tools to achieve this goal. Previous experience has shown that attempts to motivate Vladimir Putin with constructive conversation yield no results. The Russian side continues to stall and exploit its battlefield advantage – its ability to engage targets at a distance and the depletion of the Ukrainian air defence systems – in the hope that the Ukrainian defences will crack. Equalizing long-range capabilities could be the “game changer” that will force Russia to sit down at the negotiating table on the terms of a ceasefire along the front line – the only possible way to stop the war.

Why Ukraine needs Tomahawks and why it is not an escalation

The Russian army is constantly changing its tactics of shelling Ukraine, but the basis of recent operations is the following approach: most large-scale strikes consist of using several dozen ballistic missiles and several hundred drones. Such tactics force the Ukrainian air defence systems to reload and contribute to more effective use of Russian missiles which can carry a significantly greater explosive weight and inflict much greater damage.

Russia is actively using a new method to destroy the Ukrainian energy system and create conditions for a blackout, hunting for military-industrial facilities and causing terrible damage to civilian infrastructure with numerous casualties among the people. While Russia feels an advantage in this sense, the question is – why would the Kremlin undergo talks for a peace agreement? The question is rhetorical.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is trying by all possible means to correct this trend. First, Ukrainian technologies now allow the use of drones more than a 1,000 kilometres behind the front line into Russian territory, which is a significant breakthrough. Such progress allows for Ukraine to strike oil refinery facilities which are key in supporting the Russian war machine. However, it is worth remembering that a drone will not be able to inflict such a large-scale impact as a ballistic missile. That is why it is difficult for the Ukrainian army to destroy strategic industrial facilities such as defence enterprises which produce Russian missiles and drones.

Second, the Ukrainian side has achieved some progress in the production of its own missile known as the Flamingo. Yet, without technological and financial support from western partners, it will be difficult to scale up the production of these missiles and their quality to a level that will allow to systematically strike Russian military targets at a distance. This is why it is so important for Ukraine to obtain Tomahawks.

The use of Tomahawks in combination with Ukrainian drones, Ukrainian-made missiles and missiles received from other partners could allow Ukraine to partially catch up with Russian capabilities and more effectively strike key targets. Also, if the US decided to allow Ukraine to obtain Tomahawks, it would be a clear political signal to other allies – in particular, Germany, which is in no rush to agree to the transfer of its mid-range Taurus missiles.

As long as one of the sides in the war believes it has an advantage on the battlefield, there will be no peace. The transfer of Tomahawks to Ukraine thus, would not be an escalation, but a partial equalization of the military potential of the parties in order to create better conditions for peace. In this context, the myth of Russian propaganda that American missiles will not change the situation on the front does not correspond to reality.

Allowing Ukraine to destroy defence enterprises and logistics on Russian territory would significantly limit the Kremlin’s potential to advance directly on certain sections of the front line and strike deep into Ukraine. If Ukraine had the ability to cause blackouts in Russia, this could deter similar actions against the Ukrainian population. Thus, Ukraine is not looking for escalation, but is fighting for a level playing field. Trump’s consent to transfer around 50 missiles would be an effective step aimed at forcing Russia to make peace.

While it is clear that the Trump administration does not seek escalation – and Ukraine shares this position – Russia’s declarations about a possible “nuclear response” to the use of Tomahawk missiles do not withstand scrutiny. First, the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine would offer Russia no military advantage while carrying severe political consequences, especially since China and India have clearly stated that such a scenario is unacceptable. Second, Ukraine is prepared to grant the US full control over target selection and the procedures for deploying the Tomahawks, ensuring complete coordination with American partners regarding potential risks. Therefore, Russia’s threats appear to be nothing more than attempts to obstruct the decision to transfer missiles to Ukraine, driven by the Kremlin’s fears of possible negative outcomes on the battlefield.

Can current deterrence stop Russia?

The recently implemented sanctions against Russia’s Rosneft and Lukoil represent an important step by the Trump administration. However, the key issue is not only the adoption of such political decisions, but also ensuring their effective enforcement. It is worth noting that Russia has successfully adapted to similar economic measures introduced by the previous US administration against companies such as Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft. There is reason to believe that Moscow will continue to find workarounds and loopholes. Moreover, Indian companies appear to have developed mechanisms to purchase Russian resources through intermediaries, not to mention China which continues to buy Russian oil at discounted prices and shows no willingness to completely block the supply channels.

Thus, while sanctions serve as a powerful political signal and may have significant long-term effects, they are not a decisive tool of coercion that will bring Russia to the negotiating table in the near future. The Russian economy will suffer, but not to a degree that would compel Putin to immediately halt hostilities on the front lines. Despite the importance of sanctions as a long-term strategic measure, in the short term they are unlikely to produce the rapid progress toward peace that Ukraine and the United States desire.

 Is a peace deal close?

The Trump administration has maintained a consistent position focused on achieving peace, a stance that deserves recognition. Yet, while Ukraine supports an unconditional ceasefire, Russia continues to exploit American goodwill for its own aims: securing victory on the battlefield and preparing the ground for future offensives against Ukraine.

Like a boxer aware of its height and reach advantage, Russia seeks to keep its opponent at a distance, wearing him down through constant pressure and clinches, so long as it does not suffer a critical weakening of its position, particularly by maintaining export revenues. Only when Russia loses this advantage will the situation change, and Putin may begin genuine negotiations. Trump, thus, faces a strategic choice: whether to force the “opponent” to stop the fight in the middle rounds or wait until the final ones. A well-calibrated combination of military and strong economic coercion could achieve this sooner rather than later.

For now, however, a peaceful resolution to the war appears to be distant. The fault does not lie with Kyiv, which has met all of Washington’s calls, nor with the United States, which continues its diplomatic efforts. Trump still holds the “coercion cards”, and using them wisely would not lead to escalation, but could instead compel Russia toward peace.

Anton Naichuk is the Director of the Eastern Europe Council based in Warsaw.

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military support, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, US-Ukrainian relations, weapons