Disinformation in Lithuania’s political landscape

A view of the old town in Vilnius. Photo: Shutterstock

Disinformation has become an increasingly visible force in Lithuania’s political life, no longer a tool used by Kremlin trolls but voiced by presidential candidates and echoed in parliamentary debates. From attacks on support to Ukraine to conspiratorial claims about Lithuania’s history, these narratives are shaping how some citizens see the world and their country. This article examines how disinformation is being mainstreamed through political rhetoric, who spreads it, and what it all means for Lithuania’s information sovereignty.

Vaitkus: echoes of the Kremlin

A former medical doctor turned political outsider, Eduardas Vaitkus ran in the 2024 presidential election with a campaign marked by populist slogans, moral panic, and a steady stream of accusations aimed at the media and political establishment.

One of his recurring themes was that mainstream media in Lithuania is “bought and paid for”, a tool of Brussels and Washington rather than a platform for honest public debate. In rallies and livestreams, he called journalists “propagandists” and criticized mainstream media channels.

But Vaitkus did not stop at media criticism. He also propagated narratives aligned with Kremlin disinformation. Most notably, he claimed that Europe should end all aid to Ukraine, including humanitarian assistance. “Why should we suffer for someone else’s war?” he asked in a video that quickly went viral on TikTok. The message, simple and emotional, provoked strong reactions. Within days, it had been picked up by multiple Russian-language Telegram channels, translated and reframed as proof that even Lithuanians “are waking up”.

This is a vivid example of how disinformation works: a radical political figure makes a bold, emotionally charged claim. Social media accelerates its reach, and foreign actors amplify it to further divide, demoralize and deceive.

Eduardas Vaitkus has disappeared from public life since the presidential elections, apart from a few protests like his request to go on stage and speak at a protest against the real estate tax. However, in mid-May, information emerged that Eduard Vaitkus had met with the leader of the pro-Russian Belaya Rus party in Minsk and held a press conference together. According to the Belarusian media, Eduard Vaitkus said that the election of the president of Lithuania was illegitimate, and that Lithuania was heading towards the destruction of its nation and statehood. It is very likely that this time Eduardas Vaitkus will not go unpunished for spreading such disinformation, as both the police and the Prosecutor General’s Office have taken an interest in this case.

Vaitkus also claimed during his election campaign that Lithuania joined the EU fraudulently, that the war in Ukraine is the United States’ proxy war, and even suggested deporting Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to Belarus. These statements are part of his strategy to attract attention, gain support from voters disillusioned with the government, and spread falsehoods.

It should be noted that around 104,000 Lithuanians voted for Vaitkus in the presidential election.

Žemaitaitis and disinformation

While Vaitkus has more or less retreated from the spotlight since the election, Remigijus Žemaitaitis remains active. Also a candidate in the 2024 presidential race, he now leads the Nemuno Aušra party, which holds seats in the Lithuanian Seimas as part of the ruling coalition. Žemaitaitis has a long history of inflammatory statements, and in recent years, has adopted a more systematic disinformation strategy, especially on Facebook, where he maintains a loyal and active following.

Žemaitaitis often posts mainstream news articles but reframes them by selectively quoting or misrepresenting the content to suit his narrative. This practice, done consistently and deliberately, keeps his audience engaged. At times, he goes further and spreads radical claims filled with hate speech.

Despite being a prominent political figure, Žemaitaitis is currently facing a hate speech case. In 2023, he posted on Facebook that Jews were a “sub-species” and shared antisemitic wartime poems encouraging violence. He also claimed that Lithuania’s Jewish community should bear responsibility for Soviet-era deportations. At the end of the previous parliamentary term, he resigned from the Seimas. Had he not, his mandate would have been revoked, preventing his candidacy in the next election.

Earlier this year, Žemaitaitis said he saw no reason to visit Ukraine unless it was to study its corruption. This remark followed an argument with Seimas Speaker Saulius Skvernelis over additional defence funding.

Such statements matter. For citizens disillusioned with their lives or government, a direct opponent of the establishment can appear as a truth-teller. Žemaitaitis’s messaging echoes Russian disinformation narratives. His calls to prioritize “Lithuanian interests” over NATO and EU commitments are picked up by Kremlin-linked media as evidence of division within the Alliance. Whether intentional or not, his messaging supports the interests of those who seek to isolate and destabilize Lithuania.

Rewriting the history: Russian strategy

While domestic political actors may exploit disinformation for votes or visibility, Russia’s disinformation goals are strategic and long-term. A recent narrative pushed by Kremlin-linked Telegram channels claims that Lithuania’s history is fabricated.

These posts, often accompanied by poor-quality graphics and citations from fringe Russian historians, argue that Lithuania “did not exist in the Middle Ages” and was “invented” by western powers after the First World War. They claim the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a Slavic creation and that the 1918 independence movement was a rebellion orchestrated by the West.

As absurd as it sounds, this narrative has a clear aim: to delegitimize Lithuania’s statehood by undermining historical memory. If people can be convinced, or made to doubt, that their national identity is artificial, they may be less likely to resist foreign influence. Russia has used this tactic across the post-Soviet space, from Ukraine and Georgia to the Baltics.

Telegram, YouTube and even the comment sections of Lithuanian news portals are preferred channels for this historical revisionism. The messaging is often subtle: seemingly innocent questions (“Was Lithuania really a medieval state?”), unsourced maps, or posts presented as “curious facts”. Over time, repetition breeds doubt, which is disinformation’s greatest ally. Moreover, this year a book on Lithuanian history was issued in Russia supporting similar lies.

Disinformation narratives: simple and emotional

Disinformation does not need to be sophisticated to succeed. In fact, its power lies in its simplicity. Rather than engage with complex realities, such as EU law or geopolitical nuance, disinformation presents the world in black and white: good versus evil, us versus them, patriots versus traitors.

Recent studies and the examples in this article reveal several key disinformation techniques. Selective framing emphasizes only those facts that support a preferred narrative. Of course, the remaining parts of it are omitted. Emotional appeals invoking fear, anger or betrayal bypass critical thinking. False context is another method: real images or quotes used misleadingly to support false conclusions.

Disinformation in Lithuania is no longer an occasional irritant. It is a structural feature of the political landscape. It exploits existing frustrations, rewrites national memory, and blurs the line between free speech and harmful deceit. Intentionally or not, political actors like Vaitkus and Žemaitaitis contribute to efforts that mislead, manipulate and polarize. While the Kremlin gains from this chaos, domestic actors often light the match. And the main casualty here is democratic resilience.

This text was prepared in the framework of the 2024/2025 edition of the Solidarity Academy, an international project of the European Solidarity Centre, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Warsaw, and New Eastern Europe. The project aims to inspire and support the development of young leaders across Europe.

Dominykas Rimaitis is a journalist with LRT, Lithuania’s national public broadcaster. With a background in communication and media studies, he is particularly interested in how media narratives shape public opinion and political discourse in the Baltic region.

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disinformation, Lithuania, Lithuanian politics