High-time for a new opening: Poland and the Russian civil society

Border between Poland and Russia in the province of Gołdap. Photo: wikimedia.org

On 10th of September, when around 20 Russian drones violated the Polish airspace, Poland became the target of the most serious air attack since the Second World War. This intrusion confirmed that Russia constitutes a fundamental threat to NATO and especially Poland’s security. This unprecedented event should provoke a critical self-reflection in Poland on toolbox of instruments that should be used in order to counter the Russian challenge. This reflection should recognize that the current “war-time-approach” towards Russia which is almost exclusively concentrated on hard military security, has exhausted itself. A more holistic approach is needed. Poland should take into consideration that Russia must be also simultaneously fought back more efficiently in the field of soft security (information, perceptions, values, ideas, etc.). It requires a decisive intensification of cooperation between Poland and the Russian civil society. Definitely, the Russian civil society, not being a political party, cannot serve as a formal political counterweight to the Putin regime, however, still by its activities it plays a relevant role in countering totalitarian tendencies, increasing awareness of human rights violations and fighting against state propaganda which promotes militarism, nationalism and neo-imperial ideas. This role consists particularly in reaching out with independent information to the Russian society. Moreover, the Russian civil society operates with remarkable economic efficiency in the media sphere. Unfortunately, due to various social, economic, political and historical reasons, the intensification of cooperation with the Polish state and society and the Russian NGOs faces serious challenges.

Poland’s attitude towards Russian civil society distinguishes itself within the EU by a variety of ambivalences and constraints deeply rooted in Polish history and culture. Russians mostly occupy in the historical memory of Polish society the position of main villains. Moreover, Russia, defined as Asian/Eastern/Oriental/Tatar-Mongol, barbaric and despotic, also became a key antithesis of Poland’s selfi image as western/European, civilised and democratic. Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine only strengthened the Polish self-identification built along this binary opposition. In effect, the perception of Russia as an autocracy inhabited by “slaves” who will always remain authoritarian/totalitarian and a priori unable to embrace democratic values, enjoys today a wide popularity in the Polish society and elites. These strong prejudices should not be reduced only to justify Polish historical grievances but also exemplify the Polish superiority complex towards Russia. On the other hand, there is a long and solid historical tradition of Polish cooperation with democratic Russian forces. It is rooted in the self-perception of Poland as a bridge towards the East which under the Polish historical motto “for our freedom and yours” “exports” liberty whilst also hiding patronising overtones (the Polish civilising mission). After the dissolution of the USSR, Poland’s institutional and financial support for the Russian civil society because of Russia’s key importance in the Polish foreign policy, was larger than in the case of most European countries. However, Poland provided the Belarusian, Georgian and Moldovan and Ukrainian civil societies with a radically more substantial aid than their Russian counterparts. The situation has not changed fundamentally since 2022 though attempts to increase Polish engagement with Russian civil society should be acknowledged. Poland has become a relatively important place of self-organisation of various groups of Russian exiles. In November 2022, Poland allowed certain groups of Russian opposition to launch the Congress of People’s Deputies, which gathers former Russian deputies of different levels. and The Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum founded by exiled separatists from Russia (including also Russian regionalists). However, after around three years both cases show that the Polish actors played an important role in their development but their interest gradually faded away. One of the key limitations of Polish engagement with the Russian civil society are suspicions concerning the Russian diaspora related to the war. Generally, Poland admits refugee status to Russian citizens very reluctantly in comparison to many EU member states. Finally, Poland remains the only EU member state that after 24th of February 2022 extradited Russian citizens back to Russia or arrested them on the basis of a warrant issued by Moscow.

Because a decisive change of current modus operandi between the Polish state institutions and the Russian civil society is highly unlikely, a special responsibility lies with the Polish third sector. It should increase its cooperation with other EU (including the Czech one) and Russian NGOs based on common fundamental democratic values within the framework of projects co-funded by the EU. They should invest in longer-term thinking and a common strategy for the EU 27, addressed towards Russian civil society. This strategy should particularly focus on the preparation of very detailed plans for Russia’s transformation into a liberal democracy based on rule of law, protection of human and minority rights and devolution of power to federal republics. Finally, the Polish third sector together with their EU and Russian partners should pressure Czech and Polish political elites (using a “bottom-up” approach), demanding the creation of more favourable legal and institutional conditions for the collaboration between them. A smarter and more flexible visa policy as well as a concrete set of financial tools and other instruments could help both Czech and Polish civil societies to intensify cooperation with relevant Russian partners constitutes one of the most urgent issues.

Adam Balcer is Program Director at the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław.

The Article is based on the policy paper titled EU-Russia Relations in the Area of People-to-People Ties: New Strategic Framework for Cooperation in the Future, available here. This text was created as part of a project called “Shaping the EU’s Future Policy on Russia in the Area of People-to-People Ties” supported by the Civil Society Forum and the European Union.

civil society, Polish-Russian relations, Russia