The disfigured spectrum: how post-communist legacies distort conservatism and democracy
Under one-party rule, political legitimacy does not come from adhering to constitutional limits but from exercising unchallenged authority in the name of the “correct” cause – once framed as ideological duty, now justified as cultural defence or popular sovereignty. The ingrained habit of bending institutions to political will, rather than letting them operate autonomously, was embedded in political culture over decades and passed on to the post-1989 elite, many of whom now lead ostensibly democratic states.
September 27, 2025 -
Adam Reichardt
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AnalysisIssue 5 2025Magazine
Viktor Orbán, who has been prime minister of Hungary since 2010, once boasted he was a very active member of the Communist Youth League. Given the ease with which old habits adapt to new rhetoric, how can we be surprised when the shadow of that past continues to shape the politics of the present?
Photo: LCV / Shutterstock
Across Europe – and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe – societies are searching for political clarity. Yet instead of clear choices, contradictions keep surfacing. More than 30 years since the fall of communism, the habits, networks and political instincts formed under one-party rule have not disappeared. Instead, they have adapted to new conditions. After 1989, few political elites were fully replaced. Many adopted the language of democracy while retaining communist-era reflexes: distrust of independent institutions, concentration of power, media control, and patronage to secure loyalty. Today’s Russia, as the inheritor of the Soviet Union, continues to promote this political culture, and in many parts of the region, it still finds a receptive environment.
What was once justified in the name of socialism is now defended through nationalism and “traditional values”. The result is a political spectrum where old left–right divisions are less relevant than a leader’s relationship to democratic norms. The blurring is especially visible on the right, where parties calling themselves “conservative” often reject the constitutional restraint that defines democratic conservatism in the West. Instead, they govern in ways that echo the authoritarianism of their communist past – an approach that aligns neatly with the governance model of Moscow today.
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