European support for Russian civil society as the key to a safer continent

Skyline of Moscow. Photo: Adam Baker / wikimedia.org

After more than three and a half years of Russia’s war against Ukraine, feelings of uncertainty and discord regarding future developments on the European continent have increasingly begun to emerge among European countries. This is due not only to Russia’s recently intensified aggression against Ukraine, but perhaps even more so to the ambiguous attitude of the United States under Donald Trump, who has, at least up until now, opted for a very cautious policy towards Putin’s regime, bordering on appeasement.

In contrast, the so-called “war-time approach,” established by European countries after 24 February 2022 and based on virtually permanent crisis management, has become fundamentally depleted and has not achieved the desired results. Among other things, it lacks any strategic direction or unifying principle that would consolidate the approach of the 27 EU member states and provide a basis for considering our future course, as well as help us determine what to expect from Russia in the coming years.

It is precisely these expectations that are beginning to diverge more and more among EU countries, ranging from extreme positions seeking to normalize relations with Putin’s regime, to establishing a more pragmatic relationship based on economic exchange, or continuing confrontation and efforts to contain and isolate Russia as much and as long as possible on an international scale. All of these positions can be found among the 27 member states, and reconciling them is becoming increasingly difficult over time.

That is why it is high time to reintroduce a strategic dimension to the European approach, and start thinking beyond the horizon of a few months or a few short years. To engender a true change in our attitude, it is necessary to consider what kind of neighbor we actually want Russia to be. The Ukrainians, who are heroically defending themselves against Putin’s aggression, emphasize that it is essential for Russia to become smaller – suggesting one possible scenario, namely the post-war breakup of the Russian Federation into smaller states or structures. However, regardless of how this process turns out, the most desired outcome would be to have a neighbor whose international politics are not motivated by revenge-seeking and imperialist aspirations, but by peaceful and, ideally, democratic (or at least pluralistic) thinking. Unfortunately, there is currently no indication of this, which has very concrete and immediate implications not only for neighboring Ukraine, but also for the security of the entire European continent.

Russia: the day after tomorrow

We therefore need to consider the possible ways we can bring about a change in Russian thinking, foreign policy, and security, which has recently been causing concern not only in neighboring Poland, but also in Romania and other nations united in the EU and NATO – alliances to which Putin’s regime is fundamentally opposed.

One (and perhaps the only) possibility is a fundamental and strategic reframing of relations between the EU and Russia, and a more consistent focus on issues and agendas that we can trust and build on. These stem from relations with Russian civil society – probably the only actor in Russia today that not only promotes the European agenda and values, but also (at least to a degree) prevents Putin’s regime from transforming the country and society into a fully authoritarian system.

Investing in these people and civil structures, whether they are still based in Russia or currently operating from abroad, is of strategic importance and may be key to restoring relations with a different Russia in the future. This will not happen overnight, but such structures have a real chance of influencing certain social processes in the future and, with the help of the West, perhaps further spreading their influence, both inside Russia and among the multi-million-strong Russian community across the EU.

If we were to turn the question around and ask who Europe’s allies in Russia currently are, the answer would essentially be the same. However, this reversed approach and uncertainty in our actions have so far demonstrated the limitations of our support for those allies, which has been further complicated by the end of US support for this agenda, brought about by Donald Trump’s arrival in office earlier this year.

For this reason, it is extremely important – and, from a European perspective, simply a good strategy – to support potential future elites, as well as moral leaders in today’s Russian and Russian-speaking world (often, unfortunately, still locked up in Russian prisons). It may help bolster European security and keep Putin’s regime as much in check as possible – despite the fact that representatives of Russian civil society themselves point out that their structures have not been and are not yet prepared to stop Putin’s rampage, and were not created for that purpose in the first place.

Nevertheless, they can certainly be useful not only in communicating within Russian society, but also in pointing out internal contradictions or violations of Western sanctions, bringing know-how from within Russia to the West, and helping Ukrainian prisoners of war and refugees, including children, who have been taken to Russia as a result of Russian aggression.

Czech and European potential for support

Like Poland, Czechia has had numerous, mostly negative experiences with Russia and its various historical incarnations. After decades and centuries under its rule or various forms of occupation and military presence, most of the population in both countries is at least wary of Russians. However, this should not automatically translate into an emotional Russophobia; instead, people should use their own personal experience to try to identify those members of Russian society who can be beneficial to Western societies by helping to mitigate the worst manifestations of Russian imperialism, systematically cultivated by Putin’s regime from an early age.

Without knowledge of the context, the conditions inside Russia, and its system of power, our effort will never amount to more than limited defensive measures; we will not be able to affect Russian society and state structures proactively and in sensitive areas. Ukrainians have already identified many of such issues in recent years. Nevertheless, it is worth building our own centers of knowledge and achieving a better understanding of local conditions, possibly with the help of part of the Russian elites, whom we might help to relocate to the EU.

However, this will definitely not be possible without a flexible and smart visa policy. It will also require establishing a basic infrastructure, centers of education, and developing them further. Russian actors also point to the need for security and the application of relevant knowledge in practical politics. These measures are absolutely essential, as is targeted financial support, which should at least partially make up for the funds lost due to the end of American involvement.

In recent years, Czechia has begun to utilize certain effective approaches that could be an interesting source of inspiration for a Europe-wide strategy and its practical measures. Through a flexible visa policy and the issuance of so-called humanitarian visas, it has been possible – often very quickly – to evacuate, or at least to provide psychological support to, that part of the Russian community who are still able to continue their work within Russia, but with the possibility of rapid departure. If the situation becomes unbearable for such groups and individuals – which will happen more and more often in the coming months and years – they should continue to receive such support even after leaving the country.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Civil Society Program, has managed to become such an intermediary, facilitating the transfer of people and resources out of Russia, despite minor criticism from the Czech non-profit sector. Unfortunately, other countries that do not have special access to human rights activists, independent media, or representatives of culture and academia can only dream of such a flexible approach – despite the fact that it was particularly the countries of the so-called southern wing of the EU that have been issuing visas to Russians on a large scale since February 2022.

In contrast, Poland is an example of a country where the prevalent social climate essentially supports greater efforts and initiatives in this particular area. However, if Czechia and Poland want to become leaders in this agenda, they will have to deliver concrete results and show leadership at the national level that can inspire other states and actors.

This is also a task that a future Czech administration will have to take up if it wants to aspire to such a position –despite the current efforts of some opposition groups to do the exact opposite, i.e., normalize relations with Putin’s regime and reject the “activist” and “ideological” stance of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has long been very active and determined in its approach.

Many issues at the Czech national level still remain unresolved; but perhaps this makes it all the more necessary to seek common European solutions and ways to thoroughly reset relations with Russia today, so as to prevent further fragmentation and strengthening the position of those who seek normalization – whose numbers are likely to grow rather than decline over time. We will see which camp the future Czech administration will join in this regard after October 4.

This text was created as part of a project called “Shaping the EU’s Future Policy on Russia in the Area of People-to-People Ties” supported by the Civil Society Forum and the European Union. The text is based on a policy paper available here.

Pavel Havlíček is a research fellow at the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in Prague. His research focuses on Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine and Russia, and the Eastern Partnership programme. He also deals with questions of strategic communication and disinformation, as well as democratization and civil society support.

civil society, Czech foreign policy, Russia