Europe’s hidden ally: Russian civil society at the frontline of democracy

Photo: Antonio Papisca Human Rights Center.

“We tried as much as we could not to distract you with our problems. But now we are in trouble — and this is our cry for help.” With these words, Meduza, one of the largest independent Russian-language media outlets with an audience of several million unique readers per month, addressed its readers on September 2nd of this year.

Meduza is an independent publication created by a team of Russian journalists in 2014. After the wave of protests in 2011–2012, the Kremlin recognized the influence of the internet on public sentiment and began to take digital space under control. Over the past 10 years, Meduza’s editorial team has twice changed its financing model. At first, it successfully developed as a business project, attracting advertising. In April 2021, Russian authorities added the outlet to the list of foreign agents. Today, that list includes more than 1,000 media outlets, organizations, and individuals. The status of “foreign agent” automatically makes its holder toxic for any contractual relationship. Individuals labeled as foreign agents are in practice unable to get jobs in Russia. Having lost most of its advertising contracts, Meduza successfully began attracting donations. After the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it became one of the leading anti-war media outlets. In January 2023, Russian authorities designated it an “undesirable organization.” That made donations to Meduza not only toxic but criminally dangerous. Financing an undesirable organization carries a prison term of up to five years. As a result, the donor model based on reader contributions was also destroyed.

In the first three years after the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian civil society received significant support from western donors. However, in January 2025, President Trump issued a series of decrees that ended grant support for civil society from USAID. In 2023, these expenses accounted for 3.2 per cent of USAID’s annual budget, or 2.28 billion US dollars. Of that, no more than 25 million dollars was spent on supporting Russian civil society. Altogether, according to JX Fund, independent Russian-language media received support of about 35 million dollars, with an audience of 10 to 20 million readers and viewers. For comparison: Russia spends up to $2 billion per year on propaganda and censorship. Alongside the elimination of USAID programs, many European government and private assistance programs have also been cut.

The situation of Russian-language opposition media has been the most thoroughly analyzed in recent years. But the condition of other sectors of independent civil society is about the same. Despite Kremlin pressure, Russians managed to build a professional and extensive network of media, human rights and environmental organizations, cultural and educational projects defending universal values of democracy and human rights. Victims of arbitrary repression by security services received legal support, journalists investigated corruption and abuses, thousands of eco-activists fought against the consequences of environmental disasters and occasionally succeeded in halting environmentally dangerous projects (for example, the landfill at Shiyes, Komi Republic).

After the start of the full-scale invasion, despite the emigration of some activists and the drastic increase in repression, Russian civil society quickly and effectively reorganized. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees received assistance, including help in reaching free parts of Ukraine and western countries. Hundreds of new political prisoners, as well as Ukrainian prisoners in Russian jails, received legal and humanitarian aid. Thousands of Russian men were able to evade mobilization and conscription thanks to information provided by human rights defenders, which was also disseminated by independent media.

Russian civil society does not have the strength to overthrow the regime. The experience of recent years has shown that non-violent civic movements cannot resist autocrats who readily use police violence and contract killings against their opponents. However, Russian civil society is effective enough to help thousands of victims of Kremlin policies and to cause the regime constant headaches. Despite public disagreements and even conflicts, it remains overall united. Activists inside the country and abroad work as a whole, maintaining effectiveness despite repression and many difficulties.

Today, however, Russian civil society is under pressure from two sides: the Russian authorities subject activists to criminal repression and invent new ways to obstruct the work of journalists, human rights defenders, and activists, while support in the West is declining. Money is not the sole measure of support, but it can serve as a good barometer. Among other problems are issues with issuing visas for activists — visas serve as insurance allowing them to leave the country immediately in case of imminent danger — as well as difficulties with legalization for forced emigrants, and smaller problems such as sudden blocking of bank accounts simply on the basis of Russian citizenship.

A just end to the war would mean Ukraine returning to its internationally recognized borders and Russia compensating the damage inflicted on that country. This would de facto mean the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s regime and its almost inevitable collapse. However, reality leaves less and less hope for such an outcome. Still, the war will not last forever. Whatever the outcome of Russia’s military confrontation with Ukraine, my country will remain a threat and a factor of destabilization for Europe. European politicians who hope to build peaceful relations with the current Russian regime are deeply mistaken. Putin has turned confrontation with the West into an existential task for his regime and has made Russian society hostage to this struggle. Only a strong and united Europe capable of resisting Putin’s Russia can protect against its expansion. Russian civil society, which defends pan-European values enshrined, among other documents and charters, in the Helsinki Accords, is a natural ally of the free peoples of Europe. Support for Russian civil society must become part of Europe’s security strategy.

There is an impression that European political elites view support for Russian civil society as proportional to the development of relations with Russia. If the EU seeks to distance itself economically from Russia, then support programs are also to be reduced. This is a false idea. Support for Russian civil society must be moved from the “Cooperation” section to the “Security” section.

This applies not only to the situation in Russia, but also within the EU. Anti-war activists represent only a small part of EU residents of Russian origin. Millions of people have arrived in the EU countries over the past 30 years. Unlike many other ethnic groups, they do not constitute a cohesive diaspora with their own structures. At the same time, for many years, EU governments ignored the fact that the only actor conducting relatively large-scale, systematic work with Russians was the Russian state, spreading its propaganda narratives among them. As a result, pro-Putin sentiment among the broad mass of Russians in Europe is more visible than anti-war sentiment. Today, the attitudes of Russians in the EU are no longer a matter of democratic socialization of migrants from Russia but a matter of security.

Reducing support for Russian pro-democracy activists will not provoke a symmetrical response from the Kremlin. On the contrary, it will be taken as a signal of weakness, and attempts to manipulate European public opinion and exert other political influence will only intensify. A strong and visible Russian civil society in Europe will be a barrier against potential appeasers of the Kremlin.

Today in Europe, Russian civil society needs recognition, cooperation, and integration. Russian democratic NGOs, media, and initiatives (regardless of their place of legal registration) must be recognized as genuine representatives of Russians’ interests. EU institutions should welcome and support cooperation between Russian NGOs, media, and initiatives and European like-minded organizations. They should be eligible for grant programs on par with NGOs from the South Caucasus, Moldova, etc. Finally, EU institutions should facilitate the professional integration of democratic activists and scholars from Russia in Europe. Confrontation with Putin’s Russia requires expanding and improving country expertise. Requalifying journalists as bartenders, scholars as taxi drivers, and human rights defenders as construction workers will weaken not only Russian civil society but also Europe itself.

Europe needs a full-fledged strategy to support Russian civil society as part of its overall strategy of security and containment of Russian expansion. A durable and just peace on the European continent is possible only if Russia democratizes. And while today the possibility of political transformation in Russia is not visible, achieving it is impossible not only without an effective policy of containment but also without supporting Russian democratic civil society both in Russia itself and within the EU.

This text was created as part of a project called “Shaping the EU’s Future Policy on Russia in the Area of People-to-People Ties”, supported by the Civil Society Forum and the European Union.

civil society, media freedom, Russia, Russian media