Russian drones in Poland, will NATO pass the test?

Photo: ivkovmark / Shutterstock

The penetration of Russian drones into Polish airspace is a deliberate act by the Russian Federation, not an accident. The only way to deter repeated provocations is through a united and decisive NATO response, one that avoids any appearance of weakness and denies the Russian military further incentive to act. Once again, Russia is sending a clear signal: the Kremlin is disregarding the Trump Administration’s efforts to establish peace and is demonstrating readiness not only to continue terrorizing civilian targets in Ukraine, but also to widen the scope of hostilities.

Why the air attack is intentional, not an accident?

In the past summer, the Ukrainian side discovered Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards among the components of downed Russian drones. This most likely indicates that Russian operators were preparing to penetrate the airspace of NATO countries, since the SIM cards of local mobile operators would allow them to connect to mobile networks and perform certain tasks.

First, to conduct reconnaissance work. The Russians are equipping drones with 4G modems and other equipment, which allows them to transmit information about the location of air defence systems, the operation of defence and electronic warfare systems, capture visual data, etc.

Second, to test the organization of airspace security of the countries on NATO’s Eastern Flank, identify its weaknesses and capabilities, the principles of interaction during patrols by the units of various Alliance countries, determine the potential reactions of governments, etc.

Third, to provoke political destabilization. The Russians are demonstrating their readiness for a new form of escalation in order to undermine political stability within the European Union and NATO. The key goal is to provide another reason to supporters of the idea of ​​Russian concessions to discuss the need to end the war on the Kremlin’s terms, the expediency of stopping aid to Ukraine in order to prevent a direct NATO-Russia conflict, etc.

If previous isolated drone incursions were meant to appear as coincidence, then the appearance of more than 20 drones in Polish airspace is difficult to justify as a “deviation from the course”. Especially, against the background of numerous motivations and goals of the Russian side.

What’s more, it is worth understanding that the drones sent to Poland were probably not intended to strike infrastructure facilities or other targets. Most likely, they did not even have a full-fledged explosive component; thus, formally NATO representatives can interpret the provocation not as an attack or a threat to territorial integrity.

The purpose of such a provocation is to rather conduct reconnaissance activities, to test NATO’s air defence systems, and prepare for the moment when the Russian military-political command decides to take more dangerous steps, including an operation to establish control over the Suwałki Corridor or intervention in other potential areas of the Baltic region.

Did Poland manage to cope with the provocation?

The Polish Armed Forces, in partnership with the Netherlands, Italy and Germany, took the necessary measures at the time of the provocation. Some of the drones were destroyed, which was an unprecedented step for NATO. Poland reasonably initiated consultations under NATO Article 4 in order not to leave the night attack without further attention.

However, the real effectiveness of the response depends on the adoption of further technical and political measures. It should be noted that the joint NATO aviation did not manage to hit all air targets. It is still difficult to calculate the exact percentage, but there were definitely drones which managed to cross a significant distance deep into Polish territory or fell on their own after running out of fuel. At the same time, a significant resource of aviation equipment was involved –four F-35 and F-16 fighter jets, three Mi-24, Mi-17 and Black Hawk helicopters were used to down drones.  Considering that the equipment was in active use all night (even the aircraft were refuelled), the whole operation looks quite expensive.

Of course, it is worth paying tribute to the professionalism of the pilots, but there are two nuances that should be taken into account to ensure even greater efficiency of further defensive operations. First, Russian drones are cheap to produce. The costs of shooting them down using air resources will significantly exceed the cost of sending them into the airspace of NATO countries. The Russians can simply continue to direct the drones in different directions, provoking a corresponding reaction from Poland and other allies in the Alliance. Moreover, Russia anly needs to deploy 50, or maybe even 100, units of cheap equipment in subsequent provocations, and the task of eliminating them in this manner would be severely complicated.

This is why Ukraine is actively seeking alternative, cost-effective ways to strengthen its air defence systems, enabling it to strike multiple targets at lower cost. A key part of this strategy involves improving electronic warfare capabilities, expanding the production of interceptor drones, and more. In this context, Poland and other NATO countries bordering Russia have strong potential for cooperation with Ukraine: the combat experience of Ukrainian soldiers and their knowledge of advanced technologies, combined with European funding and support, could create an effective air defence shield.

As for political measures, Poland reacted within the limits of what is possible and made a pass to NATO. The Alliance can no longer show weakness, since provocations will certainly continue. Among the potential actions of the Alliance that would make sense are the expansion of the military presence on the borders with the Russian Federation and Belarus, an increase in the number of aircraft patrolling the airspace over Poland, the Baltic countries, and Scandinavia.

At the same time, one key thing that can strengthen NATO’s position is to begin real consultations on the possibility of creating a specialized zone in the regions of western Ukraine (at least 150-200 kilometres long), where all air targets that appear to be on their way to NATO airspace could be shot down over Ukraine, before they penetrate Poland or Romania. Of course, such a decision requires consensus and political will, but it would clearly fix the rules of the game and set real “red lines”. The Russian side is no longer afraid to cross the previous lines set.

Will Russia resort to further provocations?

NATO has the opportunity to demonstrate its own strength without a direct military clash with Russia if it takes decisive steps after this provocation. Otherwise, new attempts by the Russian side to penetrate the Alliance’s airspace will be even more large-scale and provocative. At the very least, Russia now stands to benefit by systematically wearing down Europe’s air defence systems.

The Russian-Ukrainian war is developing along a trajectory to the point where thousands of drones will be in the air at one time. Another attack of Lviv or Volhynia regions will be an “excellent opportunity” to launch several dozen more air targets into Poland or the Baltics. In this way Russia can begin to exhaust NATO even without a war.

The more that European countries use expensive resources to counter new provocations, the less they will be able to help Ukraine, and will lose financially themselves. It is likely that this, too, is one of the Russian command’s simple calculations. Therefore, to reliably protect its own borders, Europe needs to develop a comprehensive air defence system, which includes both expensive fighters and installations, as well as cheaper means designed to continuously counter the next time a swarm of drones tries to suddenly penetrate their space.

The relevant technologies are already being tested by the Russians and this must be taken into account when planning military spending for the defence of European countries and when planning at the NATO level. Of course, countering the Russian threat should be comprehensive: it should include not only shooting down their drones or missiles, but also increasing sanctions pressure, where Poland is leading the calls for such action.

Traditionally, the nuclear deterrence security system is built on ensuring that nuclear countries do not enter into direct conflict and that nuclear weapons are not used. That is why the US and other NATO countries rightly explain their reluctance to provoke a direct military conflict with Russia. However, it seems that the Kremlin has found a different interpretation of “nuclear deterrence”: Russia is testing NATO’s strength with conventional methods, neutralizing the significant advantage of the Alliance countries in conventional means with threats to use nuclear weapons in case of their conventional response to Russian provocations.

Such a Russian approach could lead to hostilities extending far beyond the borders of Ukraine, given the Kremlin’s plans to redistribute spheres of influence in Europe. It needs an effective response that will not provoke a real military confrontation between NATO and Russia, but will form clear “red lines” that will prevent the Kremlin’s further desire to test the Alliance. The Polish side has confirmed for itself: the Russian war is not only against Ukraine, it threatens everybody.

The key thing that can be done in these conditions is to fully ensure own defence capabilities and strengthen Ukraine’s military potential both within the framework of coordination of air defence systems and through investments in joint military-industrial activities supporting the Ukrainian army.

Interestingly, now when Viktor Orbán is blocking military aid packages from the EU budget and sabotaging joint decisions, he is putting not only Ukraine, but also his own NATO allies under attack, as Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski reminded him quite clearly via social networks.

NATO and the EU need further unity and support Ukraine as a defence outpost on the eastern flank, and not be afraid to show subjectivity, forcing Russia to make peace. Only then will new provocations be avoided.

Anton Naychuk is the director of the East European Council, a think tank and public diplomacy club established to research and discuss current political, economic and social processes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

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drones, NATO, Poland, Russia, Russia's war against Ukraine, War