Is the Russian opposition even relevant?

A march in memory of Boris Nemtsov on February 29th, 2020 in Moscow. The banner reads: "My Russia is sitting in prison". Photo: Edward Nemtcov / Shutterstock

The question of how much influence the Russian opposition currently living abroad actually has or potentially can have on Russian society is worth asking since the opposition inside Russia has been completely suppressed.

The Russian opposition last came into the spotlight on June 5th this year, when Yulia Navalnaya, Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza took part in a joint session of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights, focused on relations with Russia’s exiled opposition. They condemned Vladimir Putin’s regime and its war, and emphasised the importance of support from western democracies for the Russian opposition.

In their addresses to MEPs, the opposition figures were quick to stress that the blame for Russia’s tragedies lies with one man alone – Putin, who has usurped power for the past 25 years. Predicting Russia’s future, Navalnaya drew a parallel with events in Central and Eastern Europe 35 years ago, when previously silent and non-protesting citizens flooded the streets, paving the way for democratic change. Kara-Murza reminded the audience that Russia has, more than once, seen seemingly permanent regimes collapse suddenly and unexpectedly. That is how tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union fell, and the same, he argued, awaits Putin’s regime.

After the Russian opposition speakers concluded, the floor was given to MEPs, who shared their thoughts and emotions and asked questions. At the end of the session, the opposition representatives were allowed to briefly respond.

All attending MEPs – with the exception of Polish member Grzegorz Braun – welcomed the meeting, praised the activists who are fighting against the regime and suffering for it, and expressed a strong belief that ties with the exiled Russian opposition must be deepened.

However, the event did not only evoke positive reactions. It reignited the long-standing debate over whether “good Russians” exist – that is, Russians fully liberated from imperial thinking – and if they do, whether they are worth supporting, whether these opposition figures have any influence or base within Russia, and whether they can realistically play a role in Russia’s political future.

Some of the controversy stemmed from the fact that the meeting was perhaps overly elevated in importance, while its format did not allow for a full picture of the opposition’s views to emerge. Given the sensitivity of the issue, even reporting by reputable outlets such as DW appeared somewhat awkward – for example, stating that the opposition figures failed to answer crucial questions posed by MEPs, such as who Crimea belongs to and how the Russian opposition intends to earn Kyiv’s trust.

This interpretation was quickly seized upon by many as a summary of both the meeting and the opposition’s views. In reality, the format of the session simply did not allow each guest to respond to every question – nor was it intended as a test or an examination.

All three opposition figures unequivocally condemn Russian aggression; they organised two anti-war events in Berlin, and their stance on the war is well known. On the issue of Crimea, both Kara-Murza and Yashin have repeatedly and firmly stated that Crimea must belong to Ukraine. Navalnaya, however, did not mention Ukraine in her speech to the European Parliament, and it appears she has not publicly clarified her stance on the status of Crimea.

As is well known, Alexei Navalny himself made various statements about Crimea during his lifetime. Navalnaya, who sees herself as a leader of the opposition and dreams of a political career – including a possible run in future presidential elections – likely understands that saying the words “Crimea belongs to Ukraine” would mean giving up any hope of playing a significant political role in Russia. This suggests that she may not truly believe that Russian society is ready for democratic change or prepared to choose a political path aligned with the West.

There is no doubt that the three Russian opposition leaders deserve respect and recognition for their courage, unwavering stance against the Russian regime, genuine sacrifice, and the suffering they have endured. Still, the context of the European Parliament meeting is so dramatic that it is hard to imagine words from any opposition figure that would feel truly adequate.

Russia continues to launch relentless missile and drone attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine. Thousands of Ukrainians have died in the war, millions have had their lives devastated and turned into a living hell. Around 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory remains occupied, cities lie in ruins, and critical infrastructure has been destroyed.

On the other hand, Ukraine reports that more than one million Russian soldiers have been killed or injured since the start of the war. Hundreds of thousands of troops are taking part in the conflict on Russia’s side, all of them doing so voluntarily, having signed contracts and receiving payment. These soldiers are considered heroes in Russia – not only by state-controlled media but by a much wider segment of society.

In the early years of the war, Russian society appeared disoriented, experiencing cognitive dissonance. But eventually, it bowed loyally to the regime and reconciled itself with the country’s supposedly inevitable fate, steeped in belligerent messianism, as proclaimed relentlessly by the state propaganda machine.

The entire country is gripped by a wave of chauvinistic frenzy. Every day brings new militaristic initiatives, new propaganda-laden educational programmes in schools and universities, and ongoing efforts to rewrite history. Myths are being forged about the “decadent” West and the boundless Russian soul, while the country’s economy is being shifted onto a war footing. Society has accepted the notion that Russia must wage war and achieve victory at any cost – even if the entire world perishes in a nuclear confrontation.

President Putin’s latest initiative, Time of Heroes, aims to place individuals with blood on their hands from the war into key positions of power. There are approximately 100,000 journalists in Russia, yet only a handful have refused to serve the regime. What are the views of Russian academics and university lecturers? Where is the voice of the so-called creative intelligentsia – especially if it truly sees itself as the custodian of “great Russian culture”?

In truth, that voice is being heard—and it supports militarism, chauvinism and Putinism. There is little point in mentioning the Russian Orthodox Church, which has become a loyal servant of the regime and one of the most vocal instigators of war and hatred. It is hard to disagree with French philosopher Michel Eltchaninoff, who describes the phenomenon of collective Putinism – not merely a one-man regime but a finely tuned system that spans multiple layers of power.

One must also consider another uncomfortable truth. Yes, Putin’s regime has activated a powerful propaganda machine. Yes, it has employed pressure and coercion. But it must also be acknowledged that, on the other hand, chauvinistic ideas have found genuine resonance within Russian society. The stench of Russian chauvinism lingered throughout the Soviet era – it was, in fact, the true adhesive holding the Soviet empire together.

Paradoxically, this has become particularly evident in recent years. While nostalgia for the Soviet Union is on the rise in Russia, it is not the once-celebrated communist ideology that people recall – a system that supposedly rested on ideals of international fraternity and equality. No – the communist ideology has evaporated without a trace. The Soviet Union is now remembered purely as a symbol of Russian greatness.

Russian opposition figures speak of brave individuals within Russia who dare to challenge the regime. But the reality is that such genuine heroes are few and far between, dwarfed by the sheer mass of people who embrace aggressive, imperialist thinking. This is plainly visible in the ratings of Russian propaganda channels and the toxic flood of hatred that ordinary users freely post every day on social media.

It is also worth noting that, unlike in Soviet times, Russians today – if they so choose – have access to comprehensive, objective information. Before the war, close ties between Russia and Ukraine meant that Russians were well acquainted with the situation in Ukraine. They knew full well that there were no Nazis there and that there was no justification for war, aggression, hatred or the atrocities now being inflicted on Ukraine by their own country.

Opposition leaders have urged the world not to forget Russia’s political prisoners – those jailed for expressing opposition to the war. But how should this appeal be weighed against the vastly greater suffering and death experienced by Ukrainians? How should one interpret Vladimir Kara-Murza’s plea not to blame all Russian citizens for the war or to “discriminate” against them solely on the basis of their nationality?

Lifting sanctions on Russian citizens would amount to recognising this war as being purely the responsibility of Putin and his inner circle, rather than Russia as a whole. But is that assessment correct? Should Russian citizens really be allowed to live undisturbed, ordinary lives while their country wages a brutal and unjustified war?

Most strikingly, not one opposition leader is calling for Russia to be defeated in the war it started. At best, they speak about restoring Ukrainian sovereignty within its 1992 borders. But is that really enough? As Ilya Yashin puts it, Russian soldiers who are repelled in Ukraine and return home defeated will supposedly have learned a hard lesson that will curb militarism, overthrow the regime and trigger democratic transformation. But can this really be considered a sufficient reckoning?

It must be admitted: there are far more questions than answers. Analysts and responsible politicians typically try to predict the future and shape political developments where possible. That logic can be applied to Russia as well – but the trouble is that both forecasting and influencing the course of events are exceptionally difficult in this case. There is no point in talking to the official representatives of the Russian government, and it is nearly impossible to either reach Russian society or obtain reliable information about it.

In this situation, the only meaningful and reasonable course of action is to expect the worst, prepare for all scenarios, arm oneself and reinforce defences to the maximum. Still, the desire to keep Russia in view, to gather more information about it and to initiate constructive efforts is entirely understandable. Those concerned about the future of Europe and Russia’s fate are turning to the only viable point of contact at present: the opposition in exile.

Yet, when one hears the enthusiastic assessments of European Parliament members and their pledges of cooperation and support during meetings with Russian opposition figures, one must ask: is the future being mistaken for the present?

A difficult and painful question arises – can one realistically expect that a significant critical mass of people will emerge in Russian society who hold views that transcend its prevailing tendencies? Tendencies with roots going back not just decades, but perhaps centuries?

The meeting at the European Parliament has once again highlighted the many questions hanging in the air – questions for which no easy answers exist.

Whom do these opposition figures represent? Can opposition leaders living abroad truly influence Russia’s future course? Do they even know what the current reality is in Russia? Do they accurately assess the prevailing public attitudes? Ultimately, are they truly advocates of western values and democracy – or are they, too, infected with the same chauvinism that dominates much of Russian society?

This article was republished through the partnership between New Eastern Europe and LRT English.

Saulius Spurga is an Associate Professor at Mykolas Romeris University located in Vilnius, Kaunas, Marijampolė, Lithuania.

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Russia, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian opposition, Russian politics